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Abstract
In a wireless application with multiple communication links, the data rate of each
link is subject to degradation due to transmitting interference from other links. A
competitive wireless game then arises as each link acts as a player maximizing its
own data rate. The game outcome can be evaluated using the solution concept of
game equilibria. However, when significant interference among the links arises,
uniqueness of equilibrium is not guaranteed. To select among multiple equilibria,
the sum of network rate or social welfare is used as the selection criterion. This
thesis aims to offer the theoretical foundation and the computational tool for de-
termining approximate correlated equilibria with global maximum expected social
welfare in polynomial games. Using sum of utilities as the global objective, we
give two theoretical and two wireless-specific contributions.
1. We give a problem formulation for computing near-exact ε-correlated equi-
libria with highest possible expected social welfare. We then give a sequen-
tial Semidefinite Programming (SDP) algorithm that computes the solution.
The solution consists of bounds information on the social welfare.
2. We give a novel reformulation to arrive at a leaner problem for computing
near-exact ε-correlated equilibria using Kantorovich polynomials with spar-
sity.
3. Forgoing near-exactness, we consider approximate correlated equilibria. To
account for the loss in precision, we introduce the notion of regret. We give
theoretical bounds on the regrets at any iteration of the sequential SDP al-
gorithm. Moreover, we give a heuristic procedure for extracting a discrete
probability distribution. Subject to players’ acceptance of the regrets, the
computed distributions can be used to implement central arbitrators to facil-
itate real-life implementation of the correlated equilibrium concept.
4. We demonstrate how to compute Pareto-optimal solutions by dropping the
correlated equilibria constraints. For demonstration purpose, we focus only
on Pareto-optima with equal weights among the players.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Problem Background
1.1.1. Game Equilibrium May Not Be Unique
In a non-cooperative game, one can verify existence of a pure Nash equilibrium [1]
by examining the players’ utility functions [2], [3], [4], [5]. For example one can
check for quasi-concavity of the players’ utility functions that ensures existence of
at least one pure Nash equilibrium in continuous games1 [5]. If existence cannot
be ascertained, then one may introduce modifications to obtain a supermodular [6]
or a potential game [7] to ensure game equilibrium exists. There is a large body
of work in wireless communication focusing on decentralized algorithms such as
distributed “water-filling” [8], [9], [10] that computes arbitrary pure Nash equilib-
ria strategies for diverse problem domains such as power control in multichannel
networks [8] and Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output (MIMO) systems [11]. The ad-
vantage of such distributed algorithms lies in their low complexity cost that enables
them to scale to larger size networks.
However the phenomenon concerning non-uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in wire-
less games poses a challenge to the decentralized approach. A distributed algo-
rithm in the presence of multiple Nash equilibria produces merely an arbitrary pure
Nash equilibrium strategy. From the perspective of the whole network, the sum of
all utilities or social welfare may be suboptimal. One way to mitigate this prob-
lem is to check for uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. However uniqueness of pure
Nash equilibrium demands more stringent criteria from the game formulation. For
example in general concave games, the utility functions need to observe the diag-
onally strict concavity property [12]. Another criterion for distributed algorithms
in wireless communication requires utility functions to satisfy a prerequisite level
of concaveness [8]. Since in general, it is unlikely that a given game readily satis-
fies the requirements for equilibrium uniqueness, multiple equilibria is a recurrent
1In a continuous game players have continuous utility functions over infinite compact action sets.
12
issue. For instance in wireless communication, multiple pure Nash equilibria may
arise when significant interference is present in the system [9], [11], [10]. There-
fore, we choose the problem domain of wireless communication to demonstrate
our optimization framework developed in this thesis because the non-uniqueness
of the Nash equilibrium is a recurrent issue in the wireless communication context.
1.1.2. Players May Not Play To Nash Equilibria
Epistemic game theory with roots in [13] is the foundational study of game the-
ory starting from the most basic elements consisting of rationality [14], belief [15]
and knowledge2 [16] of the players. One can predict game behaviour by analyz-
ing rational behaviour induced by the players’ beliefs and knowledge about the
game. The result from an epistemic analysis is a set of rational strategy profiles
that the players find reasonable to adopt from. Since all rational strategy profiles
are equally likely game outcomes, an arbitrary profile adopted by the players may
not constitute a Nash equilibrium even if the equilibrium is unique [17], [18], [19],
[20], [5]. Furthermore in a two-player game, Aumann and Brandenburger in [21]
require the players to have pre-game mutual knowledge3 of each other’s selected
strategy as a sufficient condition to guarantee players conform to a Nash equilib-
rium.
1.1.3. Pareto-Optimal Solutions Are Difficult To Compute For
General Non-Linear Problems
In the context of wireless communication, determining the global maximum sum
of utilities [22] for wireless systems such as Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output sys-
tems (MIMO) [11], [23] is a challenging problem since the objective function and
the constraints are nonlinear and non-convex.
2Knowledge refers to irrefutable information, unlike a belief that forms a conjectured forecast.
3Unfortunately in a non-cooperative game, it is not the usual case that a player has advanced knowl-
edge of his opponents’ actual selected strategies.
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1.2. Solution Approaches
1.2.1. Using Social Welfare As A Selection Criterion And Computing
Correlated Equilibria With Highest Expected Social Welfare
To select among multiple equilibria, we use the social welfare [24] or sum of utili-
ties as the selection criterion [25], [26], [27]. However in the presence of multiple
equilibria, an arbitrary Nash equilibrium may still lead to suboptimal welfare. The
correlated equilibrium is an alternative game solution concept by Aumann [28],
[20]. Notably the set of correlated equilibria contains all Nash equilibria as special
cases [29], [30], [31]. Thus a correlated equilibrium with the highest possible ex-
pected social welfare offers welfare that is at least as good as the best performing
Nash equilibrium of the game. However an arbitrary correlated equilibrium can
also possibly do worse than a given Nash equilibrium. This has led us to consider
global optimization to compute a correlated equilibrium with the highest possible
expected social welfare.
Other than wireless communication, computing correlated equilibria strategies
maximizing a domain-specific objective have several useful applications such as
determining Pareto-improving strategies for governmental policy management (e.g.
to set up guiding laws overseeing domestic/foreign relations) [32], transnational
public goods allocations (e.g. to establish international protocols for preservation
of ozone-shield) [33] and legal adjudication (e.g. to resolve commercial disputes
through arbitration) [34, 35].
1.2.2. Players Always Play To Correlated Equilibria As A
Consequence of Bayesian Rationality
With reference to developments in epistemic game theory [18], [19], [28], [20],
[21], we first consider Bayesian rationality [13], [18], [19], [20], [36] that leads
players to rational strategy profiles constituting correlated equilibria [28], [20],
[37].
1.2.3. Exploitation Of Global Polynomial Optimization Technique In
Computing Pareto-Optimal Solutions
By reformulating the problem of computing Pareto-optimal solutions as a classi-
cal global polynomial optimization problem [38] with polynomial constraints and
a rational polynomial objective function [39], we get to compute Pareto-optimal
14
solutions by varying the weights in the sum of utilities or social welfare objective
function.
1.3. Research Agenda Of Thesis
The aim of this thesis is to produce a theoretical foundation and the accompanying
methodology and tool for computing correlated equilibria in polynomial games.
We aim to demonstrate the tool specifically in the wireless communication prob-
lem domain because the non-uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is a recurrent
issue in the wireless communication context. We emphasize that our optimization
framework handles general polynomial objectives and constraints with respect to
an infinite compact feasible set. By focusing on the social welfare of the players
as the objective function, we get to quantify and compare the performances of cor-
related equilibria with that of Nash equilibria. The research agenda is listed in the
following objectives.
1. To give the problem formulation for computing a correlated equilibrium with
the highest possible expected social welfare given a polynomial game. Al-
though we focus on games with polynomial utility functions, useful approx-
imations can still be derived since polynomials with finite degrees can ap-
proximate continuous functions reasonably well within a compact set [40].
2. To produce a computational tool that solves the problem formulation in (1) to
determine correlated equilibria with global-optimal expected social welfare
of a polynomial game.
3. To apply the formulation and algorithm from (1)-(2) on wireless communi-
cation problems. We seek a heuristic procedure to derive from the output of
(1)-(2) a solution representation suitable for the real-life implementation of
the correlated equilibrium concept.
4. To compute the social welfare of a Pareto-optimal solution, which is unre-
strained by any game equilibrium constraint.
1.4. Achievements Of Thesis
1. We give an infinite-dimensional formulation for computing correlated equi-
libria with global optimal social welfare in polynomial games with multi-
15
variate strategy sets that are real basic semialgebraic and compact. We then
relax the infinite-dimensional formulation into finite-dimensional moment
optimization problems with sum-of-squares constraints expressible as lin-
ear Semidefinite Programming Problems (SDP). In the asymptotic case, we
prove that solving a sequence of such moment relaxations leads to solutions
that converge to a near-exact ε-correlated equilibrium with global-optimal
expected social welfare. Since each relaxation is solvable as an SDP, we
describe a dedicated sequential SDP algorithm for this purpose.
2. Our contribution (1) above however relies on sum-of-squares constraints that
grow to become large size SDP problems as the algorithm converges to the
near-exact correlated equilibrium with global-optimal social welfare. Since
standard solvers may not be able to handle such SDP problems effectively,
we introduce a novel problem reformulation using Kantorovich polynomi-
als. Interestingly, the resulting reformulation exhibits attractive correlative
sparsity pattern, meaning the size of each sum-of-squares constraint can be
significantly reduced thereby resulting in smaller-sized moment relaxations
that are more manageable by standard SDP solvers. We also demonstrate the
above two theoretical contributions in a two-player polynomial game and in
a wireless system consisting of two mutually interfering links.
3. If certain conditions concerning the moments are satisfied, we demonstrate
the computation of probability distributions that represent approximate cor-
related equilibria in power control games. We quantify the loss in precision
due to the approximation using the notion of regret. Assuming the regrets
are within tolerance, the computed distributions facilitate construction of
central arbitrator nodes that are crucial to the real-life implementation of the
correlated equilibrium concept in power control games.
4. In the above contributions (1)-(3), we consider only game equilibria solu-
tions with global optimal social welfare. By forgoing the equilibria con-
ditions associated with the distributed character of a wireless system, we
may still make further gains in social welfare by computing Pareto-optimal
solutions. We demonstrate this by disabling the equilibria constraints and
expressing the global maximization of the sum of non-concave utilities for
a Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output (MIMO) interference system as a global
optimization problem with a rational function objective. We then solve for
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the global maximizing solutions using the moment approach.
5. For all problem formulations discussed in the above contributions, we derive
moment relaxations that are directly expressible as tractable polynomial-
time solvable linear SDP problems. Therefore, the developed optimization
framework of this thesis requires only polynomial-time to obtain bounds in-
formation on the expected social welfare achievable by the correlated equi-
libria of a given game that has polynomial utilities and constraints.
1.5. Limitations Of Thesis
For the following limitations, we identify new opportunities for further research to
be discussed in subsection 7.2 under future work.
• The developed framework does not handle uncertainty in the game model.
For example, it is assumed the parameter values making up the utility func-
tions are held constant. However there are situations where model param-
eters fluctuate due to a volatile environment. For example, wireless chan-
nel gain values fluctuate due to background noise in a wireless system, and
consumer demands exhibit volatility due to dynamic consumer behavioural
patterns in a competitive pricing market. Such uncertainties can potentially
render the solution computed by the framework ineffective. Therefore, the
current framework optimizes only a captured instantaneous snapshot of the
given system.
• The main goal of the developed framework is to compute the global op-
timal expected social welfare values achievable by the correlated equilib-
ria of a static non-cooperative game that has polynomial utilities and con-
straints. The developed framework is essentially a centralized approach,
which does not scale well for larger size networks. However, we point out
to the reader the following complementary features of our centralized opti-
mization framework with respect to the distributed approach.
– Since the global optimization method in this thesis is a centralized ap-
proach that solves for the global-best equilibrium, it can be used to
evaluate the equilibrium performance of a distributed algorithm. Al-
though a distributed algorithm is more flexible and scalable, we do
not know how optimal the equilibrium is as far as a global objective
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is concerned (e.g. social welfare). Without knowing the global best
performance of equilibria pertaining to a wireless game, it becomes a
challenge for the network designer using the distributed approach to
assess his own arbitrary equilibrium performance against the global
best. If the designer wishes to check the optimality characteristics of
game equilibria against a global objective, the designer can use our
algorithm for such purpose.
– Since the optimization framework requires full access to all decision
variables of the wireless nodes, the developed framework is applicable
primarily in the centralized setting. This is unlike the distributed set-
ting where the goal of the network is to settle quickly to an arbitrary
Nash equilibrium, which may be suboptimal in terms of the social wel-
fare. The distributed algorithm capable of steering link nodes towards
an arbitrary correlated equilibrium is the learning algorithm by Hart
and Mas-Colell in [41] that is demonstrated in cognitive radio applica-
tions [42], [43], [44], sensor network operation [45] and power alloca-
tion in MIMO systems [46]. Unfortunately, the learning algorithm in
[41] handles only discrete action sets (i.e. pure strategies). Although
Stoltz and Lugosi in a separate effort [30] generalize the learning al-
gorithm in [41] to handle games with infinite compact action sets, no
practical and scalable algorithm based on [30] has been demonstrated
in the open literature at the time of writing this thesis. Moreover, the
learning algorithm in [30] determines only an arbitrary correlated equi-
librium without looking at achieving the global optimum of some ob-
jective function (e.g. social welfare). Therefore, developing a practical
and scalable distributed algorithm that computes correlated equilibria
with global optimal expected social welfare for games with infinite
compact action sets remains an open research problem. The focus of
this thesis is on games with polynomial utilities and infinite compact
action sets defined by polynomial constraints. The developed frame-
work in this thesis computes approximate correlated equilibria with
global optimal expected social welfare that serve as benchmark val-
ues to assess the quality of arbitrary correlated equilibria learnt by the
distributed algorithms. The developed framework thus takes a step to-
wards addressing the open problem of computing correlated equilibria
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with global optimal expected social welfare that is left unanswered by
the distributed approach, which is more suited to determining local
optimal rather than global optimal game equilibria.
– We can use either a distributed algorithm or our centralized optimiza-
tion framework to compute an arbitrary equilibrium. However by solv-
ing a tractable polynomial-time solvable moment relaxation problem,
our global optimization method returns performance bounds of all equi-
libria of a game that has polynomial utilities and constraints. Thus our
centralized global optimization method serves as a complementary tool
to the distributed approach.
1.6. Organization Of Thesis
In Chapter 2, we describe the basic concepts behind game equilibria, polynomial
positivity, the moment approach and semidefinite programming. In Chapter 3,
we explain how to compute a near-exact ε-correlated equilibrium with the highest
possible (i.e. global maximum) expected social welfare. In Chapter 4, we give
a novel problem reformulation using Kantorovich polynomials with sparsity. In
Chapter 5, we describe how to compute approximate correlated equilibria with
regrets. We then describe in Chapter 6 how to compute Pareto-optimal solutions.
Finally in Chapter 7, we evaluate our results, give our conclusions and recommend
future work.
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1.8. Assumptions, Terminology and Notations
We emphasize to the reader that the optimization framework developed in this
thesis handles infinite compact feasible sets with a non-empty interior.
1.8.1. Scalar Sum-Of-Squares (SOS) Polynomials and Quadratic
Modules
• R, R+, R++, N : respectively, sets of real, non-negative, positive real and
natural numbers.
• N0 : set of natural numbers including the zero element.
• Rd [x] : ring of real polynomials in x ∈ Rn of degree d ∈ N0, or less.
• R[x] : ring of polynomials with arbitrary degree.
• |S| : returns cardinality of input set S.
• Dτn , {α ∈Nn0 | αi ≤ τi, i = 1, . . . ,n} : set of degree vectors with cardinality
|Dτn|=×i=1,...,n(τi +1) where degree τ ∈ Nn. Dropping superscript τ , Dn is
the set of degree vectors of arbitrary degree.
• |α |, ∑ni=1 αi : sum of elements in degree vector α ∈ Nn0.
• A†, AT , αT : respectively complex conjugate, matrix and vector transpose.
• xα ,×nj=1x
α j
j : monomial that is a single term with degree |α |where x∈Rn,
α ∈ Nn0.
• p(x)∈Rd[x] : polynomial defined as p(x),∑α∈Sdn pαxα where p, (pα)α∈Sdn
∈ RSdn is the coefficient vector.
• Sdn , {α ∈ Nn0 : |α | ≤ d} : set of degree vectors.
• s(n,d), (n+d)!/(n!d!) : operator returning the cardinality of Sdn .
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• bd(x), (xα)α∈Sdn : monomial basis in x with degree up to d that follows the
negative degree lexicographic ordering4.
• b(x), (xα)α∈Nn0 : infinite monomial basis vector.
• ∑i∈I p2i (x) : a scalar SOS polynomial, where I indexes a set of polynomi-
als pi ∈ R[x].
• deg(p(x)) : operator returning the degree of an arbitrary p ∈ R[x].
• {x ∈ Rn | 0≤ hi(x) ∈ R[x], i ∈I } : real basic compact semialgebraic set.
• Sl : set of real symmetric matrices of size l.
• S[x]l : set of symmetric matrices of size l with polynomial entries in R[x].
•  : for A,B ∈ S, operator  is the Loewner partial order defined by A  B
if and only if A−B is positive semidefinite.
• S Sx , {s∈Rd [x] | ∃Z ∈ Ss(n,d/2), Z  0, s(x) = b(x,S)T Zb(x,S)} : subspace
of scalar SOS polynomials with degree up to d ∈ 2N0 in x where S ⊆ Sd/2n ,
b(x,S) = (xα)α∈S , and Z is symmetric positive semidefinite. If the set of
degree vectors S is Sn, then S x denotes the space of all scalar SOS polyno-
mials in x.
• Given a basic compact semialgebraic set Φ = {φ ∈Rn | 0≤ hi(φ)∈R[φ ], i∈
I Φ}, the quadratic module of degree r ∈ 2N0 generated by hi(φ), ∀i ∈I Φ
is defined as MrΦ , {s(φ)+∑i∈I Φ si(φ)hi(φ)} where s(φ) ∈S Sφ , si(φ) ∈
S
S′iφ , S⊆ Sr/2n , S′i ⊆ S
r′i/2
n such that r′i+
(
1− (−1)deg(hi(φ)))/2= r−deg(hi(φ)).
We denote the quadratic module of infinite degree by MΦ .
The quadratic module generated by hi ∈ R[x], i ∈I can be made to satisfy the
Archimedean property by adding the redundant constraint c− xT x ≥ 0, for a suit-
able c ∈ R++ into the constraint set indexed by I .
1.8.2. Polynomial Game
We consider only the single stage non-cooperative game where player q belongs
to a finite set Q.
4Given x ∈ Rn, α ,β ∈ Nn0, the monomial ordering xβ ≻negdeglex xα holds if and only if |β | < |α |
or |β |= |α |, ∃ j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that α j′ = β j′ , ∀ j′ ∈ {1, . . . , j−1}, α j < β j.
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• xq ∈Rnq , x, (xq)q∈Q, x−q , (xq′)q′∈Q\{q} : respectively, the action of player
q, the joint actions of all players in set Q, and the actions of other players
except player q. In a wireless game, each player q ∈ Q corresponds to a
network link.
• X,∏q∈Q Xq ⊂ Rn : joint action set of all players, where n, ∑q∈Q nq.
• Xq , {xq ∈ Rnq | 0 ≤ hi(xq) ∈ R[xq], i ∈I Xq} : basic compact real semi-
algebraic action set of player q ∈ Q. The set I Xq indexes the polynomial
constraints giving rise to the feasible set Xq.
• X−q ,∏q′∈Q\{q}Xq′ ∈ Rn : the joint action set of all players except player
q where n = ∑q∈Q nq.
• uq(x) : utility function of player q where x = (xq,x−q) ∈ X, xq ∈ Xq, and
x−q ∈ X−q. We make the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility as-
sumption [47], in which the utility of each player due to a mixed strategy is
equivalent to his expected utility. We assume uq(x) ∈ R[x].
• A game is called finite (infinite) if the joint action set X is finite (infinite).
We shall refer to games with continuous utilities over infinite and compact
strategy sets as continuous games. A continuous game is called polynomial
if the players’ utility functions are polynomials.
• j,√−1; The italic j however refers to a running index.
• A matrix X ∈ Cl×l , l ∈ N is Hermitian if and only if X† = X .
• vec(X) : Gives the vectorized form of the upper triangular real and imagi-
nary values in an Hermitian matrix X ∈ Cl×l , l ∈ N.
Applying the notion of competitive game-play to wireless communication, a game
player refers to a network link that maximizes its own utility. In Chapter 6 where
we work on a wireless MIMO system in which each network link has an Hermitian
input Xq ∈ Sl , l ∈ N, q ∈ Q, we perform vectorization on the inputs to obtain
xq = vec(Xq).
1.8.3. Players’ Strategy Profile
• A given action xq ∈ Xq of player q is an observation of a random variable
with a probability distribution piq ∈PXq . Under this setting, player q is said
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to adopt a mixed strategy represented by piq. When player q’s strategy is
represented by a Dirac distribution piq ∈PXq with respect to a fixed xq ∈Xq
where piq(xq) = 1, player q is said to adopt a pure strategy.
• (piq)q∈Q ∈∏q∈QPXq =PX : strategy profile of the players.
• P indepX ,
{
pi ∈PX | pi(x) = pi1(x1)× . . .×pi|Q|(x|Q|), ∀x ∈ X
}
: set of in-
dependent strategy profiles where piq is the strategy (i.e. distribution) of
player q.
• indepq(pi−q),
{
piq ∈PXq |∃pi ∈P indepX ,pi(x) = piq(xq)×pi−q(x−q),∀x ∈ X
}
: set of all player q’s strategies (i.e. distributions) independent of pi−q ∈
P indepX−q .
• The set of correlated strategy profiles is represented by PX since a joint dis-
tribution pi ∈PX can have dependencies leading to players’ strategies being
correlated. Note if pi ∈P indepX , the correlated strategy profile pi specializes
into an independent strategy profile.
1.8.4. Probability Measures and Moments
• yα ,
∫
X x
α dpi(x) ∈ R : moment of order α ∈ Sdn , d ∈ N0 for a probabil-
ity measure pi on X, and y , (yα)α∈Sdn ∈ RS
d
n is the corresponding moment
sequence.
• ∗ : localizing operator for which h ∗ y ∈ RSd−d′n , d ∈ N0, d′ ∈ N0, d′ ≤ d is
defined as (h∗y)α ,∑γ∈Sd′n hγyα+γ for all α ∈ S
d−d′
n , given h(x)∈Rd
′
[x] and
an arbitrary moment sequence y ∈ RSdn .
• Md(y) , ∫X bd(x)bd(x)T dpi(x) ∈ Ss(n,d) : moment matrix of order d ∈ N0
with moment sequence y , (yα)α∈S2dn , (
∫
X x
α dpi(x))α∈S2dn ∈ RS
2d
n
. Re-
expressing in moments, the matrix entry indexed by (α ,β ) is [Md(y)]α,β =
yα+β for α , β ∈ Sdn . The infinite moment matrix is defined as M(y) ,∫
X b(x)b(x)T dpi(x).
• Md−⌈d′/2⌉(h∗y), ∫X bd(x)bd(x)T h(x)dpi(x) ∈ Ss(n,d−⌈d′/2⌉) : localizing ma-
trix of order d −⌈d′/2⌉, d ∈ N0, d′ ∈ N0, d′ ≤ 2d where the moment se-
quence y is defined as y, (yα)α∈S2dn , (
∫
X x
α dpi(x))α∈S2dn ∈RS
2d
n , and h(x)∈
Rd
′
[x]. Re-expressing in moments, the matrix entry indexed by (α ,β ) is
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[
Md−⌈d′/2⌉(h∗ y)
]
α,β = ∑γ∈Sd′n hγyα+β+γ for α , β ∈ S
d−⌈d′/2⌉
n . Dropping
the superscript, M(h∗ y) , ∫X b(x)b(x)T h(x) dpi(x) is the infinite localizing
matrix.
• PX : set of all probability measures (i.e. probability functions) over X. That
is, pi ∈PX satisfies
∫
X dpi(x) = 1.
• supp(pi), {x∈X | pi(x)> 0} : support of a measure pi ∈PX. If the support
of a measure pi has finite number of elements, the latter are called atoms.
• Given Md(y) with arbitrary y ∈ RS2dn , the kernel of the moment matrix is
defined as the set {p(x) ∈ Rd [x] | p(x) = pT bd(x), Md(y)p = 0}.
1.8.5. Miscellaneous
• diag(v) : diagonal matrix with the entries of the vector v on the diagonal.
• ⊗, I, tr(A), det(A) : respectively, the Kronecker product, identity matrix,
trace and determinant of an arbitrary matrix A.
• Kl , {(i, j) : i, j = 1, . . . , l} : a two-tuple index set.
• (A,B)l , trl
(
AT (I⊗B)), where
trl(C),


tr(C1,1) . . . tr(C1,l)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
tr(Cl,1) . . . tr(Cl,l)

 ∈ Rl×l
for l,m ∈ N, A ∈ Rlm×lm, B ∈ Rm×m, C ∈ Rlm×lm, and Ck ∈ Rm×m with
k ∈Kl .
• Ei, j , eieTj : unit matrix where ei is a unit vector with its ith component set
to one.
• Sl , cov(xi,x j), E(x) : respectively, the set of all real symmetric matrices of
size l, the covariance between variables xi and x j, and the expectation of x.
• ⌈x⌉+ : max(0,x), x ∈ R.
• dsupp(p(x)) ,
{
α | p(x) = ∑α∈Sdn pαxα , pα 6= 0
}
: operator returning the
set of degree vectors corresponding to monomials with non-zero coefficients
in p(x) ∈ Rd [x], d ∈ N0, x ∈ Rn.
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• Given a vector variable φ , we denote the index set of all attributes of φ by a
bold φ , and we refer to the attributes of φ indexed by C⊆ φ as φC.
• len(φ) : returns number of attributes in the vector variable φ .
• w.l.o.g, l.h.s, r.h.s : respectively, “without loss of generality”, “left-hand-
side” and “right-hand-side”.
Definition 1 (Flat extension) Let A, B, C ∈ S, and F =
[
A B
BT C
]
. If rank(F) =
rank(A), then F is a flat extension of A.
Definition 2 (Matrix sum-of-squares) A polynomial matrix S(x) ∈ S[x]l , l ∈ N is
called a sum-of-squares (SOS) if there exists another polynomial matrix Z(x) ∈
(R[x])k×l , k ∈ N, such that S(x) = Z(x)T Z(x).
Definition 3 (Principal minor) Given matrix A of size l and index set K⊆ [1, . . . , l],
the principal minor of A with respect to K is defined as the determinant of the sub-
matrix of A whose rows and columns are indexed by K.
Definition 4 (Positive semidefinite matrix) Given A∈ Sn, A is positive semidefinite
if and only if xT Ax≥ 0, ∀x ∈Rn. In notation form, A 0 denotes that A is positive
semidefinite.
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2. Basic Concepts
2.1. Game Equilibria
Given |Q|-players in a non-cooperative static game, the solution concept is repre-
sented by the notion of a game equilibrium. We briefly describe the Nash equilib-
rium and the correlated equilibrium for finite and infinite games in the following
subsections. We elaborate the game equilibria concepts further in Chapter 4.
2.1.1. Pure and Mixed Nash Equilibria
In [5], [48], the players’ strategies in a non-cooperative static game are assumed in-
dependent. For a finite game, a given strategy profile pi∗= (pi∗q ,pi∗−q)∈P indepX con-
stitutes a Nash equilibrium [1] (i.e. pure or mixed Nash equilibrium) if no player
q can make further gains to his own expected utility by unilaterally deviating from
his strategy pi∗q , assuming others were to remain in their strategies pi∗−q:
∑
xq∈Xq
[
pi∗q (xq)−µq(xq)
] ∑
x−q∈X−q
pi∗−q(x−q)uq(xq,x−q)≥ 0,
∀µq ∈ indepq(pi−q), pi−q ∈P indepX−q , q ∈Q,
(2.1)
where X is the discrete joint action set, x = (xq,x−q) ∈ X, xq ∈ Xq, x−q ∈ X−q,
operator indepq(pi−q) returns the set of all player q’s strategies independent of
pi−q, which is an independent distribution itself (see subsection 1.8.3). Note that
inequality (2.1) is equivalent to the following,
∑
x∈X
[
pi∗(x)−µq(x) ∑
x−q∈X−q
pi∗−q(x−q)
]
uq(x)≥ 0,
∀µq ∈ indepq(pi−q), pi−q ∈P indepX−q , q ∈Q.
(2.2)
If any of the player’s strategy is a mixed strategy (i.e. there exists q such that piq(xq)
is not a Dirac distribution), then pi∗ is said to be a mixed Nash equilibrium strategy
profile. Otherwise if all players’ strategies are pure strategies (i.e. piq(xq) is a Dirac
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distribution for all q ∈ Q), then pi∗ is said to be a pure Nash equilibrium strategy
profile.
For an infinite game with compact X, the mixed Nash equilibrium strategy profile
pi∗ = (pi∗q ,pi∗−q) ∈P indepX is defined by
∫
X
uq(x) dpi∗(x)≥
∫
X
uq(x) d
(
µq×pi∗−q
)
(x),
∀µq ∈ indepq(pi−q), pi−q ∈P indepX−q , q ∈Q.
If pi∗ is a Dirac measure over the infinite compact X, then pi∗ constitutes a pure
Nash equilibrium strategy profile.
2.1.2. Correlated Equilibrium
Aumann in [28], [20] considers the situation where all players have a common
prior understanding of the actual game-play behaviour (e.g. experts’ opinions, pub-
lic polls) in the form of a common prior distribution pi ∈PX over the set of all joint
actions. In addition, Aumann assumes each player is capable of making subjective
probabilistic assessments of his opponents’ strategic choices through pi . As a con-
sequence, the players’ strategies can become correlated [37]. We emphasize that
the standard normal form game is not defined to facilitate players with a common
prior understanding of the actual game-play behaviour. Aumann [20] redefines the
normal form game to obtain an extended normal form game, which accommodates
a common prior distribution pi accessible to all players. The extended normal form
game replaces each standard discrete action set Xq, q ∈ Q with a new action set
consisting of functions of the type ζq : Xq → Xq known as departure functions.
The common prior distribution pi ∈PX is then said to recommend players with a
correlated strategy profile constituting a correlated equilibrium if no player q can
make further gains to his own expected utility by unilaterally deviating from his
actions recommended by pi , assuming others were to follow their recommenda-
tions. In order for the common prior distribution to contribute towards a correlated
equilibrium for a finite game, pi has to satisfy the following constraint,
∑
x∈X
pi(x) [uq(x)−uq(ζq(xq),x−q)]≥ 0, ∀ζq : Xq → Xq, q ∈Q, (2.3)
where X is the discrete joint action set, x = (xq,x−q) ∈X, xq ∈Xq, x−q ∈X−q, and
ζq : Xq → Xq is a departure function representing player q’s deviation from the
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different actions xq recommended by pi . In inequality (2.3), pi constitutes a corre-
lated equilibrium if every player q adopts the identity function to be its departure
function such that ζq(xq) = xq.
When the action sets Xq, q ∈ Q are infinite compact sets in the context of an
infinite game, the condition for the common prior probability measure pi ∈PX to
contribute towards a correlated equilibrium is given by Hart and Schmeidler [49]
in the following constraint,
∫
X
[uq(x)−uq(ζq(xq),x−q)] dpi(x)≥ 0,∀ζq : (Xq,B(Xq))→ (Xq,B(Xq)), q ∈Q,
(2.4)
where ζq(xq) is a signed Borel-measurable function and B(Xq) is the Borel σ -
algebra of Xq. For further elaboration of the correlated equilibrium concept, the
reader is referred to Chapter 4.
2.1.3. Polynomial Game
Many successful applications of real algebraic geometry in global and robust opti-
mization have surfaced in the past decade, such as global polynomial optimization
[38], computation of certificates for establishing polynomial positivity via SOS
technique [50], and robust SDP [51]. In this thesis, we exploit advances in global
polynomial optimization and SOS technique to compute moment sequences corre-
sponding to correlated equilibria with global-optimal expected social welfare. We
deal with only polynomial games by Dresher et al. [52]. Furthermore, the polyno-
mial games are in normal-form and are non-dynamic static (i.e. one-shot).
2.1.4. Set-Relations of Game Equilibria Strategy Profiles
Pure Nash equilibria
strategy profiles
Mixed Nash equilibria
strategy profiles
Correlated equilibria 
strategy profiles
Figure 2.1.: Set-Relations of Game Equilibria Strategy Profiles.
Due to subsection 2.1.1, the set of mixed Nash equilibria strategy profiles forms a
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superset of the pure Nash equilibria strategy profiles. To be elaborated in subsec-
tion 4.2.3, the relationship between the set of Nash equilibria strategy profiles and
the set of correlated equilibria strategy profiles is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
2.2. Semidefinite Programming
In a linear SDP, the feasible set is a convex cone of positive semidefinite matrices.
Consider C ∈ Sn, X ∈ Sn, and A j ∈ Sn, j ∈I where I is the index set of the
constraints. In SDP, the primal form is
inf
X∈Sn
〈C,X〉
s.t. X  0,〈
A j,X
〉
= b j, ∀ j ∈I .
(2.5)
The dual form is
sup
y∈R|I |
bT y
s.t. ∑
j∈I
C− y jA j  0.
(2.6)
Denoting the primal objective value by p∗ and the dual objective value by d∗, weak
duality states that d∗ ≤ p∗.
2.3. Expressing A Scalar Sum-Of-Squares Polynomial
Given p(x) ∈ R2d [x] where d ∈ N, the polynomial p(x) is scalar sum-of-squares if
and only if there exists Z ∈ Ss(n,d) such that
Z  0,
∑
β ,γ∈Sdn | β+γ=α
Zβγ = pα ∈ R, ∀α ∈ S2dn . (2.7)
The constraints in condition (2.7) can be used to verify whether a given p(x) is
indeed a scalar SOS polynomial. This method is taken from [53], which can be
used to verify whether a given polynomial p(x) ∈ R2d [x] is indeed scalar SOS by
checking feasibility of the positive semidefinite constraint and equalities in condi-
tion (2.7). Consistent with [50], checking whether a given polynomial p(x) ∈R[x]
is indeed scalar SOS is equivalent to checking feasibility of a Linear Matrix In-
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equality (LMI) via an SDP solver.
2.4. Positivity of Constrained Polynomials
Putinar [54] states the following proposition concerning strict positivity of scalar
polynomials over real basic compact semialgebraic sets.
Theorem 1 [54] Consider a basic compact semialgebraic set X and a p(x)∈R[x],
x ∈ X. If p(x)> 0, ∀x ∈ X, then p(x) is expressible as
p(x) = s0(x)+ ∑
j∈I
s j(x)h j(x), ∀x ∈ X, (2.8)
where s0(x), s j(x) ∈S x, j ∈I are scalar SOS polynomials.
2.5. Non-Negativity of Constrained Polynomials
Before proceeding, we mention the Archimedean property associated with a quadratic
module. Given X = {x∈Rn | 0≤ h j(x)∈R[x], j ∈I }where I is the index set of
the constraints, the quadratic module MX generated by polynomials h j(x), j ∈I
is said to be Archimedean if the following holds true,
∃g(x) ∈MX s.t. {x ∈ Rn | g(x)≥ 0} is a compact set. (2.9)
Other equivalent forms of condition (2.9) can be found in [53] and [55]. As sug-
gested by Lasserre in [38], the quadratic module MX can be made Archimedean
by augmenting the constraints indexed by I with the redundant bound constraint
0≤ h|I |+1(x) = c−xT x using a sufficiently large finite radius c∈R++. Kuhlmann
and Marshall [56] give the following theorem.
Theorem 2 [56] Given a real basic compact semialgebraic set X, if the quadratic
module MX is Archimedean, then the following equivalence,
{p(x)≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X}⇔ {p(x)+ ε ∈MX,∀ε > 0} ,
holds true for all p(x) ∈ R[x].
30
Recall the sufficient condition in Theorem 1. Since we can readily implement the
quadratic module via LMI constraints, we derive a condition that is nearly both
sufficient and necessary for implementing non-negativity constraints. Theorem 2
implies that we need to fix ε to a constant so that the constraint p(x)+ ε ∈ MX,
∀ε > 0 can be simplified into a standard quadratic module membership constraint
implementable via LMI constraints. By adopting a small constant ε > 0, we arrive
at the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Given a fixed ε > 0, and a basic compact semialgebraic set X, we
let F ≥−ε = {p(x) ∈ R[x] | p(x) ≥ −ε , x ∈ X}, F ε,MX = {p(x) ∈ R[x] | p(x)+
ε ∈ MX}, and F >−ε = {p(x) ∈ R[x] | p(x) > −ε , x ∈ X}. Assuming MX is
Archimedean, we have F >−ε ⊂F ε,MX ⊂F ≥−ε .
Proof 1 Since MX is Archimedean and due to [54], F >−ε ⊂F ε,MX . Since ∃℘∈
R[φ ], ℘≥ 0, ℘ /∈MX due to [57], F Mε ,X ⊂F ≥−ε follows. 
Due to our adoption of the fixed ε > 0, Proposition 1 states that satisfying the
constraint p(x) ∈F Mε ,X is equivalent to implementing a feasible set containing
polynomials satisfying p(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X and in addition a proper subset of those
polynomials satisfying p(x) ≥ −ε , ∀x ∈ X. Therefore, we are effectively imple-
menting a superset containing F ≥0, but such a superset also contains a proper
subset of F ≥−ε . By setting ε to a small fixed positive constant, we get to define
near exact ε-correlated equilibria. This is not a significant issue because we are
primarily interested in F ≥0 and not in F ≥−ε .
2.6. Moment Approach
In this thesis, game equilibria are represented by probability measures. In order to
deal with probability measures via their moment sequences, we will often refer to
the following set of moment sequences
Y , {y ∈ RNn0 | ∃pi ∈PX with y = (yα)α∈Sn =
∫
X
b(x) dpi(x)}, (2.10)
where b(x) = (xα)α∈Sn is the infinite monomial basis. According to [54], if X is
compact and the constraints h j(x)≥ 0, j ∈I defining X satisfy the Archimedean
property, then the set Y of definition (2.10) is equivalent to the following positive
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semidefinite representation,
Y = {y ∈ RNn0 | M(y) 0, M(h j ∗ y) 0, ∀ j ∈I }, (2.11)
where M(y) and M(h j ∗y), j ∈I respectively are the infinite moment and localiz-
ing matrices. Due to the positive semidefinite representation of the set of moment
sequences in definition (2.11), we are able to represent the set of probability mea-
sures PX using the set of moment sequences defined in equation (2.11). That is,
we are able to reformulate the original problem formulation involving probability
measures into a moment optimization problem, whose relaxation is expressible as
a linear SDP problem.
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3. Computation of Near-Exact
ε-Correlated Equilibria with Global
Maximum Social Welfare
For games with discrete strategy sets, there are existing works that compute cor-
related equilibria optimizing linear objectives (for example, social welfare) for
graphical games [58, 59, 60]. In the same vein, Krishnamurthy et al. [45] and
Belmega et al. [46] use discretized strategy sets and apply the adaptive procedure
by Hart and Mas-Colell [61] in their computation of correlated equilibria for sen-
sor networks and Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output systems (MIMO). For general
polynomial games, Stein et al. [62] give an adaptive algorithm also based on dis-
cretization of the strategy sets. However, the strategy sets of continuous games in
wireless communication are often continuous multivariate. For example, Popescu
et al. [9] analyze Nash equilibria for two mutually interfering links acting as play-
ers whose input strategies are transmit covariance matrices, which are clearly mul-
tivariate. For better computational performance, the discretization approach for
wireless games may impose restrictive limits on the number of discrete actions
accessible by each link player. As such, we do not employ discretization in this
chapter. A development by Stein et al. [31] uses convex relaxations to compute
correlated equilibria for general polynomial games without discretization. Al-
though the method considers only univariate strategy sets, their approach serves
as an impetus to this chapter.
In this chapter, we propose an algorithm that computes the correlated equilibrium
with global-optimal (i.e., maximum) expected social welfare for single stage poly-
nomial games. We first derive tractable primal/dual semidefinite programming
(SDP) relaxations for an infinite-dimensional formulation of correlated equilibria.
We give an asymptotic convergence proof, which ensures solving the sequence
of relaxations leads to solutions that converge to the correlated equilibrium with
the highest expected social welfare. Finally, we give a dedicated sequential SDP
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algorithm and demonstrate it in a wireless application with numerical results.
This chapter is taken from our first publication in section 1.7.
3.1. Introduction
In a wireless application with multiple communication links, the channel capacity
of each link is subject to degradation due to interference from other transmitting
links. A competitive wireless game then arises as each link acts as a competi-
tive player maximizing its own mutual information. The outcome of such a game
can be evaluated using the solution concept of game equilibria [27]. Wireless
researchers have developed variants of the fixed-point water-filling algorithm [63]
that computes an arbitrary Nash equilibrium point for such games. However, when
significant interference among the links arises, uniqueness of equilibrium is not
guaranteed [9, 10]. To select among multiple equilibria, social welfare or sum of
network rate [27] is used as a selection criterion. As fixed-point algorithms such as
water-filling converge only to an arbitrary equilibrium, the resulting Nash equilib-
rium is likely to achieve suboptimal social welfare. Although there are analytical
methodologies for checking uniqueness of equilibrium for continuous games in
wireless applications [27], it will be beneficial if an algorithm exists that computes
the equilibrium with the highest social welfare in the presence of multiple equilib-
ria induced by interference. In this chapter, we propose the correlated equilibrium
as the solution concept [28, 20, 49] because the set of correlated equilibria is con-
vex and contains all Nash equilibria as special cases [30]. Thus, the correlated
equilibrium with global-optimal expected social welfare is not only amenable to
convex optimization, but it also offers welfare that is at least as good as the best-
performing Nash equilibrium of the game. We then derive tractable relaxations of
the problem formulation for computing an ε-correlated equilibrium with the high-
est possible expected social welfare. We also devise an algorithm to compute the
ε-correlated equilibrium solution.
3.1.1. An Illustrative Example
For ease of exposition, we give a simple two-player polynomial game example
with multiple correlated equilibria. In a certain household, an old mother’s son
just got married. The mother wants to spend time with her son as before, but the
newly-married daughter-in-law wants undivided attention from her husband. Let
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the mother’s strategy1 be xm ∈ Tm , [0,1], the amount of time she spends with
her son. Let the daughter-in-law’s strategy be xd ∈ Td , [0,1], the amount of time
she spends with her husband. As the mother also wants his son to be happy with
his newly-married wife, the mother’s utility is um(xm,xd), xm + xd . However, the
daughter-in-law perceives the mother’s presence as an interruption between herself
and her husband, therefore the daughter-in-law’s utility is ud(xm,xd), xd − xmxd .
According to Hart and Schmeidler [49], a correlated equilibrium pi over T, Tm×
Td is defined by the following inequalities2,∫
T
xm−ζm(xm) dpi(xm,xd)≥ 0, (3.1)
∫
T
[xd −ζd(xd)] (1− xm) dpi(xm,xd)≥ 0, (3.2)
for all departure functions ζm : Tm → Tm, ζd : Td → Td . Since the constant func-
tion ζm = 1 is a valid departure function, inequality (3.1) requires each correlated
equilibrium in this example to be a joint probability measure pi satisfying
∫
T
xm dpi(xm,xd) = 1,
which implies the marginal pi(xm = 1) has to be one since xm ∈ Tm = [0,1]. Since
the mother always adopts the pure strategy of xm = 1 for any correlated equilibrium
of this game, inequality (3.2) is trivially satisfied. From the above arguments,
there exist multiple correlated equilibria for this game since any arbitrary pi over
(xm,xd)∈ {1}×Td is feasible for inequality (3.2). This implies there exist distinct
global-best and worst correlated equilibria in terms of the expected sum of utilities3
or welfare values defined by
∫
T
um(xm,xd)+ud(xm,xd) dpi(xm,xd).
Therefore, the best correlated equilibrium is representable as the Dirac measure pi
such that for all B⊆ Tm×Td , we have
pi(B) =
{
1 if (xm = 1,xd = 1) ∈ B,
0 otherwise,
1In general, the algorithm presented in this chapter handles multivariate strategies.
2The formulation of correlated equilibria is mentioned in Theorem 3.
3We emphasize to the reader that our optimization framework accepts any general polynomial as
the objective function, not just the sum of polynomial utilities.
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with a corresponding expected sum of utilities being two. The equilibrium indi-
cates that both mother and daughter-in-law should spend the whole time with the
son, even though the daughter-in-law does not get the attention she wants. The
worst correlated equilibrium is representable as the Dirac measure pi such that for
all B⊆ Tm×Td , we have
pi(B) =
{
1 if (xm = 1,xd = 0) ∈ B,
0 otherwise,
with a corresponding expected sum of utilities being one. The equilibrium states
that the mother still spends time with her son but the daughter-in-law ignores her
husband completely, since the daughter-in-law feels indifferent when the mother
is around the whole time. For this example, the algorithm presented in this chapter
aims to compute the global-best and worst welfare values of two and one respec-
tively.
3.1.2. Contributions and Organization of Chapter
The chapter is organized as follows.
1. In subsection 3.2, we mention formulations of correlated equilibria for con-
tinuous and polynomial games.
2. In subsection 3.3, we formulate the computation of correlated equilibrium
with global-optimal expected social welfare as a polynomial optimization
problem with semi-infinite constraints. To facilitate computation, we derive
tractable primal/dual SDP relaxations of the resulting problem formulation.
In addition, we provide a proof of asymptotic convergence, showing that
solving the sequence of relaxations leads to solutions that converge to the
correlated equilibrium with global-optimal expected social welfare. Subsec-
tion 3.3 then ends with a dedicated sequential SDP algorithm. To the best
of our knowledge, the algorithm proposed in this chapter is the first of this
kind that can cope with continuous multivariate strategy sets.
3. In subsection 3.4, we demonstrate the sequential SDP algorithm by comput-
ing social welfare values of correlated equilibria for a mutually interfering
wireless system [9] via two numerical examples. We first compute the social
welfare values achievable by the global-optimal (and global-worst) corre-
lated equilibria. We then compute the welfare values attainable by the best
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(and worst-performing) Nash equilibria using a standard fixed-point method.
As shown in the examples, the significant closeness between social welfare
values by the correlated and the Nash equilibria demonstrate the efficacy of
our algorithm.
3.1.3. Limitation
Based on [64, 53, 38], we use truncated (i.e., of finite length) moment sequences
to represent probability measures with support over basic compact semialgebraic
sets. As it is not possible to represent general correlated equilibria using truncated
moment sequences [31], we consider only those that are representable by truncated
sequences.
3.2. Formulations of Correlated Equilibria
Although Aumann [20] gives formulations of correlated equilibria for finite games,
Hart and Schmeidler [49] use Borel-measurable departure functions to formulate
correlated equilibria for continuous games. We recall the definitions of continuous
and polynomial games in subsection 1.8.2.
Theorem 3 [49] A formulation of correlated equilibria pi for continuous games is
∫
X
[uq(x)−uq(ζq(xq),x−q)] dpi(x)≥ 0,∀ζq : (Xq,B(Xq))→ (Xq,B(Xq)), q ∈Q,
where ζq(xq) is a signed Borel-measurable function and B(Xq) is the Borel σ -
algebra of Xq.
The existence of correlated equilibria for continuous games is established by the
following theorem.
Theorem 4 [49] For each q ∈ Q, let the space Xq be compact Hausdorff and the
function uq be continuous (where X is endowed with the product topology). In
addition, let B(Xq) be the Borel σ -algebra on Xq, and B(X) be the Borel σ -
algebra on X. Then there exists a countably additive correlated equilibrium with
respect to
{
B(Xq)
}
q∈Q and B(X).
To compute correlated equilibria for polynomial games, Stein et al. [31] use squares
of polynomials p2(xq), p ∈ R[xq] as test functions to give the following theorem.
The reason for choosing squares of polynomials is so that Stein et al. in [31] can
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get to reformulate the definition of correlated equilibria in Theorem 3 using posi-
tive semidefinite matrix constraints.
Theorem 5 [31] A formulation of correlated equilibria pi for polynomial games
based on test functions is
∫
X
p2(xq) [uq(x)−uq(tq,x−q)]dpi(x)≥ 0, ∀p ∈ R[xq], ∀tq ∈ Xq, q ∈Q. (3.3)
Remark 1 Theorem 4 implies the feasible set of correlated equilibria in inequality
(3.3) is always non-empty with respect to compact strategy sets Xq in the Euclidean
space.
3.3. Problem Formulation and Solution
We formulate the computation of correlated equilibrium with global-optimal ex-
pected social welfare for a single stage polynomial game in subsection 3.3.1. As
the resulting formulation involves semi-infinite positive semidefinite (i.e., robust
semidefinite) constraints, we first introduce results by Scherer and Hol [51] con-
cerning matrix positivity over compact sets via SOS matrix decomposition in sub-
section 3.3.2. Subsection 3.3.3 gives a formulation of correlated equilibria using
SOS matrix decomposition and gives the resulting primal SDP relaxation. We then
give the dual SDP relaxation and the asymptotic convergence proof in subsection
3.3.4. Finally in subsection 3.3.5, we give a sequential SDP algorithm.
3.3.1. Computing Correlated Equilibrium with Global-Optimal
Expected Social Welfare
Definition 5 The social welfare function is defined as the sum of utilities of all
players q ∈Q [27],
u(x), ∑
q∈Q
uq(x), x ∈ X. (3.4)
In case the utilities of certain players are overlooked when optimizing the social
welfare objective function, one can introduce non-equal weights to the objective to
perform a re-optimization. The maximization of social welfare formulation (3.4)
can be modeled as a polynomial optimization problem [38],
u∗x , sup
x
u(x)
s.t. x ∈ X.
(3.5)
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Proposition 2 The problem formulation for computing the correlated equilibrium
pi with global-optimal expected social welfare is
P : sup
pi∈PX
∑
q∈Q
∫
X
uq(x) dpi(x)
s.t.
∫
X
p2(xq) [uq(x)−uq(tq,x−q)]dpi(x)≥ 0, ∀p ∈ R[xq], ∀tq ∈ Xq ⊂ Rnq ,
where PX is the set of all probability measures supported by X.
Proof 2 Since we consider only games with polynomial utilities such that uq(x) ∈
R[x], q ∈Q, we cast the maximization of social welfare (3.4) as a polynomial opti-
mization problem [38] with general probability measure pi supported by compact
set X as the decision variable. Introducing inequality (3.3), we get problem P. 
In order to rewrite P as an optimization problem over moment sequences instead
of probability measures, we further introduce the set of moment sequences
Y , {y ∈ RNn0 | ∃pi ∈PX with y =
∫
X
b(x) dpi(x)},
where b(x) is the infinite monomial basis.
Proposition 3 For a specific pi , the expression
∫
X
p2(xq) [uq(x)−uq(tq,x−q)]dpi(x)≥ 0,∀p ∈ R[xq], tq ∈ Xq,
in problem P is equivalent to
cT PTq M(νtq ∗ y)Pqc≥ 0,∀c ∈ RN,∀tq ∈ Xq,
where y ∈Y , νtq(x) is shorthand for νq(x, tq) , uq(x)− uq(tq,x−q), M(νtq ∗ y) is
the localizing matrix, and Pq is a column selection matrix such that b(xq) = PTq b(x)
with x ∈ X.
Proof 3 Representing p ∈ R[xq] with cT b(xq), we get
∫
X
p2(xq) [uq(x)−uq(tq,x−q)]dpi(x) =
∫
X
cT b(xq)b(xq)T c νq(x, tq) dpi(x)
=
∫
X
cT PTq b(x)b(x)T νq(x, tq)Pqc dpi(x)
= cT PTq M(νtq ∗ y)Pqc. 
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For notational convenience, we introduce the following shorthand,
Mq(y, tq), PTq M(νtq ∗ y)Pq, (3.6)
where M(νtq ∗ y) is a localizing matrix involving the function νtq(x) and the mo-
ment sequence y. Before introducing the following result, we note from problem
P in Proposition 2 that ∑q∈Q
∫
X uq(x) dpi(x) = ∑α∈Nn0 uαyα = uT y.
Corollary 1 The following problem
sup
y∈RNn0
uT y
s.t. M(y) 0,
M(hqi ∗ y) 0, ∀i ∈I q,
Mq(y, tq) 0, ∀tq ∈ Xq,
}
q ∈Q,
(3.7)
is equivalent to problem P in the moment form, where M(y), M(hqi ∗ y) are the
infinite moment and localizing matrices, and Mq(y, tq) is taken from definition (3.6).
Proof 4 From problem P, we have ∑q∈Q
∫
X uq(x) dpi(x) = ∑α∈Nn0 uαyα = uT y.
We then devise a moment optimization problem whose feasible set of moment se-
quences Y has the following positive semidefinite representation [54],
Y , {y ∈ RNn0 | M(y) 0, M(hqi ∗ y) 0, i ∈I q, q ∈Q}. (3.8)
To optimize for correlated equilibria, we invoke Proposition 3 and introduce the
inequality M(y, tq) 0,∀tq ∈Xq, resulting in problem (3.7), which is equivalent to
problem P of Proposition 2 in the moment form. 
However the moment optimization problem in Corollary 1 involves infinite mo-
ment sequences y ∈Y , which is defined in definition (3.8). In order to arrive at
a computationally viable algorithm, we relax the moment optimization problem
in Corollary 1 by considering only truncated moment sequences with moments of
order up to 2d such as y = (yα)α∈S2dn ∈ RS
2d
n
.
Remark 2 W.l.o.g, we let y0 = 1. For any d ∈ N0 with 2d ≥ maxq∈Q deg(uq(x)),
we can relax problem (3.7) into a problem involving moments with order of at most
2d.
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Proposition 4 The relaxed form of problem (3.7) is
Pd : sup
y∈RS2dn
uT y
s.t. Md(y) 0,
Md−dqi(hqi ∗ y) 0, i ∈I q,
Md−dq0q (y, tq) 0, ∀tq ∈ Xq,
}
q ∈Q,
where Md(y) ∈ Ss(n,d), Md−dqi(hqi ∗ y) ∈ Ss(n,d−dqi) are the truncated moment and
localizing matrices with dqi , ⌈deg(hqi(x))/2⌉, and Md−dq0q (y, tq) ∈ Ss(nq,d−dq0) is
the truncated matrix-valued function in definition (3.6) with dq0, ⌈deg(νq(x, .))/2⌉.
Proof 5 Apply truncated moment sequence y ∈ RS2dn into problem (3.7), we get
problem Pd . 
Remark 3 In problem Pd of Proposition 4, the positive semidefinite matrix con-
straints ensure the truncated moment sequence y = (yα)α∈S2dn corresponds to a
measure in PX. Since the moment sequence y contains moments of order up to 2d
as dictated by the finite-size moment and localizing matrices, moments of higher
order exceeding 2d are left unconstrained in problem Pd . This implies that the
relaxed form of problem (3.7) contains only a proper subset of all moment condi-
tions enforced in the original problem (3.7). As a result, we have supPd ≥ supP
since fewer constraints in problem Pd allows supPd to achieve the same or higher
objective value than supP, which carries the full burden of enforcing an infinite
number of moment conditions.
3.3.2. Matrix Positivity over Compact Sets via SOS Matrix
Decomposition
The following definition is central for further exposition. A matrix-valued polyno-
mial S ∈ (R[x])l×l , l ∈ N, is defined as SOS if there exists another matrix-valued
polynomial T ∈ (R[x])k×l , k ∈ N, such that S(x) = T (x)T T (x). Clearly, if S is
a SOS polynomial matrix, then S(x)  0 for all x ∈ Rn. We note that, the con-
verse implication is not necessarily true [51]. The importance of SOS polynomial
matrices originates from the following result.
Lemma 1 [51] A matrix-valued polynomial S ∈ (R[x])l×l of degree 2r is SOS if
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and only if there exists a positive semidefinite matrix Z ∈ Rls(n,r)×ls(n,r) such that
S(x) = (br(x)⊗ I)T Z(br(x)⊗ I).
Lemma 1 implies that verifying whether a matrix-valued polynomial is SOS is
equivalent to checking feasibility of a Linear Matrix Inequality (LMI). We now
mention results on matrix positivity over compact sets.
Lemma 2 [51] Consider the problem
sup
y
cT y
s.t. y ∈ Rn, F(t,y)≻ 0, ∀t ∈H,
(3.9)
where c ∈ Rn, H , {t ∈ Rn | H(t) 0}, H(t) is a symmetric matrix that depends
polynomially on t, and F(t,y) ∈ Sl depends polynomially on t but affinely on y.
The optimal value of the following problem
sup
y
cT y
s.t. y ∈ Rn,
S′(t) and S(t) = F(t,y)− (S′(t), H(t))l −κI are SOS matrices in t,
(3.10)
is a lower bound to problem (3.9), where κ ∈ R++.
Remark 4 We specialize the matrix H(t) to be diag([. . . ,hi(t), . . .]T ), i ∈I such
that H(t) 0 results in H becoming a compact semialgebraic set. We also denote
the degrees of S(t) and S′(t) by 2r and 2r′ respectively. Since H(t) is diagonal, and
the quadratic module generated by hi(t), i ∈I can be made Archimedean due to
subsection 1.8.1, both Lemma 4 and Theorem 1 of [51] state that there exist finite
degree bounds on r and r′ such that the feasible y in problems (3.10) and (3.9) are
equivalent. This results in the equality of the optimal objective values of problems
(3.10) and (3.9).
Remark 5 The degree of S(t) dominates that of S′(t), implying r ≥ r′.
3.3.3. Primal SDP Formulation of Problem Pd,r
Recall Md−dq0q (y, tq)  0,∀tq ∈ Xq in problem Pd that formulates the set of corre-
lated equilibria via y. We now reformulate the above constraint into an LMI. We
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introduce ε > κ ∈R++ and by Lemma 1 and Theorem 2 of [51], the positive defi-
nite expression Md−dq0q (y, tq)+ εI ∈ Slq with lq , s(nq,d−dq0) decomposes into
Md−dq0q (y, tq)+ εI−
(
S′(tq), H(tq)
)
lq = S(tq), (3.11)
where
(
S′(tq), H(tq)
)
lq =
(
(br′(tq)⊗ I)T Z′q(br
′
(tq)⊗ I), H(tq)
)
lq
, (3.12)
S(tq) = (br (tq)⊗ I)T Zq (br (tq)⊗ I) , (3.13)
and Z′q ∈ S|I q|lqs(nq,r
′)
, Zq ∈ Slqs(nq,r) are positive semidefinite. To simplify equa-
tions (3.11)-(3.13), we use further results by Scherer and Hol [51] in the following
remark.
Remark 6 Since Md−dq0q (y, tq) is affine in y and depends polynomially on tq, it is
re-expressible as
Md−dq0q (y, tq) = y0 ∑
β∈S2rnq
Dqβ0tβq + ∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
yα ∑
β∈S2rnq
Dqβαtβq , (3.14)
where 2r ≥ deg(νq(., tq)), tβq is a monomial in tq with degree β , and Dqβα ∈ Slq is
a constant coefficient matrix. According to Scherer and Hol [51], introducing per-
mutation matrices ∆′q ∈ R|I q|lqs(nq,r
′)×|I q|lqs(nq,r′)
, ∆q ∈ Rlqs(nq,r)×lqs(nq,r) and con-
stant coefficient matrices Λ′qβ ∈ S|I q|s(nq,r
′)
, Λqβ ∈ Ss(nq,r) such that
br′(tq)⊗ I = ∆′q(I⊗br
′
(tq)),
(I⊗br′(tq))H(tq)(I⊗ (br′(tq))T ) = ∑β∈S2r′nq Λ
′
qβ t
β
q ,
br(tq)⊗ I = ∆q (I⊗br(tq)) ,
br(tq)br(tq)T = ∑β∈S2rnq Λqβ t
β
q ,
(3.15)
allows equations (3.12)-(3.13) to be rewritten as
(
(br′(tq)⊗ I)T Z′q(br
′
(tq)⊗ I), H(tq)
)
lq
= ∑
β∈S2r′nq
(
(∆′q)T Z′q∆′q, Λ′qβ
)
lq
tβq , (3.16)
(br(tq)⊗ I)T Zq(br(tq)⊗ I) = ∑
β∈S2rnq
(
∆Tq Zq∆q, Λqβ
)
lq
tβq . (3.17)
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Since r≥ r′ due to Remark 5, we pay attention only to r. To eliminate tq effectively
from our consideration of equations (3.11)-(3.13), we proceed by equating the co-
efficients of the monomials tβq , β ∈ S2rnq on the r.h.s of equations (3.14), (3.16) and
(3.17) with respect to equation (3.11). As a result, the conservative approximation
of problem Pd is
Pd,r : sup
y,Z′q,Zq
uT y
s.t. y ∈ RS2dn , Md(y) 0,
Z′q  0, Zq  0, Md−dqi(hqi ∗ y) 0, i ∈I q,
∑α∈S2dn yαDqβα + εqβ −
(
(∆′q)T Z′q∆′q, Λ′qβ
)
lq
− (∆Tq Zq∆q, Λqβ)lq = 0, β ∈ S2rnq ,


q ∈Q,
where εqβ = εI if |β |= 0 else εqβ = 0. Notice the decision variable y is affine in the
positive semidefinite moment and localizing matrices of problem Pd,r. Moreover,
y is affine in the matrix equalities of problem Pd,r. Therefore, problem Pd,r is a lin-
ear SDP problem with the truncated moment sequence y and positive semidefinite
matrix variables Z′q and Zq, q ∈ Q as the decision variables. Since problem Pd,r
is a linear SDP problem, we have shown that computing a near-exact ε-correlated
equilibrium with highest possible expected social welfare parameterized by finite
(d,r) is indeed computationally tractable.
Remark 7 Augmenting problems (3.10), (3.9) with Md(y)  0 and Md−dqi(hqi ∗
y) 0, i ∈I q common to both Pd,r and Pd , Remark 4 implies there exists a finite
degree bound rˆ such that supPd,rˆ = supPd , r ≤ rˆ.
3.3.4. Dual SDP Formulation of Problem Pd,r
Since Md(y) and Md−dqi(hqi ∗ y) are affine in y, we can rewrite them as
Md(y) = y0B0 + ∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
yαBα ,
Md−dqi(hqi ∗ y) = y0Cqi0 + ∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
yαCqiα , i ∈I q, q ∈Q,
(3.18)
where Bα ∈ Ss(n,d) and Cqiα ∈ Ss(n,d−dqi) are constant coefficient matrices. We
derive the dual SDP problem in the following proposition.
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Proposition 5 Introducing dual matrix variables N ∈ Ss(n,d), Tqi ∈ Ss(n,d−dqi) with
i ∈ I q, Vqβ ∈ Slq with lq , s(nq,d − dq0) and β ∈ S2rnq , constant matrices Bα ,
Cqiα from equations (3.18), Dqβα from equation (3.14), constant ε ∈ R++, matrix
variables Zq and Z′q from equations (3.11)-(3.13), and constant matrices ∆q, ∆′q,
Λqβ , Λ′qβ from equations (3.15), the dual problem of Pd,r is
Dd,r : inf
N,Tqi,Vqβ
[N]1,1 + ∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈I q
hqi(0) [Tqi]1,1 + ∑
q∈Q
∑
β∈S2rnq
νqβ (0)
[
Vqβ
]
1,1
+ ε ∑
q∈Q
tr(Vq0)
s.t. N  0, Tqi  0, i ∈I q,
∑
β∈S2rnq
∑
k∈Klq
[
Vqβ
]
k ∆
′
qEk⊗Λ′qβ (∆′q)T  0,
∑
β∈S2rnq
∑
k∈Klq
[
Vqβ
]
k ∆qEk⊗Λqβ ∆Tq  0,


q ∈Q,
−uα = 〈N,Bα〉+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈I q
〈
Tqi,Cqiα
〉
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
β∈S2rnq
〈
Vqβ ,Dqβα
〉
, α ∈ S2dn \{0}n.
Proof 6 All entries of B0, Cqi0 and Dqβ0 are zeros except [B0]1,1 = 1, [Cqi0]1,1 =
hqi(0), and [Dqβ0]1,1 = νqβ (0), where νqβ (x) conforms to νq(x, tq)=∑β∈S2rnq νqβ (x)t
β
q ,
and νq(x, tq) first appears in Proposition 3. The Lagrangian L of problem Pd,r is
L = uT y+ tr
(
N
[
y0B0 + ∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
yαBα
])
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈I q
tr
(
Tqi
[
y0Cqi0 + ∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
yαCqiα
])
+ ∑
q∈Q
tr
(
U ′qZ′q
)
+ ∑
q∈Q
tr(UqZq)
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
β∈S2rnq
tr
(
Vqβ
[
∑
α∈Sn2d
yαDqβα + εqβ −
(
(∆′q)T Z′q∆′q, Λ′qβ
)
lq
−(∆Tq Zq∆q, Λqβ)lq
])
,
(3.19)
where N  0, Tqi  0, U ′q  0 and Uq  0 are the newly-introduced symmetric dual
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matrix variables. Using Proposition 23 of Appendix A.1, equation (3.19) becomes
L = ∑
α∈S2dn
uαyα +[N]1,1 + ∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
〈N, Bα〉yα
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈I q
hqi(0) [Tqi]1,1 + ∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈I q
∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
〈
Tqi, Cqiα
〉
yα
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
β∈S2rnq
νqβ (0)
[
Vqβ
]
1,1 + ∑
q∈Q
∑
β∈S2rnq
∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
〈
Vqβ , Dqβα
〉
yα
+ ε ∑
q∈Q
tr(Vq0)
+ ∑
q∈Q
〈
U ′q− ∑
β∈S2rnq
∑
k∈Klq
[
Vqβ
]
k ∆
′
qEk⊗Λ′qβ (∆′q)T , Z′q
〉
+ ∑
q∈Q
〈
Uq− ∑
β∈S2rnq
∑
k∈Klq
[
Vqβ
]
k ∆qEk⊗Λqβ ∆Tq , Zq
〉
.
(3.20)
Now the Lagrangian dual problem is
inf
N,Tqi,U ′q,Uq,Vqβ

 sup
y,Z′q,Zq
L

 , i ∈I q, β ∈ S2rnq , q ∈Q. (3.21)
In order for supy,Z′q,Zq L to attain the following maximum other than ∞,
max
y,Zq,Z′q
L =[N]1,1 + ∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈I q
hqi(0) [Tqi]1,1 + ∑
q∈Q
∑
β∈S2rnq
νqβ (0)
[
Vqβ
]
1,1 + ε ∑
q∈Q
tr(Vq0),
(3.22)
the following conditions need to hold true with respect to equation (3.20),
−uα = 〈N,Bα〉+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈I q
〈
Tqi, Cqiα
〉
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
β∈S2rnq
〈
Vqβ , Dqβα
〉
, α ∈ S2dn \{0}n,
(3.23)
∑
β∈S2rnq
∑
k∈Klq
[
Vqβ
]
k ∆
′
qEk⊗Λ′qβ (∆′q)T =U ′q, (3.24)
∑
β∈S2rnq
∑
k∈Klq
[
Vqβ
]
k ∆qEk⊗Λqβ ∆Tq =Uq. (3.25)
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Satisfying conditions in equalities (3.23)-(3.25), problem (3.21) becomes
inf
N,Tqi,U ′q,
Uq,Vqβ
[N]1,1 + ∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈I q
hqi(0) [Tqi]1,1 + ∑
q∈Q
∑
β∈S2rnq
νqβ (0)
[
Vqβ
]
1,1 + ε ∑
q∈Q
tr(Vq0)
s.t. N  0, Tqi  0, i ∈I q, U ′q  0, Uq  0,
∑
β∈S2rnq
∑
k∈Klq
[
Vqβ
]
k ∆
′
qEk⊗Λ′qβ (∆′q)T =U ′q,
∑
β∈S2rnq
∑
k∈Klq
[
Vqβ
]
k ∆qEk⊗Λqβ ∆Tq =Uq,


q ∈Q,
−uα = 〈N,Bα〉+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈I q
〈
Tqi,Cqiα
〉
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
β∈S2rnq
〈
Vqβ ,Dqβα
〉
, α ∈ S2dn \{0}n.
(3.26)
Dropping U ′q and Uq in problem (3.26), we get problem Dd,r. 
We now give an upper bound of Dd,r, which is used in the subsequent asymptotic
convergence proof.
Theorem 6 An upper bound of Dd,r is u∗x + ξ + λ d,r, where ξ ∈ R++ is a small
constant, u∗x is the optimal value of problem (3.5), and λ d,r is defined as
λ d,r , ∑
q∈Q
〈
∑
β∈S2rnq
∑
k∈Klq
[
Vqβ
]
k ∆
′
qEk⊗Λ′qβ (∆′q)T , Z′q
〉
+ ∑
q∈Q
〈
∑
β∈S2rnq
∑
k∈Klq
[
Vqβ
]
k ∆qEk⊗Λqβ ∆Tq , Zq
〉
,
(3.27)
where matrix variable Vqβ is taken from Proposition 5, matrix variables Zq, Z′q from
equations (3.12)-(3.13) and constant matrices ∆q, ∆′q, Λqβ , Λ′qβ from equations
(3.15).
Proof 7 The following is based on proof techniques in [38]. Since the quadratic
module generated by the set of inequalities governing X can be made Archimedean
due to subsection 1.8.1, every p ∈ R[x] with finite degree strictly positive on X is
expressible using scalar SOS polynomials s(x) and s′(x) [54] such that
p(x) = s(x)+∑
i
hi(x)s′(x), x ∈ X, (3.28)
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where i indexes the inequalities. Recall u(x) in the social welfare formulation
(3.4) and u∗x in problem (3.5), we use the above arguments to express the positive
polynomial u∗x −u(x)+ξ as
u∗x −u(x)+ξ =
kQ
∑
k=1
n2k(x)+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈I q
{
hqi(x)
kqi
∑
k=1
t2qik(x)
}
, (3.29)
where ξ ∈ R++, kQ and kqi are the number of terms with respect to the above two
scalar SOS polynomials whose nk, tqik ∈ R[x] terms are of bounded degrees. The-
orem 4 states that there exists at least one correlated equilibrium for a polynomial
game with compact X. Such a correlated equilibrium pi has a moment sequence
that corresponds to a value in the decision variable y of Pd,r. Integrating both
sides of equation (3.29) with respect to pi , we get
−
∫
X
u(x) dpi(x)+u∗x +ξ
=
∫
X
kQ
∑
k=1
n2k(x)dpi(x)+
∫
X
∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈I q
{
hqi(x)
kqi
∑
k=1
t2qik(x)
}
dpi(x)
=
kQ
∑
k=1
∑
α∈S2dn
(n2k)αyα + ∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈I q
kqi
∑
k=1
∑
α∈S2(d−dqi)n
∑
γ∈Sdeg(hqi(x))n
(t2qik)α+γyα+γ(hqi)γ
=
kQ
∑
k=1
〈
nk, Md(y)nk
〉
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈I q
kqi
∑
k=1
〈
tqik, Md−dqi(hqi ∗ y)tqik
〉
=
kQ
∑
k=1
〈
nkn
T
k , M
d(y)
〉
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈I q
kqi
∑
k=1
〈
tqikt
T
qik, M
d−dqi(hqi ∗ y)
〉
,
(3.30)
where deg(n2k(x)) ≤ 2d, k = 1, . . . ,kQ, and deg(hqi(x)t2qik(x)) ≤ 2d, k = 1 . . . ,kqi,
for q ∈ Q, i ∈ I q. Using the Gram-matrix method in [53], we use the coeffi-
cient vectors of nk(x) and tqik(x) to construct symmetric matrices namely N =
∑kQk=1 nknTk  0 and Tqi = ∑
kqi
k=1 tqikt
T
qik  0. Introducing N and Tqi into equation
(3.30), we get
−
∫
X
u(x) dpi(x)+u∗x +ξ
=
〈
N, Md(y)
〉
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈I q
〈
Tqi, Md−dqi(hqi ∗ y)
〉
.
(3.31)
Recall that u∗x is the optimal value of problem (3.5), we arrive at the following
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equivalence,
(u∗x ≥ supPd,r ≥ supP)⇔ (u∗x −ρ = supP),
for a fixed constant ρ ∈ R+. Therefore we rewrite equation (3.31) as
−
∫
X
u(x) dpi(x)+ supP+ξ +ρ =
〈
N, Md(y)
〉
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈I q
〈
Tqi, Md−dqi(hqi ∗ y)
〉
.
(3.32)
Based on a sufficiently large r by Remarks 4 and 7, the feasible y’s governed
by the system of equalities in Pd,r are equivalent to the y’s defined by the robust
semidefinite constraint in Pd . The existence of correlated equilibrium pi implies
the system of equalities in Pd,r is feasible, meaning there exist symmetric positive
semidefinite matrices Z′q and Zq satisfying the following system of equalities in
Pd,r,
∑
α∈S2dn
yαDqβα +εqβ −
(
(∆′q)T Z′q∆′q, Λ′qβ
)
lq
−(∆Tq Zq∆q, Λqβ)lq = 0,β ∈ S2rnq ,q∈Q,
(3.33)
where lq , s(nq,d− dq0). Augmenting the r.h.s of equation (3.32) with the zero-
valued expression from equation (3.33), and introducing an arbitrary matrix4Vqβ ,
we have
−
∫
X
u(x)dpi(x)+ supP+ξ +ρ
=
〈
N, Md(y)
〉
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈I q
〈
Tqi, Md−dqi(hqi ∗ y)
〉
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
β∈S2rnq
〈
Vqβ , ∑
α∈S2dn
yαDqβα + εqβ −
(
(∆′q)T Z′q∆′q, Λ′qβ
)
lq
− (∆Tq Zq∆q, Λqβ)lq
〉
.
(3.34)
4Since 〈V,S〉 = 〈(V T +V )/2,S〉 holds for arbitrary V and symmetric S, the arbitrary Vqβ can be
treated as symmetric due to Proposition 20 in Appendix A.1.
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Applying equations (3.18), Propositions 22 and 23 in Appendix A.1, we get
−
∫
X
u(x)dpi(x)+ supP+ξ +ρ +λ d,r
= [N]1,1 + ∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈I q
hqi(0) [Tqi]1,1 + ∑
q∈Q
∑
β∈S2rnq
νqβ (0)
[
Vqβ
]
1,1 + ε ∑
q∈Q
tr(Vq0)
+ ∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
〈N, Bα〉yα + ∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈I q
∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
〈
Tqi, Cqiα
〉
yα
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
β∈S2rnq
∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
〈
Vqβ , Dqβα
〉
yα ,
(3.35)
where λ d,r , ∑
q∈Q
〈
∑
β∈S2rnq
∑
k∈Klq
[
Vqβ
]
k ∆
′
qEk⊗Λ′qβ (∆′q)T , Z′q
〉
+ ∑
q∈Q
〈
∑
β∈S2rnq
∑
k∈Klq
[
Vqβ
]
k ∆qEk⊗Λqβ ∆Tq , Zq
〉
.
(3.36)
In terms of satisfying problem Dd,r, its constraints ensure the following to hold
true,
∑
β∈S2rnq
∑
k∈Klq
[
Vqβ
]
k ∆
′
qEk⊗Λ′qβ (∆′q)T  0, ∑
β∈S2rnq
∑
k∈Klq
[
Vqβ
]
k ∆qEk⊗Λqβ ∆Tq  0.
(3.37)
Both inequalities (3.37) and equation (3.35) ensure that N, Tqi and Vqβ form a
feasible solution to problem Dd,r. Re-expressing equation (3.35) in terms of the
objective value of Dd,r, we get
−
∫
X
u(x)dpi(x)+ supP+ξ +ρ +λ d,r =
Dd,r + ∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
〈N, Bα〉yα + ∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈I q
∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
〈
Tqi, Cqiα
〉
yα
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
β∈S2rnq
∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
〈
Vqβ , Dqβα
〉
yα .
(3.38)
Since inequalities (3.37) ensure λ d,r in definition (3.36) to be non-negative, we
have a valid upper bound of Dd,r expressible as supP+ξ +ρ +λ d,r. Recall from
Remarks 3 and 7, we have supPd,r ≥ supP. Combined with weak duality, we get
supP+ξ +ρ +λ d,r ≥ inf Dd,r ≥ supPd,r ≥ supP. 
Lemma 3 There exists finite upper degree bound 2r on S(tq) and S′(tq) in equation
(3.11) independent of the increasing moment relaxation order d.
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Proof 8 The following arguments are taken from section 3 of [51]. For ease of
discussion, we assume all constraints defining Xq are properly rescaled such that
h j(tq) ≤ 1, ∀ j ∈I q. We introduce ρ ∈ R++ and c ∈ R++ such that ρ , 1nq+√nq
and c− ∥∥tq∥∥22 = ψ0(tq) +∑ j∈I ψ j(tq)h j(tq) where ψ0(tq), ψ j(tq) ∈ Stq , j ∈ I .
We now get to re-express tq ∈ Xq in a new coordinate space z = ρ
(
tq
c
+ e
)
. We
then denote the expression Md−dq0q (y, tq)+ εI of equation (3.11) by F(tq). We re-
express F(tq) and h j(tq) in the new z-space as ˆF0(z), F(c(z/ρ− e)) and ˆh j(z),
h j(c(z/ρ−e)). To facilitate below arguments, we introduce the expression P(z),
ˆF0(z)−∑ j∈I
[ξ (1− ˆh j(z))2k] ˆh j(z)I − (ε−)I where ξ ∈ R++, k ∈ N and ε− >
0 is a value slightly less than ε . We now denote the maximum degrees of SOS
polynomial matrices S(tq) and S′(tq) in equation (3.11) by 2r and 2r′ respectively.
According to section 3 of [51], there exist ξ and k such that the following degree
bounds apply,
2r ≤max{ϑ +2, ϑ +deg(ψ0(tq))}, 2r′ ≤max{2k, ϑ +deg(ψ j(tq))},
(3.39)
where ϑ = deg(P(z))(deg(P(z))
2−1)L(P(z))
ε −1 with L(P(z)),maxα∈Nnq0
‖dα P(0)‖2
|α|! , dα ,
∂ α11 . . .∂
αnq
nq and ‖.‖2 is the spectral norm. Since radius c is readily expandable such
that 0 < c−∥∥tq∥∥22 = ψ0(tq)+∑ j∈I ψ jh j(tq), ∀tq ∈ Xq, the degrees of ψ0(tq) and
ψ j(tq) are finitely upper bounded due to Theorem 6 of [65].
When the moment relaxation order d is increased, the number of variables in tq
remains at nq and the degree of tq remains fixed in the expression Md−dq0q (y, tq)+εI
of equation (3.11). Due to the degree bounds in inequalities (3.39), the degree 2r
can be held fixed to a sufficiently large positive integer such that it is independent
of the increasing relaxation order d. 
Theorem 7 For a sufficiently large r, as d increases to infinity, supPd,r is mono-
tonically non-increasing and weakly-⋆ converges to supP.
Proof 9 Due to Remark 7, there exists a finite upper bound r such that supPd,r =
supPd , r ∈N for a fixed moment relaxation order d. By Lemma 3, such finite upper
bound r can be held fixed independent of the increasing d. For below arguments,
we let r be at its fixed upper bound such that supPd,r = supPd .
To show that supPd,r is monotonically non-increasing, we employ a proof tech-
nique in [38]. We introduce the order d′ = ⌈deg(u(x))/2⌉ such that there is a
corresponding moment sequence (y′α)α∈S2d′n that maximizes supP
d′,r
. Note that the
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objective value Pd′,r due to y′ is the best maximum attainable since the coefficients
of u(x) involve monomials of x up to a finite degree of 2d′. Then by adopting d > d′
(w.l.o.g, we let r be sufficiently large such that Pd,r = Pd), the corresponding longer
moment sequence (yα)α∈S2dn at best can only achieve the same maximum value that
is already attained at Pd′,r. But (yα)α∈S2dn is subject to even more stringent moment
matrix constraints owing to the required matrix positivity of moment and localizing
matrices of larger dimension sizes, which implies the maximum ever attainable at
supPd,r cannot be higher than supPd′,r. Therefore supPd,r is monotonically non-
increasing with increasing d.
We now adapt the approach in [66] to show that supPd,r weak-⋆ converges to supP
with increasing d. Recall that the domain set X is compact, and the quadratic
module M
(
(h j)j∈I
)
generated by the polynomial constraints defining X can be
made Archimedean through an additional but redundant bound constraint (see
subsection 1.8.1). Due to Theorem 1 in [55], we have for all p(x) ∈ R[x], there
exists N ∈ N such that N ± p(x) ∈ M((h j)j∈I ). Since xα ∈ R[x] for a fixed
α ∈ Nn0, we have
N ± xα = s0(x)+ ∑
j∈I
s j(x)h j(x), (3.40)
where s0(x), s j(x) ∈S x, j ∈I are scalar SOS polynomials of arbitrary degrees,
and the degrees of s0(x) and s j(x) are inversely proportional to the magnitude of
N due to Theorem 6 of [65]. Let pi ∈PX be a probability measure over X. We
define the linear operator ld(p(x)) , ∫X p(x) dpi(x) = ∑α∈S2dn pαyα where d ∈ N,
p(x) ∈ R[x] and deg(p(x))≤ 2d. Applying operator ld(.) on equation (3.40) with
finite d, we obtain
N y0± yα = l(s0(x))+ ∑
j∈I
l (s j(x)h j(x))≥ 0, ∀α ∈ S2dn , x ∈ X, (3.41)
where N ∈ N is a sufficiently large integer facilitating inequality (3.41) such that
s0(x) ∈S 2dx , s j(x) ∈S
2(d−⌈deg(h j(x))/2⌉)
x , j ∈I are scalar SOS polynomials. To
facilitate below arguments, we define the supremum norm ‖ f‖
∞
, sup‖x‖≤1 | f (x)|
where x and f reside respectively in an arbitrary primal linear space and the
corresponding dual space of continuous linear functionals. With the supremum
norm in place, we introduce Nd > N such that Nd takes the place of N in
inequality (3.41), and Nd satisfies∥∥∥∥ yNd
∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ 1, (3.42)
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where y = (yα)α∈S∞n = (
∫
X x
α dpi(x))α∈S∞n . We now let yˆ
d
ext be the extension of the
normalized
(
yα
Nd
)
α∈S2dn with a sequence of zeros to make it an infinite bounded
sequence. We introduce the set ˆY dext that contains all yˆdext with arbitrary d ∈ N.
Let Y X , {y ∈ RS∞n | M(y)  0, M(h j ∗ y)  0, j ∈I } be the set of moment
sequences satisfying the positive semidefinite constraints imposed on the infinite
moment matrix M(y) and localizing matrices M(h j ∗ y), j ∈ I with respect to
domain X. By Lemma 4.1 of [53] and equation (4.18) in [53], the dual space
of the quadratic module M((h j)j∈I ) is Y X. Due to Weierstrass’ approximation
theorem, the set of all polynomials with rational coefficients Q[x] is countable
and dense in R[x]. This implies there exists a countable subset of Q[x] that is
dense in M
(
(h j)j∈I
) ⊂ R[x]. Moreover, the set M((h j)j∈I ) is closed due to
Theorem 3.49 of [53] since X has a non-empty interior by assumption in section
1.8. Therefore M((h j)j∈I ) has an everywhere dense subset consisting of rational
polynomials in Q[x]. This makes the normed subspace M
(
(h j)j∈I
)
separable. We
now use the neighbourhood base at zero consisting of all open sets of the form
{y ∈ R∞n : |pT y| < ε , ∀p(x) ∈ M} constructed using arbitrary but finite subset
M ⊂ M((h j)j∈I ) and ε > 0 to generate the weak-⋆ topology on the dual space
Y X. We now define the closed unit ball in Y X by
BY , {y ∈Y X | ‖y‖∞ ≤ 1}. (3.43)
By the Banach-Alaoglu theorem, BY is sequentially compact in the weak-⋆ topol-
ogy of the dual space Y X. Since BY is sequentially compact and the topology in-
duced in BY by the weak-⋆ topology of Y X is metrizable due to Theorem 5 of sub-
section 20.4 in [67], every convergent sequence in BY has a limit point in the same
BY . Due to inequality (3.42) and definition (3.43), we have ˆY dext ⊆ BY . There-
fore, Theorem 4 of [67] states that every bounded sequence
(
yˆdiext
)
i∈N with entries
in ˆY dext contains a weak-⋆ convergent subsequence
(
yˆdiext
)
i∈S⊆N where di ∈ N is
the uppermost degree of the moments in yˆdiext. As a result, pointwise convergence to
an arbitrary yˆ ∈ ˆY dext is achievable by a subsequence such that
lim
i→∞
((
yˆdiext
)
α
)
i∈S⊆N = yˆα , ∀α ∈ S∞n . (3.44)
Pointwise convergence of yˆdiext → yˆ implies pointwise convergence of ydiext → y,
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where ydiext = yˆ
di
extNd and y = yˆNd ∈Y X. Thus we have
lim
i→∞
((
ydiext
)
α
)
i∈S⊆N = yα , ∀α ∈ S∞n , (3.45)
for an arbitrary y ∈Y X. We now solve the problem supPd,r by constructing the
sequence (
ydiext
)
i∈N such that di+1 = di +1. (3.46)
Due to equation (3.45), there exists a subsequence in sequence (3.46) whose limit
point is an arbitrary y ∈Y X. Thus we have
lim
i→∞
((
ydiext
)
α
)
i∈S⊆N = yα , ∀α ∈ S∞n , and di+1 = di +1. (3.47)
Let the moment sequence solution to supP be y∗ corresponding to a near-exact
correlated equilibrium with global-optimal expected social welfare. As i → ∞ in
equation (3.47), we have di → ∞ and the constraints in problem supPd,r approach
that of the original problem supP. Therefore, we have limi→∞
((
ydiext
)
α
)
i∈S⊆N =
y∗α , ∀α ∈ S∞n with weak-⋆ convergence.
Since supPd′,r ≥ supPd,r = supPd ≥ supP, and supPd is upper bounded due to
Theorem 6, supPd,r is monotonically non-increasing and is weak-⋆ convergent to
supP based on the above arguments. 
3.3.5. Sequential SDP Algorithm
We give the following algorithm for solving problem Pd,r.
1. Select a tolerance δ > 0 and set k = 1, dk , maxq∈Q dq0, rk = 0 and zk−1 =
+∞, where dq0 appears in Proposition 4.
2. Solve problem Pdk,rk with an SDP solver, denote the optimal value by z∗k , and
the optimal moment sequence by y∗k .
3. If Pdk,rk is infeasible, set rk+1 = rk +1, increment k and repeat Step 2. If the
inequalities z∗k−1 <+∞ and |(z∗k−z∗k−1)/z∗k−1| ≤ δ hold, terminate and return
(z∗k ,y
∗
k). Otherwise set dk+1 = dk +1, rk+1 = rk, increment k and repeat Step
2.
We remark that Pd is a relaxation of the original problem P, while Pd,r is a re-
striction of Pd . The above algorithm increases d until the optimal value of Pd,r
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saturates, while r is only increased if an infeasibility is detected. If δ is suffi-
ciently small, the algorithm will therefore determine a near-optimal solution for
the original problem P.
3.4. Wireless Application
We first describe the mutually interfering wireless system by Popescu et al. [9]
in subsection . In subsection 3.4.2, we describe the fixed-point “water-filling” al-
gorithm [68] that can be used to compute an arbitrary pure Nash equilibrium in
a distributed setting. Subsection 3.4.3 explains the conditions for analytical in-
ducement of multiple Nash equilibria [9]. Subsection 3.4.4 describes adaptation
of the game problem required for the application of our sequential SDP algorithm
(see subsection 3.3.5). We then give two numerical examples in subsections 3.4.5
and 3.4.6. In numerical example 1, the game setup has one unique Nash equilib-
rium under weak interference. We demonstrate the SDP algorithm in computing a
correlated equilibrium that coincides with the unique Nash equilibrium. In numer-
ical example 2, we introduce significant interference into the wireless system, and
analytically induce the best, intermediate and worst-performing Nash equilibria.
We then demonstrate the SDP algorithm in computing correlated equilibria whose
welfare values are significantly close to that of the best and worst-performing Nash
equilibria of the wireless game.
3.4.1. Mutually Interfering System
We consider the same wireless system by Popescu et al. [9]. The system consists
of two mutually interfering links, each with one transmitter sending to one receiver
in the real signal space. Denoting the set of players by Q , {1,2}, and the signal
vector received at the receiver’s end in link q ∈Q by ϕq ∈ Rγq , we have
ϕq , ∑q′∈Q√gq′qφq′ +ηq, (3.48)
where φq ∈ Rγq is the transmit signal vector of player q, gq′q ∈ R+ is the gain
from the transmitter antenna in link q′ to the receiver antenna in link q, ηq ∈ Rγq
is the white Gaussian noise vector with covariance matrix E(ηqηTq ) = η0I, and
η0 ∈ R++ is the common power spectral density. In Figure 3.1, we illustrate the
two mutually-interfering wireless links.
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g22
Figure 3.1.: Two mutually-interfering wireless links where “TX” and “RX” re-
spectively denote transmitter and receiver. The dotted arrows depict
inter-link interference.
Denoting the covariance matrix of the transmit signal vector φq by Xq,E(φqφ Tq )∈
Sγq , the mutual information of link q is expressible as
1/2log2
det
(
∑q′∈Q gq′qXq′ +η0I
)
det
(
∑q′∈Q\{q} gq′qXq′ +η0I
) . (3.49)
There is a power constraint that enforces tr(Xq) = Pq ∈ R++ with Pq as the power
limit. We henceforth denote the mutual information expression (3.49) by Uq(Xq,X−q).
The above arguments imply that the channel capacity of link q is given by
max
Xq∈Xq
Uq(Xq,X−q), q ∈Q, (3.50)
where Xq , {X  0, tr(X) = Pq}. As the capacity of any link q is affected by the
input X−q of the other link, we have a competitive game whose outcome can be
evaluated using game equilibria.
3.4.2. Nash Equilibrium as a Water-Filling Solution
From game (3.50), a pure Nash equilibrium at (X∗q , X∗−q) is defined by a fixed-point
solution to the following problem,
X∗q = arg maxXq∈Xq
Uq(Xq,X∗−q), ∀q ∈Q, (3.51)
which ensures no player deviates from the strategies specified by (X∗q , X∗−q), as-
suming the other player were to stick to its strategy at X∗−q. One can obtain a pure
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Nash equilibrium solution of problem (3.51) by application of the iterative water-
filling procedure [68]. Using the analogy of a cavern with uneven ground levels,
filling it with water will always achieve a single flat water-level despite the uneven
base. The single flat level above a particular ground level represents the amount
of power to be allocated to a particular subchannel, and the corresponding ground
level represents the amount of background noise in the subchannel.
3.4.3. Conditions for Multiple Nash Equilibria
Popescu et al. [9] give conditions under which different multiplicities of Nash
equilibria occur with respect to the wireless system of mutually interfering links.
These conditions are reproduced in Table 3.1, where g21, g12 are the interference
gains and “Overlap” refers to spectra-overlapping of the transmit covariance ma-
trices X1 and X2. To be consistent with the terminology used in [9], we call the
Table 3.1.: Conditions for Different Multiplicities of Nash Equilibria
Channel Gain Characteristics
Case No. Overlap g21g12 > 1 g21g12 = 1 g21g12 < 1
1 Complete unique unique unique
2 Incomplete many many not applicable
3 None many unique not applicable
sum of utilities ∑q∈QUq(Xq,X−q) the collective capacity. When multiple equilib-
ria occur, the equilibria with the worst, intermediate and best collective capacity
correspond to cases 1-3 of Table 3.1 respectively. We remark that the water-filling
fixed-point solution, which is also a Nash equilibrium point, is not guaranteed to
achieve global-optimal collective capacity.
3.4.4. Adaptation of Game Problem for Sequential SDP Algorithm
To solve problem (3.51) using the problem formulation of Pd,r in subsection 3.3.3,
we introduce X , (Xq,X−q) and notational shorthands,
mq(X), det(∑q′∈Q gq′qXq′ +η0I),
m−q(X−q), det(∑q′∈Q\{q} gq′qXq′ +η0I).
Furthermore, we let uq(vec(Xq),vec(X−q)) be the mutual information of link q
that takes in vectorized forms of X1 and X2. Therefore, the mutual information
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expression (3.49) can be re-expressed as
uq(xq,x−q) = 1/(logb 2)(logb mq(X)− logb m−q(X−q)) , (3.52)
where b is the logarithm base, xq = vec(Xq) is the vectorized upper triangle of Xq,
x−q = (. . . ,vec(Xq′), . . .), q′ 6= q, and nq = γq(γq+1)/2. As we deal with correlated
equilibria, we apply the expectation operator on the utility functions in equation
(3.52). This implies the expected social welfare objective function (i.e. expected
collective capacity of the mutually interfering wireless system) is expressible as
∑
q∈Q
∫
X
uq(xq,x−q) dpi(x) =
1/(logb 2) ∑
q∈Q
{
E(logb mq(X))−E(logb m−q(X−q))
}
.
(3.53)
Recall that our problem formulation Pd,r accepts only polynomial utilities, we re-
express the logarithms in equation (3.53) using quadratic approximations. For
example, the expected value E(logb mq(X)) is approximated as
E(logb mq(X)) = E(logb κmq(X))− logb κ ≈
E
(
a2κ
2mq(X)2 +a1κmq(X)+a0
)− logb κ, (3.54)
where κ ∈ R++ is a sufficiently small constant used in conjunction with a suit-
ably large logarithm base b to ensure the output range of mq(X) stays in a short
interval (0,ξ ), ξ ∈ R++ within which the above quadratic formulation leads to
a reasonably good approximation. The constants a2, . . . ,a0 can be obtained via
a polynomial curve-fitting tool. Therefore, E(logb mq(X)) in equation (3.53) can
be approximated using only moments in E(mq(X)2) and E(mq(X)) of the type∫
X x
αdpi(x) where α ∈ S2dn , for some n,d ∈ N. The same reasoning applies to
E(logb m−q(X−q)) in equation (3.53). In the examples below, we use κ = 5.0e−3,
a2 =−0.0127, a1 = 0.2645, a0 =−0.3250 and b = ξ = 10.
3.4.5. Numerical Example 1
We invoke our SDP algorithm in subsection 3.3.5 to compute the correlated equi-
librium for a setup where there is one unique Nash equilibrium point. With ref-
erence to the analytical model in Table 3.1, we set the intra-link gain values to
g11 = g22 = 1 but set the interference gains to g12 = g21 = 0.25 such that all water-
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filling fixed-point solutions result in complete spectra-overlapping of the transmit
covariance matrices X1 and X2. We set the dimensions of signal vectors for both
links to γ1 = γ2 = 2 (i.e. n1 = n2 = 3), power limits to P1 = P2 = 2, and noise
power spectral density to η0 = 1.0e−4. Regardless of the initial search point, the
water-filling procedure converges to the unique pure Nash equilibrium point at
X1 = I, X2 = I. (3.55)
Feeding the above Nash equilibrium point into the objective function of Pd,r, we
get the expected social welfare value of 9242.776×1.0e−6.
Table 3.2.: Numerical Example 1: Pure Strategies and Expected Social Welfare
values of Correlated Equilibria computed using SDP algorithm
No Params Link 1
′s
Strategy
Link 2′s
Strategy
Expected
Social Welfare
×1.0e−6
d r vec(X1) =
(x1,x2,x3)
T
vec(X2) =
(x4,x5,x6)
T
Global
Worst
(inf Pd,r)
Global
Optimal
(sup Pd,r)
1 3 1 [1,0,1]T [1,0,1]T 9242.665 9242.665
Table 3.3.: Numerical Example 1: Comparison of Expected Social Welfare Values
Achievable By Correlated Equilibria And By Nash Equilibrium
Expected
Social Welfare
Of Correlated
Equilibrium
(computed by
SDP algorithm)
×1.0e−6
Expected
Social Welfare
Of Nash
Equilibrium
(computed by
Water-Filling
With Start
Point From
Analytical Model)
×1.0e−6
Global-Optimal 9242.665 9242.776
Global-Worst Same as above due to unique equilibrium
Setting tolerance δ = 1%, we invoke the sequential SDP algorithm to solve inf Pd,r
and supPd,r. For both problems, the SDP algorithm terminates at d = 3, r = 1 and
returns the same correlated equilibrium solution. Taking the solved instance of
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supPd,r, we examine the resulting moments in the moment matrix Md(y). De-
noting the vectorized inputs by vec(X1) = (x1,x2,x3) and vec(X2) = (x4,x5,x6),
we observe that
∫
xix jdpi(x) =
∫
xidpi(x)
∫
x jdpi(x) for i, j = 1, . . . ,6, meaning the
cov(xi,x j) = 0. This implies the correlated equilibrium whose moment sequence
is the solution to sup Pd,r has pure strategies (i.e. pi is a Dirac measure) reflected
in
∫
xidpi(x), i = 1, . . . ,3 for link 1 and in
∫
xidpi(x), i = 4, . . . ,6 for link 2. Due
to space constraint, we round off these pure strategies and tabulate them in row 1
of Table 3.2, which show their significant closeness to the pure Nash equilibrium
strategy in equations (3.55). As expected, the social welfare values achievable by
the correlated equilibrium and by the Nash equilibrium are significantly close as
evidenced in Table 3.3.
3.4.6. Numerical Example 2
We invoke our SDP algorithm to compute the correlated equilibria with global-
optimal and global-worst expected social welfare for a setup where multiple Nash
equilibria exist due to significant mutual interference. The setup parameters are
similar to those in numerical example 1. However with reference to the analytical
model in Table 3.1, we set the interference gain values instead to g12 = g21 = 1
such that all water-filling fixed-point solutions result in one of three cases namely
“complete” (case 1), “incomplete” (case 2) or “no spectra-overlapping” (case 3)
of X1 and X2 (see subsection ). We then analytically determine three initial search
points that induce the water-filling procedure to converge to three distinct pure
Nash equilibria such that each Nash equilibrium corresponds to exactly one of the
above three cases. For case 1, complete spectra-overlapping is achievable by using
the initial search point at X1 = I and X2 = I. The resulting Nash equilibrium point
by water-filling procedure is
X1 = I, X2 = I. (3.56)
For case 2, incomplete spectra-overlapping is achievable by using an arbitrary ini-
tial search point. We use the initial search point at
X1 =
[
0.7998 0.1838
0.5034 1.2044
]
, X2 =
[
1.6649 0.9311
0.5870 0.0911
]
, (3.57)
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and the resulting Nash equilibrium point by water-filling is
X1 =
[
0.6027 −0.0239
−0.0239 1.3973
]
, X2 =
[
1.3973 0.0239
0.0239 0.6027
]
. (3.58)
For case 3, non-overlapping of the spectra is achievable using the initial search
point at X1 = diag([2,0]T ) and X2 = diag([0,2]T ). The resulting Nash equilibrium
point by water-filling is
X1=diag([1.9985,0.0015]T ), X2=diag([0.0015,1.9985]T ). (3.59)
Feeding pure Nash equilibria strategies from equations (3.56), (3.58) and (3.59)
into the objective function of Pd,r, the worst, intermediate and best expected social
welfare values in multiples of 1.0e−5 are 1318.3725, 1360.1953 and 1581.6362
respectively.
We then invoke our SDP algorithm to solve sup Pd,r and inf Pd,r, and tabulate the
results in Table 3.4. We omit the strategies because the strategies associated to the
global-optimal and global-worst correlated equilibria are of mixed type.
Table 3.4.: Numerical Example 2: Expected Social Welfare values of Correlated
Equilibria computed using SDP algorithm
No Params
Expected
Social Welfare
×1.0e−5
d r Global-Worst
(inf Pd,r)
Global-Optimal
(sup Pd,r)
1 3 1 1318.8034 1582.4009
Table 3.5 shows that the global-optimal and global-worst expected social wel-
fare computed by our SDP algorithm are significantly close to the welfare val-
ues achievable by the pure Nash strategies computed by water-filling aided by the
analytical model in Table 3.1.
3.5. Conclusion
Our demonstrations in numerical examples 1 and 2 show that the welfare values
achievable by the correlated equilibria with global-optimal (global-worst) expected
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Table 3.5.: Numerical Example 2: Comparison Of Expected Social Welfare Values
Achievable By Correlated Equilibria And By Nash Equilibria
Expected
Social Welfare
Of Correlated
Equilibria
(computed by
SDP algorithm)
×1.0e−5
Expected
Social Welfare
Of Nash Equilibria
(computed by
Water-Filling
with start
points from
Analytical Model)
×1.0e−5
Global-Optimal 1582.4009 1581.6362
Intermediate not applicable 1360.1953
Global-Worst 1318.8034 1318.3725
social welfare are significantly close to those achievable by the best (worst) per-
forming Nash equilibria. In contrast, a fixed-point type algorithm without the aid
of an analytical model is likely to yield a Nash equilibrium with suboptimal wel-
fare, given a random initial search point such as the one depicted in the “Interme-
diate” row in Table 3.5.
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4. Computing Near Exact ε-Correlated
Equilibria using Kantorovich
Polynomials with Sparsity
There are existing applications computing correlated equilibria such as cognitive
radio networks for spectrum access [42], [43], [44], node activation in sensor net-
works [45], and power allocation in wireless systems [46]. The underlying algo-
rithms in the above applications are the distributed learning methods in [61], [41].
The applications however either return an arbitrary equilibrium without any perfor-
mance guarantee on the expected social welfare, or discretize the players’ strategy
sets to obtain a finite game. Due to our emphasis on continuous games, the dis-
cretization approach seems unsuitable as the number of discrete actions under such
consideration grows rapidly.
In this chapter, we provide motivations for the correlated equilibrium solution con-
cept from the game-theoretic and optimization perspectives. We then propose an
algorithm that computes ε-correlated equilibria with global-optimal (i.e., maxi-
mum) expected social welfare for normal form polynomial games. We derive
an infinite dimensional formulation of ε-correlated equilibria using Kantorovich
polynomials, and re-express it as a polynomial positivity constraint. We exploit
polynomial sparsity to achieve a leaner problem formulation involving Sum-Of-
Squares (SOS) constraints. By solving a sequence of Semidefinite Programming
(SDP) relaxations of the problem, our algorithm converges to a global-optimal ε-
correlated equilibrium. The chapter ends with two numerical examples involving
a two-player polynomial game, and a wireless game with two mutually-interfering
communication links.
This chapter is taken from our second publication in section 1.7.
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4.1. Introduction
In this chapter, we refer to developments in epistemic game theory [18], [19], [28],
[20], [21], and consider the type of rational behaviour that leads players to rational
strategy profiles constituting game equilibria. Before stating that Bayesian ratio-
nality [13], [18], [19], [20], [36] is one such rational behaviour that leads players
to rational strategy profiles constituting correlated equilibria [28], [20], [37], we
start by explaining what constitutes rational behaviour. We emphasize in subsec-
tion 4.1.1 that not every type of rational behaviour leads players to equilibria. On
the contrary, we explain in subsection 4.1.2 how Bayesian rationality always leads
players to correlated equilibria. Thus the game-theoretic advantage of the cor-
related equilibrium lies in its predictability assured through Bayesian rationality.
Moreover from the optimization perspective, the convex set of correlated equilibria
is amenable to convex optimization [29], [30], [31]. These advantages therefore
motivate us to select the correlated equilibrium as the game solution concept. We
propose in subsection 4.1.3 our method for computing a correlated equilibrium
with the highest possible expected social welfare. We list the contributions of this
chapter in subsection 4.1.4. The organization of the chapter is described in sub-
section 4.1.5.
4.1.1. The Role Of Rationality In Game Behaviour Prediction
In a non-cooperative game with complete information1, each player forms his own
beliefs (i.e. conjectured forecasts) about his opponents’ strategic choices before
deciding his own strategy [18], [19], [5]. Since any of these beliefs may become
true, a player regards a strategy as rational if that strategy is optimal (i.e. best re-
sponse) to at least one of his beliefs about his opponents’ strategies. To facilitate
each player with sufficient information to start forming his own beliefs, it is as-
sumed that players have common knowledge2 [69], [70], [5] of the game structure
(i.e. players’ strategy sets and payoffs) and of the fact that each player selects
only strategies that maximize his expected utility relative to his beliefs. In other
words, a player’s strategy is rational if it is optimal to at least one of his beliefs
based on his common knowledge. In the case where each player’s belief comes
1Note each player still does not know the actual strategies of other players.
2Information E is common knowledge if all players know E, and all players know that all players
know E, and all players know that all players know that all players know E, ad infinitum.
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from a deterministic3 (i.e. non-subjective) evaluation of his opponents’ strategic
choices and payoffs, we refer to the strategy selection behaviour of the players as
strategic rationality. It is indicated in [17], [18], [19], [20], [5] that there is no
guarantee players with strategic rationality always adopt a rational strategy profile
constituting a Nash equilibrium4.
4.1.2. Bayesian Rationality Is Sufficient And Necessary For
Correlated Equilibria
To achieve better prediction of game behaviour, Bernheim [18] introduces the no-
tion of strategies’ rationalizability for normal form games5 by considering rational
behaviour in the sense of Savage’s [71] axioms of individual rationality. Bernheim
[18] and Pearce [19] assume the players have common knowledge of the game
structure and of the following two facts. The first fact states that each player forms
his own subjective probabilistic beliefs about others’ strategic choices. The second
states that each player selects only strategies that maximize his expected utility rel-
ative to his subjective probabilistic beliefs. When each player regards a strategy
as rationalizable (i.e. rational) if that strategy is optimal to at least one of his sub-
jective probabilistic beliefs based on his common knowledge, Aumann [20] refers
to the strategy selection behaviour of the players as Bayesian rationality6. In ad-
dition, Aumann in his work [20] makes the common prior assumption [13] where
a publicly observable random event (e.g. a traffic signaler showing red or green
signal light7) is assumed to exist in the game. Every time the players make a joint
observation of the random event (e.g. two drivers on two opposing lanes observ-
ing a traffic signaler), each player receives his own private recommended strategy.
For example, the traffic signaler shows a red light recommending the driver on the
first lane to stop, and concurrently shows a green light recommending the driver
on the opposing lane to keep going. Aumann also assumes the players know the
common prior probability distribution governing the random variable (e.g. both
drivers on the two opposing lanes know that the signaler allocates red and green
signals fairly). Therefore in Aumann’s case, each player no longer forms his own
3Each player neither holds any subjective view nor conducts any probabilistic assessment of his
opponents’ strategic choices.
4Unless stated otherwise, we refer to both pure and mixed Nash equilibria strategies.
5Pearce [19] independently applies strategies’ rationalizability to extensive form games.
6Aumann attributes the players’ abilities for subjective probabilistic assessments as a result of the
subjectivist Bayesian view of the world.
7For ease of discussion, we do not consider the amber or yellow signal.
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subjective probabilistic beliefs. Each player instead relies on the publicly known
common prior distribution to form his own subjective probabilistic beliefs about
others’ strategic choices through Bayesian inferencing. For example assuming
both drivers know that the signaler shows green/red or red/green pair on the two
opposing lanes with equal chance, a driver seeing green light on his lane forms
his own subjective beliefs about how the other driver on the opposing lane would
respond to the recommended red/stop signal. Assuming the players are Bayesian
rational, Aumann [20] shows if the common prior distribution recommends play-
ers with a strategy profile in line with Bayesian rationality, then the players would
voluntarily adopt the recommended strategy profile to arrive at a correlated equi-
librium. Consider the traffic signaler example where we assume both drivers know
that the signaler shows green/red or red/green pair with equal chance. In this short
example, Bayesian rationality of the players is characterized by a strong preference
for safety. We assume driver A sees green light on his lane. Driver A believes that
driver B on the opposing lane would much prefer to obey the recommended red-
stop signal to avoid an accident since A believes that B believes A would gladly
obey the recommended green-go signal. Therefore a correlated equilibrium of the
drivers on the two opposing lanes arises where no driver has the incentive to uni-
laterally deviate from his recommended traffic signal.
Remark 8 Bernheim [18] and Pearce [19] indicate that players subject to Sav-
age’s [71] axioms exercise strategies’ rationalizability for their rational strategy
profiles. Under the common prior assumption, Brandenburger and Dekel [37]
show that such players rationalizing over their strategies is equivalent to players
conforming to Bayesian rationality to achieve correlated equilibria [20].
Remark 9 We now list the game-theoretic advantages of Bayesian rationality and
the correlated equilibrium concept below. The properties giving rise to below last
three advantages are detailed in subsection 4.2.3.
1. Bayesian rationality is recognized as a normative standard in epistemic
game theory [72], [36], and is even argued to be a rational model of hu-
man cognition [73]. On the industrial front, Bayesian rationality is used
to model intelligent behaviour of cognitive radio transceivers achieving a
correlated equilibrium for wireless spectrum access [42], [43], [44]. Other
applications are detailed in subsection 4.1.3.
2. As mentioned in subsection 4.1.1, players with strategic rationality may not
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adopt a rational strategy profile constituting a Nash equilibrium. On the
contrary, Bayesian rationality under the common prior assumption is equiv-
alent to players achieving correlated equilibria [20]. See subsection 4.2.3
for property.
3. When players are Bayesian rational under the common prior assumption,
a game designer can influence the game outcome by computing a common
prior distribution consistent with Bayesian rationality. The designer then
informs the players of the distribution governing a publicly observable ran-
dom event. For example consider a local traffic authority overseeing road
safety at a junction near to a school. Bayesian rationality of the drivers is
characterized by a willingness to compromise safety for time urgency. To
promote safety, the traffic authority customizes the traffic signaler to allo-
cate red and green signals (i.e. observable random event) according to a
common prior distribution that slows down traffic on the lane linked to the
school. To discourage risk-taking, the authority puts up road signs along the
lane linked to the school before the junction to warn drivers of pedestrians
(i.e. informing players of the distribution). The game designer is assured
that the players would voluntarily adopt the strategy profile recommended
by the prior distribution to arrive at a correlated equilibrium due to Remark
8 and [20]. See subsection 4.2.3 for property.
4. In Bayesian rationality, the definition of correlated equilibrium subsumes
that of the Nash equilibrium. This means a Nash equilibrium applied in
the context of Bayesian rationality offers the same benefits associated with
the correlated equilibrium in the above-mentioned. See subsection 4.2.3 for
property.
4.1.3. Computing Correlated Equilibrium with Highest Possible
Expected Social Welfare
To compute global optimal correlated equilibria for games with polynomial util-
ities over infinite compact strategy sets, we use the same moment relaxation ap-
proach by Kong et al. (our first publication in section 1.7) in [74] that originates
from Stein et al. [31]. Our method in this chapter exploits results in global poly-
nomial optimization [38], [75] and approximation theory [76], [77] to re-express
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the infinite-dimensional problem formulation of global optimal correlated equilib-
ria into a finite-dimensional moment relaxation problem. We remark even though
we focus on games with polynomial utility functions, useful approximations can
still be derived since polynomials with finite degrees can approximate continuous
functions reasonably well within a compact set [40].
4.1.4. Contributions
1. We elaborate properties of the correlated equilibrium that give rise to the
game-theoretic advantages highlighted in Remark 9.
2. For computational purpose, Stein et al. in [31] introduce several classes of
test functions8 to re-express the original formulation of correlated equilibria
by Hart and Schmeidler [49] into a form convenient for algorithmic com-
putation. In this chapter, we adopt the same approach using test functions
to give a formulation for computing ε-correlated equilibria with the highest
possible expected social welfare values. Instead of representing test func-
tions using squares of polynomials for games with polynomial utilities as in
[31], [74], we propose in this chapter to represent test functions using Kan-
torovich polynomials [78], [76], [77]. By exploiting polynomial sparsity
[75], [79], [80], the revised formulation for ε-correlated equilibria based on
our proposed Kantorovich-based test functions exhibit attractive correlative
sparsity pattern [75]. This feature leads to a leaner problem formulation in
comparison to the one by Kong et al. [74]. We reformulate our computation
of ε-correlated equilibria into a moment relaxation problem, solvable as a
convergent sequence of SDP [81] problems. Each SDP problem is in turn
solvable using an SDP tool (e.g. [82]).
3. We demonstrate our algorithm in two numerical examples. The first is a two-
player polynomial game with univariate strategy sets taken from Stein et al.
[31]. The second involves a wireless system with two mutually interfering
network links [9]. For each example, we compute and project the computed
moments of ε-correlated equilibria onto the utility space to obtain graphi-
cal plots of the extreme boundaries of the expected social welfare objective.
This is achieved by varying the weights of the social welfare objective func-
tion9, and solving the corresponding global optimization problems. As we
8Stein et al. use test functions for reasons elaborated in Remark 13.
9The social welfare objective by default is an equally weighted sum of the players’ utilities.
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tighten the relaxation parameters to converge to the more accurate moments
of ε-correlated equilibria, each instance of relaxation parameters contributes
to a specific boundary of the social welfare objective appearing in the graph-
ical plots.
4.1.5. Organization of Chapter
We mention characterization of Bayesian rationality and game equilibria in sec-
tion 4.2, and elaborate properties of the correlated equilibrium giving rise to the
game-theoretic advantages stated in Remark 9. In section 4.3, we proceed to men-
tion two infinite-dimensional formulations of exact correlated equilibria for con-
tinuous games. In section 4.4, we give the problem formulation for computing
exact correlated equilibria with global-optimal expected social welfare. We then
describe our use of Kantorovich polynomials to represent test functions in the for-
mulation. To improve computational performance, we update the formulation for
exact equilibria to accommodate ε-correlated equilibria by using a polynomial pos-
itivity constraint. The positivity constraint is re-expressible as a single quadratic
module membership constraint with finite upper degree bound. Quadratic module
membership constraints are computationally appealing because they are express-
ible as SOS constraints, implementable as linear matrix inequalities [50] solvable
by SDP tools (e.g. [82]). Furthermore we exploit polynomial sparsity [75] to split
the single quadratic module membership constraint into multiple low dimensional
quadratic module membership constraints resulting in leaner SOS constraints. We
then end section 4.4 with a sequential SDP algorithm. In section 4.5, we demon-
strate our algorithm in two numerical examples.
4.2. Characterization of Bayesian Rationality and Game
Equilibria
The formulations of correlated equilibria by Aumann [28], [20] apply to finite
games. In this section, we focus only on finite games with discrete strategy sets.
In subsection 4.2.1, we mention the formulation by Aumann [20] for Bayesian
rationality under the common prior assumption. We explain in subsection 4.2.2
game equilibria conditions to evaluate whether a rational strategy profile adopted
by the players constitutes an equilibrium. In subsection 4.2.3, we elaborate prop-
erties of the correlated equilibrium giving rise to the game-theoretic advantages in
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Remark 9.
4.2.1. Formulation For Bayesian Rationality Under Common Prior
Assumption
Recall in subsection 4.1.2 that Aumann in [20] makes the common prior10 assump-
tion [13] where players receive recommended strategies from a common prior dis-
tribution pi ∈PX. The distribution pi recommends players with strategies consis-
tent with Bayesian rationality if
∑
x−q∈X−q
pi(x−q|xq) [uq(xq,x−q)−uq(tq,x−q)]≥ 0, ∀tq ∈Xq, xq,∈Xq, q∈Q. (4.1)
4.2.2. Evaluation of Game Outcome
We consider the situation where players have adopted an arbitrary rational strat-
egy profile. We mention the conditions under which the adopted strategy profile
constitutes a Nash equilibrium or a correlated equilibrium.
Nash Equilibrium
In games with strategic rationality, the players’ strategies are assumed independent
[5], [48]. A given strategy profile pi∗ = (pi∗q ,pi∗−q) ∈ P indepX constitutes a Nash
equilibrium [1] (i.e. pure or mixed Nash equilibrium) if no player q can make
further gains to his own expected utility by unilaterally deviating from his strategy
pi∗q , assuming others were to remain in their strategies pi∗−q:
∑
xq∈Xq
[
pi∗q (xq)−µq(xq)
] ∑
x−q∈X−q
pi∗−q(x−q)uq(xq,x−q)≥ 0,
∀µq ∈ indepq(pi−q), pi−q ∈P indepX−q , q ∈Q,
(4.2)
where operator indepq(pi−q) returns the set of all player q’s strategies independent
of pi−q, which is an independent distribution itself (see subsection 1.8.3). Note that
10We remind the reader that not every common prior distribution recommends strategies that are
rationalizable by Bayesian rational players.
70
inequality (4.2) is equivalent to the following,
∑
x∈X
[
pi∗(x)−µq(x) ∑
x−q∈X−q
pi∗−q(x−q)
]
uq(x)≥ 0,
∀µq ∈ indepq(pi−q), pi−q ∈P indepX−q , q ∈Q.
(4.3)
Due to strategic rationality, we remind the reader that each player q being non-
Bayesian rational holds no subjective probabilistic assessment of his opponents’
strategic choices except for µq over his own actions in inequality (4.2).
Correlated Equilibrium
In games with Bayesian rationality, the players’ strategies can be correlated [37].
In [28], [20], a common prior distribution pi ∈PX is said to recommend players
with a correlated strategy profile constituting a correlated equilibrium if no player
q can make further gains to his own expected utility by unilaterally deviating from
his strategy recommended by pi , assuming others were to follow their recommen-
dations.
We emphasize that the normal form game for players with strategic rationality
is not defined to facilitate players with a common prior distribution. Aumann
[20] redefines the normal form game to obtain an extended version or extended
normal form game, which accommodates a common prior distribution accessible
to the Bayesian rational players. The extended normal form game equips each
player with a new strategy set defined by ζ q , {ζq : Xq → Xq} or set of departure
functions.
Remark 10 The departure function gets its name from the fact that given xq ∈Xq,
an arbitrary ζq ∈ ζ q leads to ζq(xq), which may depart from xq.
Consider a common prior distribution pi that recommends players with a correlated
strategy profile. The profile constitutes a correlated equilibrium [28], [20] if
∑
x∈X
pi(x) [uq(x)−uq(ζq(xq),x−q)]≥ 0, ∀ζq ∈ ζ q, (4.4)
where x = (xq,x−q), xq ∈ Xq, and x−q ∈ X−q.
Remark 11 In normal form games with strategic rationality, the correlated equi-
librium is not applicable because each player being non-Bayesian rational in
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this case holds no subjective probabilistic assessment of his opponents’ strate-
gic choices. As a result, the correlated equilibrium applies only to games where
Bayesian rationality is assumed. This is the case because Bayesian rational play-
ers are capable of making such subjective probabilistic assessments, unlike players
with only strategic rationality. However the Nash equilibrium is not only applica-
ble to games with strategic rationality, but it applies also to games with Bayesian
rationality because the correlated equilibrium generalizes the Nash equilibrium.
This means that a Nash equilibrium can manifest as a correlated equilibrium in
games with the Bayesian rationality assumption. We elaborate the generalization
property in subsection 4.2.3.
4.2.3. Properties of the Correlated Equilibrium
We elaborate properties that give rise to the advantages highlighted in Remark 9.
In this subsection, we deal only with Bayesian rationality under the common prior
assumption in extended normal form games (see subsection 4.2.2). For ease of
understanding we remind the reader that we use pi ∈PX to represent a probability
distribution, which is referred to by different names. When we refer to a common
prior distribution pi , we are in effect referring to the strategy profile recommended
by pi . If the players get to satisfy the condition for correlated equilibrium in in-
equality (4.4) by adopting the pi-recommended strategy profile, then we say that pi
is a correlated equilibrium. Therefore a given correlated equilibrium pi is in effect
a common prior distribution that recommends players with a correlated strategy
profile, which they would not deviate from.
Bayesian Rationality under Common Prior Assumption is Equivalent To
Condition For Correlated Equilibrium
Recall in inequality (4.1) the condition under which a common prior distribution
pi recommends strategies in line with Bayesian rationality under the common prior
assumption. Recall in inequality (4.4) the condition under which a common prior
distribution pi recommends a strategy profile constituting a correlated equilibrium.
Aumann in [20] shows that inequality (4.1) is equivalent to inequality (4.4). We
explain this result in the following remark.
Remark 12 If pi recommends players with strategies in line with Bayesian ratio-
nality under the common prior assumption, the Bayesian rational players would
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voluntarily adopt the pi-recommended strategy profile to arrive at a correlated
equilibrium. Conversely if the Bayesian rational players achieve a correlated equi-
librium by following the strategy profile recommended by a common prior pi , then
pi must have recommended players with strategies in line with Bayesian rationality
under the common prior assumption.
Bayesian Rational Players Always Follow a Common Prior Distribution
Consistent with Bayesian Rationality
As explained in Remark 12, as long as the customizable common prior distribution
pi recommends players with strategies in line with Bayesian rationality under the
common prior assumption, the Bayesian rational players would voluntarily adopt
the pi-recommended strategy profile to arrive at a correlated equilibrium.
Correlated Equilibrium Generalizes the Nash Equilibrium
By the following proposition, we give a proof to show that the Nash equilibrium
can manifest as a correlated equilibrium in an extended normal form game.
Proposition 6 [29]11 A correlated equilibrium pi is a Nash equilibrium strategy
profile if and and only if pi equals the product of its marginals.
Proof 10 We first show that a Nash equilibrium (pi∗q ,pi∗−q) ∈P indepX in inequality
(4.2) can manifest as a correlated equilibrium. In Lemma 33.2 of [48], a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for (pi∗q ,pi∗−q) to be a Nash equilibrium requires every
action of player q in the support supp(pi∗q ) to be a best response to pi∗−q such that
∑
x−q∈X−q
pi∗−q(x−q) [uq(xq,x−q)−uq(tq,x−q)]≥ 0,
∀tq ∈ Xq, xq ∈ supp(pi∗q ), q ∈Q.
(4.5)
To express inequality (4.5) using departure functions, we define each ζq(xq) ∈ ζ q
as a map that relates the fixed ordered sequence (xq)xq∈Xq to a tuple in ∏|Xq|Xq.
As a result, we obtain the following condition equivalent to inequality (4.5),
∑
xq∈Xq
pi∗q (xq) ∑
x−q∈X−q
pi∗−q(x−q) [uq(xq,x−q)−uq(ζq(xq),x−q)]≥ 0,
∀ζq ∈ ζ q, q ∈Q.
(4.6)
11The authors in [29] state the property without a proof.
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Since (pi∗q ,pi∗−q) in inequality (4.6) satisfies inequality (4.4), we have shown that
the Nash equilibrium can manifest as a correlated equilibrium. Conversely, a
correlated equilibrium pi ∈PX can represent a Nash equilibrium by setting pi =
(pi∗q ,pi∗−q) ∈ P indepX . The proof from inequality (4.6) back to inequality (4.5) is
obtainable using the above same arguments. 
4.3. Correlated Equilibria in Continuous Games
In sections 4.1 and 4.2, the formulations of correlated equilibria by Aumann [28],
[20] apply to finite games. Hart and Schmeidler [49] generalize the formulations
by Aumann [28], [20] to give an infinite-dimensional formulation of correlated
equilibria for continuous (i.e. infinite) games using Borel-measurable departure
functions (see Remark 10). From this section onwards, we focus on correlated
equilibria for continuous games. Before discussing the formulation of correlated
equilibria, we remind the reader that we work in the Euclidean space Xq ⊂ Rnq ,
q ∈ Q. Henceforth, Xq with the Euclidean norm induces the topological space
with the Borel-σ algebra B(Xq). We denote the corresponding σ -additive Borel
measure defined on B(Xq) by piq with Xq as the unit. With the product topology,
we define pi =×q∈Qpiq as the σ -additive Borel measure on B(X).
Theorem 8 [49] A formulation of correlated equilibria pi for continuous games is
∫
X
[uq(x)−uq(ζq(xq),x−q)]dpi(x)≥ 0,∀ζq :(Xq,B(Xq))→(Xq,B(Xq)), q∈Q,
where x = (xq,x−q), xq ∈ Xq, x−q ∈ X−q, ζq(xq) is a signed Borel-measurable
departure function, and B(Xq) is the Borel σ -algebra of Xq.
The existence of correlated equilibria for continuous games is established by the
following theorem.
Theorem 9 [49] Assume that for each q ∈ Q, the space Xq is compact Hausdorff
and the function uq is continuous (where X is endowed with the product topology).
Let B(Xq) be the Borel σ -algebra on Xq, and let B(X) be the Borel σ -algebra
on X. Then there exists a countably additive correlated equilibrium with respect
to
{
B(Xq)
}
q∈Q and B(X).
Remark 13 Stein et al. state that the departure function ζq(xq) within the term
uq(ζq(xq),x−q) in Theorem 8 leads to a complicated nested function composition
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[31]. For algorithmic convenience, Stein et al. propose to use test functions f (xq)
to replace the original nested function composition uq(ζq(xq),x−q) with the sim-
pler non-nested f (xq)uq(tq,x−q), tq ∈Xq. Using this approach, Stein et al. use test
functions to give the following equivalent reformulation12 of correlated equilibria
in Theorem 8.
Theorem 10 [31] A formulation of correlated equilibria pi for continuous games
based on test functions f (xq) is
∫
X
f (xq) [uq(x)−uq(tq,x−q)]dpi(x)≥ 0,
∀ f : (Xq,L (Xq))→ (R+,B(R+)), tq ∈ Xq, q ∈Q,
(4.7)
where x = (xq,x−q), xq ∈ Xq, x−q ∈ X−q, L (Xq) is the σ -algebra of Lebesgue-
measurable subsets of Xq, and f can be in any of the following classes namely
(i) characteristic functions of measurable sets, (ii) measurable functions with fi-
nite range, (iii) bounded measurable functions, (iv) continuous functions, or (v)
squares of polynomials.
We denote by LXq the linear space of Lebesgue integrable functions defined on the
compact set Xq. In addition, we denote by ¯L
+
Xq ⊂ LXq the subspace of functions
that are non-negative and bounded.
Remark 14 In [31], Stein et al. use class (v) test functions to formulate corre-
lated equilibria using Theorem 10. However in this chapter, we propose to use
class (iii) test functions ¯L+Xq to formulate correlated equilibria. We use the space of
Kantorovich polynomials [78], [76], [77] generated by the Bernstein basis polyno-
mials [78] to represent ¯L+Xq because class (iii) test functions can be discontinuous.
More importantly, Kantorovich-based test functions enable us to derive a more ef-
ficient formulation of correlated equilibria (see subsection 4.4.7 for details). Note
the above efficiency gain is related to our second contribution in subsection 4.1.4.
4.4. Problem Formulation and Solution
In subsection 4.4.1, we first mention the infinite-dimensional problem formulation
for computing exact correlated equilibria with global-optimal expected social wel-
12Stein et al. [31] indicate that their formulation based on test functions however does not have a
direct game-theoretic interpretation to it.
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fare. To represent class (iii) test functions in ¯L+Xq of Remark 14, we first introduce
multivariate Kantorovich polynomials in subsection 4.4.2. We explain in subsec-
tion 4.4.3 how to represent ¯L+Xq using Kantorovich polynomials. In subsection
4.4.4, we re-express the problem formulation for global optimal correlated equi-
libria using Kantorovich polynomials. Instead of optimizing probability measures
directly, we reformulate the computation of global-optimal correlated equilibria
into a moment optimization problem in subsection 4.4.5. To improve computa-
tional performance, we update the formulation for exact equilibria to accommo-
date ε-correlated equilibria in subsection 4.4.6 by using a polynomial positivity
constraint per player. Each polynomial positivity constraint is realizable as a sin-
gle quadratic module membership constraint. We then exploit polynomial sparsity
in subsection 4.4.7 to split the single quadratic module membership constraint into
multiple low dimensional ones, each focusing on a specific proper subset of vari-
ables hence obtaining a leaner problem. In subsection 4.4.8, we give the SDP
moment relaxation of the initial infinite-dimensional formulation from subsection
4.4.1. We finally give a dedicated sequential SDP algorithm in subsection 4.4.10,
which is used to solve the SDP moment relaxation in subsection 4.4.8.
4.4.1. Computing Correlated Equilibria with Global-Optimal
Expected Social Welfare
The social welfare function is defined as the sum of utilities [24], [27] of all players
q ∈ Q. Assuming the players have polynomial utilities, we derive the following
proposition using inequality (4.7) and Remark 14.
Proposition 7 The problem formulation for computing a correlated equilibrium pi
with global-optimal expected social welfare is
P : sup
pi∈PX
∑
q∈Q
∫
X
uq(x) dpi(x)
s.t.
∫
X
f (xq) [uq(x)−uq(tq,x−q)]dpi(x)≥ 0,
∀ f (xq) ∈ ¯L+Xq , tq ∈ Xq ⊂ Rnq , q ∈Q,
where x = (xq,x−q), xq ∈ Xq, and x−q ∈ X−q.
Proof 11 See Appendix B.1. 
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4.4.2. Multivariate Kantorovich Polynomials
We first denote by L[0,1]n the linear space of functions defined on the unit hyper-
cube. In approximation theory a given function (including discontinuous ones)
f (z) ∈ L[0,1]n at a given z0 ∈ [0,1]n can be approximated by a Kantorovich polyno-
mial [78], [76], [77], which is constructed out of Bernstein basis polynomials [78].
For n ∈N and z ∈Rn, an n-dimensional Bernstein basis polynomial multi-indexed
by j ∈ Dτn with degree vector τ ∈ Nn is
pτ1j1(z1) . . . p
τn
jn(zn), (4.8)
where pτiji(zi) = s(τi− ji, ji)z
ji
i (1− zi)τi− ji . Due to the multi-index j, we have |Dτn|
number of Bernstein basis polynomials. Given f (z)∈L[0,1]n , the Kantorovich poly-
nomial (Kτn f )(z) of degree vector τ with respect to f (z) is defined by [78], [76],
[77],
(Kτn f )(z), ∑
j∈Dτn
[
∏
i=1,...,n
(τi +1)
∫
[0,1]n
χτj (z′) f (z′)dz′
]
pτ1j1(z1) . . . p
τn
jn(zn), (4.9)
where χτj (z′) is the characteristic function returning 1 if z′ ∈ ∏ni=1
[
ji
τi+1 ,
ji+1
τi+1
]
, or
0 otherwise. Therefore given z0 ∈ [0,1]n, limτ→∞(Kτn f )(z0) = f (z0).
4.4.3. Representing Test Function Space ¯L+Xq Using Kantorovich
Polynomials
To represent the test function space ¯L+Xq in problem P of Proposition 7 using Kan-
torovich polynomials in definition (4.9), we give the following proposition.
Proposition 8 Every f (z) ∈ ¯L+[0,1]n is expressible as a linear combination of Bern-
stein basis polynomials within the hypercube [0,1]n, with a unique sequence of
non-negative and bounded basis coefficients (ω j)j∈Dn .
Proof 12 See Appendix B.2. 
Remark 15 To fulfill the hypercube requirement of Proposition 8, we introduce a
vector-valued affine transformation ℘q(xq), (℘qi(xqi))i=1,...,nq , ℘q : Xq → [0,1]nq
to embed the compact Xq within [0,1]nq . Due to ℘q(xq), there exists an isomor-
phism between ¯L+Xq and ¯L
+
℘q(Xq) such that we can represent the former linear space
with the latter.
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4.4.4. Re-expressing Problem P Using Kantorovich Polynomials
For notational convenience, we denote the Bernstein basis polynomial of degree
vector τ in expression (4.8) by pτj(xq) = pτ1j1(℘q1(xq1)) . . . p
τnq
jnq (℘qnq(xqnq)) where
xq ∈Xq, j ∈Dτnq , and ℘q(xq) is taken from Remark 15. Setting τ to infinite degree
vector, the correlated equilibria constraint in problem P of Proposition 7 becomes
∫
X

 ∑
j∈Dnq
ω j p j(xq)

 [uq(x)−uq(tq,x−q)]dpi(x)≥ 0,
∀(wq, tq) ∈Ωq×Xq, q ∈Q,
(4.10)
where x = (xq,x−q), xq ∈ Xq, x−q ∈ X−q, wq , (ω j)j∈Dnq is the sequence of all
basis coefficients13 that first appears in Proposition 8, and Ωq ,∏ j∈Dnq [0,1].
Remark 16 For notational convenience, we use a scalar value τ to represent the
Kantorovich degree vector (τi)i=1,...,n in definition (4.9) where τi = τ .
4.4.5. Computing Correlated Equilibria As An Infinite-Dimensional
Moment Optimization Problem
In order to rewrite problem P as an optimization problem over moment sequences
instead of probability measures, we introduce the set of moment sequences
Y , {y ∈ RNn0 | ∃pi ∈PX with y =
∫
X
b(x) dpi(x)}, (4.11)
where b(x) is the infinite monomial basis vector.
Proposition 9 Applying inequality (4.10) and re-expressing problem P in mo-
ments, we have
sup
y∈Y
uT y
s.t. M(y) 0,
M(hk ∗ y) 0, ∀k ∈I Xq ,
∑
j∈Dnq
ω j

 ∑
α∈Sn
yα

b jα − ∑
ζ∈S2dqnq
c jαζ tζq



≥ 0, ∀(wq, tq) ∈Ωq×Xq,


∀q ∈Q,
(4.12)
13Note that the basis coefficients ω j are not Bernstein coefficients.
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where wq, (ω j)j∈Dnq , dq, ⌈deg(νq(.,xq, .))/2⌉with νq(tq,xq,x−q), uq(xq,x−q)−
uq(tq,x−q) as a difference of utilities, b jα ∈ R, c jαζ ∈ R are constants, M(y),
M(hk ∗ y) are the infinite moment and localizing matrices, and y is an infinite mo-
ment sequence.
Proof 13 See Appendix B.3. 
Remark 17 Based on [64], [38], [53], we can use truncated (i.e., of finite length)
moment sequences to represent probability measures over a basic compact semial-
gebraic set. To obtain a relaxation of problem (4.12), we limit the moment degrees
of y up to 2d, d ∈ N. Furthermore, we limit the Kantorovich degree in Dτnq to
scalar14 τ =
⌊
2(d−δq)/nq
⌋
where δq , ⌈deg(νq(.,xq,x−q))/2⌉, and νq(.) first
appears in Proposition 9.
Proposition 10 A finite-dimensional semi-infinite relaxation of problem (4.12) with
finite degree d is
Pd : sup
y
uT y
s.t. y ∈ RS2dn , Md(y) 0,
Md−dk(hk ∗ y) 0, ∀k ∈I Xq ,
∑
j∈D⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋nq
ω j

 ∑
α∈S2dn
yα

b jα − ∑
ζ∈S2dqnq
c jαζ tζq



≥ 0,
∀(wq, tq) ∈Ωq×Xq,


q ∈Q,
where wq = (ω j)j∈D⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋nq
, dk , ⌈deg(hk(xq))/2⌉, δq is taken from Remark 17,
dq from Proposition 9, yα =
∫
X(x)
αdpi(x), α ∈ S2dn are the moments of a measure
pi ∈PX, and Md(y) ∈ Ss(n,d), Md−dk(hk ∗y) ∈ Ss(n,d−dk) are the truncated moment
and localizing matrices.
Proof 14 See Appendix B.4. 
Remark 18 By Proposition 10, we have supPd ≥ supP.
14See Remark 16.
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4.4.6. Formulating ε-Correlated Equilibria Using Single High
Dimensional Quadratic Module Membership Constraint
We first denote the last semi-infinite non-negativity correlated equilibria constraint
of problem Pd in Proposition 10 by pq(y,wq, tq) ≥ 0, ∀(wq, tq) ∈Ωq×Xq. Simpli-
fying the constraint, we get
pq(y,wq, tq) = ∑
j∈D⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋nq
ω j

 ∑
α∈S2dn
yα ∑
ζ∈S2dqnq
a jαζ tζq

≥ 0,
∀(wq, tq) ∈Ωq×Xq,
(4.13)
where wq = (ω j)j∈D⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋nq
, a jαζ = b jα −c jαζ if ζ = 0, otherwise a jαζ =−c jαζ
if ζ 6= 0. Note that b jα and c jαζ are taken from Proposition 10, and inequality
(4.13) formulates exact correlated equilibria via the moment sequence y. By intro-
ducing a small fixed ε ∈R++, we get to accommodate ε-correlated equilibria [31]
using a polynomial positivity constraint pq(y,wq, tq)+ ε > 0, ∀(wq, tq) ∈Ωq×Xq
[56]. According to [54], [53] the polynomial positivity constraint is expressible as
a single quadratic module membership constraint,
pq(y,wq, tq)+ ε ∈MΩq×Xq , (4.14)
where ε > 0 is a small fixed constant, and MΩq×Xq is a quadratic module generated
by the constraints defining15 Ωq×Xq.
Theorem 11 [65] Given p ∈ Rd [φ ], φ ∈ Φ = {φ ∈ Rn : hi(φ) ≥ 0, i ∈ I Φ},
p(φ) > 0 such that p(φ) = s(φ)+∑i∈I Φ si(φ)hi(φ) ∈ MΦ , with s, si ∈S φ , the
degree of si(φ)hi(φ), i ∈I Φ is upper-bounded by rˆ = c exp
(
(d2nd |p|p∗ )
c
)
, where
the operator exp(.) refers to the exponential function, p∗ = minφ p(φ), constant
c ∈R++ depends on the constraints hi(φ), i ∈I Φ , and |p|= maxα |pα |∏i=1,...,n αi!|α|! .
Remark 19 Due to Theorem 11, representing ε-correlated equilibria with y in
pq(y,ω , t)+ε ∈MΩq×Xq for a fixed ε > 0 requires only finitely bounded MrΩq×Xq .
Remark 20 Due to Remark 19, ε > 0 enables membership constraint (4.14) to
hold true with a finitely upper bounded MrΩq×Xq .
15The sets Ωq and Xq are defined respectively in inequality (4.10) and in section 1.8.
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The quadratic module membership constraint (4.14) is re-expressible as an equality
with scalar SOS terms,
pq(y,wq, tq)+ ε ∈ MrΩq×Xq
= s(wq, tq)+ ∑
j∈I Ωq
s j(wq, tq)h j(ω j)+ ∑
k∈I Xq
sk(wq, tq)hk(tq),
(4.15)
where wq =(ω j)j∈D⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋nq
, s(wq, tq)∈S Sr/2(wq,tq), s j(wq, tq)∈S S
r′j/2
(wq,tq)
, sk(wq, tq)∈
S S
r′k/2
(wq,tq)
, deg(pq(.,wq, tq))≤ r∈ 2N0, r′j and r satisfy r′j+
(
1− (−1)deg(h j(ω j)))/2=
r−deg(h j(ω j)), and r′k and r satisfy r′k+
(
1− (−1)deg(hk(tq)))/2 = r−deg(hk(tq)).
Remark 21 We refer to the SOS constraints s(wq, tq)∈S Sr/2(wq,tq), s j(wq, tq)∈S S
r′j/2
(wq,tq)
,
and sk(wq, tq) ∈S S
r′k/2
(wq,tq)
in the membership constraint (4.15). Since the number of
attributes in (wq, tq) of equality (4.15) is len(wq, tq) = |D⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋nq |+nq, uphold-
ing membership constraint (4.15) leads to high dimensional SOS constraints.
Remark 22 As a major contribution in this chapter, we circumvent high dimen-
sionality of the SOS constraints by exploiting sparsity of the polynomial positivity
constraint that formulates ε-correlated equilibria in membership constraint (4.15).
Through sparsity analysis, we get to avoid defining the scalar SOS terms s(wq, tq),
s j(wq, tq) and sk(wq, tq) in membership constraint (4.15) using all attributes in
(wq, tq).
4.4.7. Formulating ε-Correlated Equilibria Using Multiple Low
Dimensional Quadratic Module Membership Constraints Via
Polynomial Sparsity
To evaluate sparsity of a polynomial positivity constraint expressed as a quadratic
module membership constraint such as membership constraint (4.15), Waki et al.
[75] (see also [83], [84]) introduce correlative sparsity pattern (CSP) structure.
Given a constrained positive polynomial in the decision variable φ , CSP essen-
tially looks for cross-terms φiφ j, i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} with non-zero coefficients in the
positive polynomial and in the constraints of φ . To determine CSP structure of a
given p(φ) ∈Rd [φ ], φ ∈Rn with constraints hi(φ)≥ 0, i ∈I Φ , a CSP matrix R =
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{†16, 0}n×n is constructed using dsupp(.)17,
R jl =


† if j = l,
† if ∃α ∈ dsupp(p(φ)), α j ≥ 1, αl ≥ 1,
† if ∃i ∈I Φ, ∃α ,β ∈ dsupp(hi(φ)), α j > 0,βl > 0 or α j > 0,αl > 0,
0 otherwise.
(4.16)
From CSP matrix R, one induces a CSP graph G(φ , E) with edges E= {( j, l) | R jl =
†, j < l}where bold φ indexes the attributes of φ . From G(φ , E), one extracts max-
imal cliques18 to determine what variables go into construction of the quadratic
modules. Each clique is representable by an index set Cγ ⊆ φ , γ ∈ Γ, where Γ
in turn indexes the maximal cliques. The benefit in exploiting polynomial sparsity
becomes obvious when we get to define the SOS terms in a quadratic module using
the lower dimensional φCγ instead of φ where len(φCγ ) < len(φ). This sets out to
achieve what is stated in Remark 22.
Let φq = (wq, tq). To evaluate the CSP structure of pq(y,φq) in membership con-
straint (4.15), we construct a CSP matrix to induce G(φ q,Eq) from which we ex-
tract maximal cliques represented by Cγ ⊆φ q, γ ∈Γq where Γq indexes the cliques.
Subject to two conditions19 in [80], these cliques enable membership constraint
(4.15) to be satisfied with
pq(y,φq)+ ε ∈ ∑
γ∈Γq
Mrγ
= ∑
γ∈Γq
[
sγ(φCγ )+ ∑
i∈I γ
si(φCγ )hi(φCγ )
]
,
(4.17)
where I q =I Xq∪I Ωq indexes all constraints of player q such that I Xq∩I Ωq =
/0, I γ = {i ∈I q | hi ∈ R[φCγ ]} indexes the set of constraints that correspond to
the γ-th maximal clique, sγ(φCγ ) ∈S r/2φCγ , si(φCγ ) ∈S
r′i/2φCγ , and r
′
i and r satisfy the
condition r′i +
(
1− (−1)deg(hi(φCγ ))
)
/2 = r−deg(hi(φCγ )).
Due to Proposition 24 in Appendix B.6, len(φCγ ) is significantly smaller than
len(φq). This means we can define the scalar SOS terms sγ(φCγ ), si(φCγ ) in mem-
16As the symbol “†” is sufficient to indicate presence of a cross-term relationship between φi and
φ j, assigning a non-zero numerical value to Ri j is immaterial.
17Refer to subsection 1.8.
18A clique of a graph is an induced complete (or fully-connected) subgraph [85]. A clique is maxi-
mal if its vertices do not constitute a proper subset of another clique.
19The conditions are elaborated in the later Remark 23.
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bership constraint (4.17) using low dimensional S r/2φCγ , S
r′i/2φCγ . This helps to mit-
igate the high dimensionality issue raised in Remark 21, and to achieve what is
stated in Remark 22. In Remark 21, one has no choice but to use all the attributes
in φq = (wq, tq) to define the SOS terms. However by exploiting polynomial spar-
sity, one gets to define the required SOS terms in membership constraint (4.17)
using only attributes in φCγ where len(φCγ ) is significantly smaller than len(φq).
Remark 23 To ensure the quadratic module membership constraint (4.17) holds
true, Grimm et al. [80] state two conditions. The first requires the quadratic mod-
ule Mrγ in membership constraint (4.17) to adhere to the Archimedean property
[79], which we show to be satisfiable in Appendix B.5 by adding bound constraints.
The second requires the maximal cliques Cγ , γ ∈ Γq in membership constraint
(4.17) to conform to the running intersection property [79]. We fulfill the second
condition by introducing our new graph extension method in Appendix B.6, which
extends G(φ q,Eq) (i.e. the CSP graph that gives rise to membership constraint
(4.17)) with extra edges. The maximal cliques extracted from the extended graph
satisfy the running intersection property.
Subsequently, Lasserre [79] gives theoretical convergence for constrained polyno-
mial optimization with sparsity subject to the condition that the quadratic mod-
ule MΦ is Archimedean, and the maximal cliques satisfy the running intersection
property as described below.
Definition 6 [85] Given that Γ indexes a collection of index sets {Cγ : γ ∈Γ}, if
there exists an ordering bijection ρ({1, . . . , |Γ|}, Γ) such that
Cρ(ˆi+1)∩
ˆi⋃
i=1
Cρ(i) ⊆ Cρ( j), ∃ j ≤ ˆi, ∀ˆi ∈ {1, . . . , |Γ|−1}, (4.18)
then the collection indexed by Γ satisfies the running intersection property.
4.4.8. Primal SDP Formulation of Problem Pd,r in Proposition 10
In [74], Kong et al. derive an SDP moment relaxation for Problem P of Proposition
7 using class (v) test functions (see Theorem 10) and matrix SOS constraints [51].
The matrix SOS constraints [51] face a high dimensionality issue similar to the
one raised in Remark 21. However by exploiting the CSP structure of membership
constraint (4.15) to arrive at the leaner membership constraint (4.17), we give the
following proposition.
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Proposition 11 An SDP moment relaxation of Problem Pd is
Pd,r : sup
y,Z′i ,Zγ
uT y
s.t. y ∈ RS2dn , Md(y) 0,
Md−dk(hk ∗ y) 0, k ∈I Xq ,
∑
α∈S2dn
aαβ yα + εβ − ∑
i∈I γ
tr
(
Z′iΛ′iβ
)
− tr(ZγΛγβ)= 0, β ∈ Sr|Cγ |,
Z′i  0, Zγ  0, i ∈I γ ,


γ ∈Γq,
q ∈Q,
where Cγ , γ ∈Γq refer to the maximal cliques that contribute to the low-dimensional
SOS constraints in membership constraint (4.17), I γ is taken from membership
constraint (4.17), d, dk from Proposition 10, Z′i ∈ Ss(|Cγ |,r
′
i/2), Zγ ∈ Ss(|Cγ |,r/2) are
matrix variables, r′i and r satisfy the condition r′i +
(
1− (−1)deg(hi(φCγ ))
)
/2 =
r−deg[hi(φCγ )], r ∈ 2N is upper bounded due to Remark 20, εβ = ε in membership
constraint (4.17) if |β |= 0 else εβ = 0, and Λ′iβ ∈ Ss(|Cγ |,r′i/2), Λγβ ∈ Ss(|Cγ |,r/2) are
constant matrices satisfying
br′i/2(φCγ )br′i/2(φCγ )T hi(φCγ ) = ∑β∈Sr′i|Cγ |
Λ′iβ φ βCγ , i ∈I γ ,
br/2(φCγ )br/2(φCγ )T = ∑β∈Sr|Cγ | Λγβ φ
β
Cγ ,

 γ ∈Γq. (4.19)
Proof 15 See Appendix B.8. 
Remark 24 With Remark 19, we can use finitely bounded Mrγ based on a suffi-
ciently large r ≤ rˆ to satisfy equality (4.17) as a quadratic module membership
constraint.
Remark 25 Due to Remark 24, there exists a finite upper degree bound rˆ such
that supPd,rˆ = supPd,r, r ≤ rˆ.
4.4.9. Dual SDP Formulation of Problem Pd,r
Because Md(y) and Md−dk(hk ∗ y) are affine in y, we can rewrite them as
Md(y) =y0B0 + ∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
yαBα ,
Md−dk(hk ∗ y) =y0Ck0 + ∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
yαCkα , k ∈I Xq , q ∈Q,
(4.20)
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where Bα ∈ Ss(n,d) and Ckα ∈ Ss(n,d−dk) are constant coefficient matrices.
Proposition 12 Let Cγ , γ ∈ Γq be the maximal cliques generated from G(φ ,E)
in subsection 4.4.7. Introducing dual matrix variables N ∈ Ss(n,d), Tk ∈ Ss(n,d−dk)
with k ∈I Xq , scalar degrees d, dk from problem Pd,r, dual scalar variable ψβ ∈R
with β ∈ Sr|Cγ |, constant matrices Bα , Ckα from equations (4.20), constants aαβ ,
ε , u from problem Pd,r, and constant matrices Λγβ , Λ′iβ from equations (4.19), the
dual problem of Pd,r is
Dd,r : inf
N,Tk,ψβ
[N]1,1 + ∑
q∈Q
∑
k∈I Xq
hk(0) [Tk]1,1 + ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
ψβ a0β
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
ψγεγ
s.t. N  0, Tk  0, k ∈I Xq ,
∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
∑
i∈I γ
ψβ Λ′iβ  0, ∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
ψβ Λγβ  0,


γ ∈Γq,
q ∈Q,
−uα = 〈N,Bα〉+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
k∈I Xq
〈Tk,Ckα〉
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
ψβ aαβ , α ∈ S2dn \{0}n,
where ψγ = ψβ , and εγ = εβ when β = 0|Cγ |, for a given γ ∈Γq, q ∈Q.
Proof 16 All entries of B0, Ck0 and a0β are zeros except [B0]1,1 = 1, [Ck0]1,1 =
hk(0) and a0β = νqβ (0) where νqβ (x) conforms to νq(t,x,x′) = ∑ζ∈Srnq νqζ (x,x′)tζ ,
and νq(t,x,x′) first appears in Proposition 10. The Lagrangian L of problem Pd,r
is
L = uT y+ tr
(
N
[
y0B0 + ∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
yαBα
])
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
k∈I Xq
tr
(
Tk
[
y0Ck0 + ∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
yαCkα
])
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
∑
i∈I γ
tr(U ′i Z′i)+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
tr(UγZγ)
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
ψβ
[
∑
α∈S2dn
aαβ yα + εβ − ∑
i∈I γ
tr(Λ′iβ Z′i)− tr(Λγβ Zγ)
]
,
(4.21)
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where the newly-introduced symmetric dual matrix variables are N  0, Ti  0,
U ′i  0, Uγ  0, and scalar dual variable ψβ ∈ R. Expanding equation (4.21), we
obtain
L = ∑
α∈S2dn
uαyα +[N]1,1 + ∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
〈N, Bα〉yα
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
k∈I Xq
hk(0) [Tk]1,1 + ∑
q∈Q
∑
k∈I Xq
∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
〈Tk, Ckα〉yα
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
ψβ
(
a0β + ∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
aαβ yα
)
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
ψβ εβ
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
〈
∑
i∈I γ
U ′i − ∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
ψβ ∑
i∈I γ
Λ′iβ , Z′i
〉
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
〈
Uγ − ∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
ψβ Λγβ , Zγ
〉
.
(4.22)
Now the Lagrangian dual problem is
inf
N,Tk,U ′i ,Uγ ,ψβ

 sup
y,Z′i ,Zγ
L

 , k ∈I Xq , i ∈I γ , γ ∈Γq, β ∈ Sr|Cγ |, q ∈Q.
(4.23)
In order for supy,Z′i ,Zγ L to attain the following maximum other than ∞,
max
y,Zγ ,Z′i
L =[N]1,1 + ∑
q∈Q
∑
k∈I Xq
hk(0) [Tk]1,1 + ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
ψβ a0β + ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
ψγεγ ,
(4.24)
the following conditions need to hold true with respect to equation (4.22),
−uα = 〈N,Bα〉+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
k∈I Xq
〈Tk, Ckα〉+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
ψβ aαβ , α ∈ S2dn \{0}n,
∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
ψβ ∑
i∈I γ
Λ′iβ =U ′i ,
∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
ψβ Λγβ =Uγ ,


γ ∈Γq.
(4.25)
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Satisfying equalities (4.25), problem (4.23) becomes
inf
N,Tk,U ′i ,
Uγ ,ψβ
[N]1,1 + ∑
q∈Q
∑
k∈I Xq
hk(0) [Tk]1,1 + ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
ψβ a0β + ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
ψγεγ
s.t. N  0, Tk  0, k ∈I Xq , U ′i  0, i ∈I γ , Uγ  0,
∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
ψβ ∑
i∈I γ
Λ′iβ =U ′i , ∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
ψβ Λγβ =Uγ ,


γ ∈Γq,
q ∈Q,
−uα = 〈N,Bα〉+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
k∈I Xq
〈Tk,Ckα〉
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
wβ aαβ , α ∈ S2dn \{0}n.
(4.26)
Dropping U ′i and Uγ in problem (4.26), we get problem Dd,r. 
We now give an upper bound of Dd,r, which is used in the subsequent asymptotic
convergence proof.
Theorem 12 An upper bound of Dd,r is u∗x + ξ + λ d,r, where ξ ∈ R++ is a small
constant, u∗x is the optimal value of problem (3.5), and λ d,r is defined as
λ d,r = ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
ψβ
[
∑
i∈I γ
〈
Λ′iβ , Z′i
〉
+
〈
Λγβ , Zγ
〉]
, (4.27)
with matrix variables Zγ , Z′i from Proposition 11, and constant matrices Λγβ , Λ′iβ
from equations (4.19), and ψβ from Proposition 12.
Proof 17 The following is based on proof techniques in [38]. If MX is Archimedean,
then every p ∈ R[x] with finite degree strictly positive on X is expressible using
scalar SOS polynomials s(x) and sk(x) [54] such that
p(x) = s(x)+ ∑
k∈I X
hk(x)sk(x), x ∈ X, (4.28)
where i indexes the inequalities. Recall u(x) in social welfare objective (3.4) and
u∗x in problem (3.5), we use the above arguments to express the positive polynomial
u∗x −u(x)+ξ as
u∗x −u(x)+ξ = ∑
l∈L
n2l (x)+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
k∈I Xq
{
hk(x) ∑
l∈Lk
t2l (x)
}
, (4.29)
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where ξ ∈ R++, L and Lk are the index sets of the SOS terms with respect to the
two scalar SOS polynomials in equation (4.29) whose nl, tl ∈ R[x] are of bounded
degrees. Theorem 4 states that there exists at least one correlated equilibrium
with respect to a polynomial game with compact X. Therefore, Theorem 4 in con-
junction with equation (4.29) imply there exists a sufficiently large d such that
deg(n2l (x))≤ 2d, l ∈ L and deg(hk(x)t2l (x))≤ 2d, l ∈ Lk, k ∈I Xq , q ∈ Q. More-
over, a correlated equilibrium pi exists whose moment sequence corresponds to a
value in the decision variable y of Pd,r. Integrating both sides of equation (4.29)
with respect to pi , we get
−
∫
X
u(x) dpi(x)+u∗x +ξ
=
∫
X
∑
l∈L
n2l (x)dpi(x)+
∫
X
∑
q∈Q
∑
k∈I Xq
{
hk(x) ∑
l∈Lk
t2l (x)
}
dpi(x)
= ∑
l∈L
∑
α∈S2dn
(n2l )αyα + ∑
q∈Q
∑
k∈I Xq
∑
l∈Lk
∑
α∈S2dn
(t2l )αyα(hk)α
= ∑
l∈L
〈
nl , Md(y)nk
〉
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
k∈I Xq
∑
l∈Lk
〈
tl , Md−dk(hk ∗ y)tl
〉
= ∑
l∈L
〈
nln
T
l , M
d(y)
〉
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
k∈I Xq
∑
l∈Lk
〈
tlt
T
l , M
d−dk(hk ∗ y)
〉
.
(4.30)
Based on the Gram-matrix method [53], we use the coefficient vectors of nk(x) and
tl(x) to construct symmetric matrices N = ∑l∈L nlnTl  0 and Tk = ∑l∈Lk tltTl  0.
Introducing N and Tk into equation (4.30), we get
−
∫
X
u(x) dpi(x)+u∗x +ξ
=
〈
N, Md(y)
〉
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
k∈I Xq
〈
Tk, Md−dk(hk ∗ y)
〉
.
(4.31)
Recall u∗x is the optimal value of problem (3.5), we have (u∗x ≥ supPd,r ≥ supP)⇔
(u∗x −ρ = supP) for a fixed constant ρ ≥ 0. Therefore we rewrite equation (4.31)
as
−
∫
X
u(x) dpi(x)+ supP+ξ +ρ =
〈
N, Md(y)
〉
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
k∈I Xq
〈
Tk, Md−dk(hk ∗ y)
〉
.
(4.32)
Based on a sufficiently large r by Theorem 11, independence of r from dq in Propo-
sition 28 of Appendix B.7 and Remark 25, the feasible y’s governed by the equality
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in Pd,r are equivalent to the y’s defined by the last constraint in Pd , which cor-
respond to the feasible set of correlated equilibria. The existence of correlated
equilibrium pi implies the equality in Pd,r is feasible, meaning there exist symmet-
ric positive-semidefinite matrices Z′q and Zq satisfying the following equality in
Pd,r,
∑
α∈S2dn
aαβ yα + εβ − ∑
i∈I γ
tr(Λ′iβ Z′i)− tr(Λγβ Zγ) = 0, β ∈ Sr|Cγ |, γ ∈Γq, q ∈Q.
(4.33)
Augmenting the r.h.s of equation (4.32) with the zero-valued expression from equa-
tion (4.33), and introducing an arbitrary variable ψβ ∈ R, we have
−
∫
X
u(x)dpi(x)+ supP+ξ +ρ
=
〈
N, Md(y)
〉
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
k∈I Xq
〈
Tk, Md−dk(hk ∗ y)
〉
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
ψβ
(
∑
α∈S2dn
aαβ yα + εβ − ∑
i∈I γ
〈
Λ′iβ ,Z′i
〉
−〈Λγβ ,Zγ〉
)
.
(4.34)
Applying equations (4.20), we get
−
∫
X
u(x)dpi(x)+ supP+ξ +ρ +λ d,r
= [N]1,1 + ∑
q∈Q
∑
k∈I Xq
hk(0) [Tk]1,1 + ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
ψβ a0β + ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
ψγεγ
+ ∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
〈N, Bα〉yα + ∑
q∈Q
∑
k∈I Xq
∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
〈Tk, Ckα〉yα
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
ψβ aαβ yα ,
(4.35)
where λ d,r = ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
ψβ
[〈
∑
i∈I γ
Λ′iβ ,Z′i
〉
+
〈
Λγβ ,Zγ
〉]
. (4.36)
In terms of satisfying problem Dd,r, its constraints ensure the following to hold
true,
∑
γ∈Γq
∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
ψβ ∑
i∈I γ
Λiβ  0, ∑
γ∈Γq
∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
ψβ Λγβ  0. (4.37)
The inequalities (4.37) and equation (4.35) ensure that N, Tk and ψβ form a feasi-
ble solution to problem Dd,r. Re-expressing equation (4.35) in terms of the objec-
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tive value of Dd,r, we get
−
∫
X
u(x)dpi(x)+ supP+ξ +ρ +λ d,r =
Dd,r + ∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
〈N, Bα〉yα + ∑
q∈Q
∑
k∈I Xq
∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
〈Tk, Ckα〉yα
+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
γ∈Γq
∑
β∈Srnq
∑
α∈S2dn \{0}n
wβ aαβ yα .
(4.38)
Since inequalities (4.37) ensure λ d,r in equation (4.36) to be non-negative, we
have a valid upper bound of Dd,r expressible as supP+ξ +ρ +λ d,r. Recall from
Remarks 18 and 25 that supPd,r ≥ supP. Combined with weak duality, one gets
supP + ξ + ρ + λ d,r ≥ inf Dd,r ≥ supPd,r ≥ supP. 
Theorem 13 For a sufficiently large r, as d increases to infinity, supPd,r is mono-
tonically non-increasing and weakly-⋆ converges to supP.
Proof 18 Due to Proposition 28 of Appendix B.7, there exists a finite upper bound
r such that supPd,r = supPd for a fixed moment relaxation order d. Moreover, such
finite upper bound r can be held fixed independent of the increasing d. We let r be
the fixed upper bound. We then use the proof of Theorem 7 to establish that supPd,r
is monotonically non-increasing and is weak-⋆ convergent to supP. 
4.4.10. Sequential SDP Algorithm
The following algorithm for solving problem Pd,r in Proposition 11 is adapted from
[74]. For the convergence proof, the reader is referred to [74].
1. Select a tolerance ∆ > 0 and set the iteration counter k = 1, dk = maxq∈Q δq,
rk = 0 and zk−1 =+∞, where δq is taken from Remark 17.
2. Solve problem Pdk,rk with an SDP solver (e.g. [82]), denote the optimal value
by z∗k , and the optimal moment sequence by y∗k .
3. If Pdk,rk is infeasible, set rk+1 = rk + 2, increment k and repeat Step 2. If
z∗k−1 <+∞ and |(z∗k − z∗k−1)/z∗k−1| ≤ ∆, terminate and return (z∗k ,y∗k). Other-
wise set dk+1 = dk +1, rk+1 = rk, increment k and repeat Step 2.
We remark that Pd is a relaxation of the original problem P, while Pd,r is a restric-
tion of Pd . The above algorithm increases d until the optimal value of Pd,r satu-
rates, while r is only increased if an infeasibility is detected. If ∆ is sufficiently
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small, the algorithm will therefore determine a near global optimal solution for the
original problem P.
4.5. Numerical Examples
In the following two numerical examples, we plot the expected utilities of players
for each game. By incrementing d in the algorithm of subsection 4.4.10 (i.e. as
τ increases due to Remark 17), the constraints formulating ε-correlated equilibria
become more stringent resulting in an increasingly accurate plot of the expected
utilities. For the two examples, we set ε to 1.0e−6 and 1.0e−7 respectively.
4.5.1. Two-Player Non-Cooperative Polynomial Game with
Univariate Strategies
This example is taken from [31] where Q = {1,2}, and players’ strategy domain
sets are defined by X1 = X2 = [−1,1]. The utility functions are
u1(x1,x2) = 0.596x21 +2.072x1x2−0.394x22 +1.360x1−1.200x2 +0.554,
u2(x1,x2) =−0.108x21 +1.918x1x2−1.044x22−1.232x1 +0.842x2−1.886,
where x1 ∈X1, and x2 ∈X2. By varying the Kantorovich degree τ from 0 to 4, we
compute the respective feasible sets of ε-correlated equilibria, and plot the result-
ing expected utilities for both players in Figure 4.1. At τ = 4, the utilities converge
to a single point depicted as a small bold circle in Figure 4.1. The expected utili-
ties corresponding to Regions 0, 2 and 4 coincide respectively with the payoffs at
relaxation orders 0, 1 and 2 in Figure 3 of [31]. Since the correlated equilibrium is
unique in this example, it is also the global best equilibrium of this game in terms
of the expected social welfare.
4.5.2. Two-Player Mutually-Interfering Wireless Communication
Links with Multivariate Strategies
This example is taken from [9]. The wireless system consists of two mutually
interfering links, each with one transmitter sending to one receiver in the real signal
space. Denoting the set of players by Q = {1,2}, the signal vector at the receiver’s
end in link q ∈Q is
rq = ∑q′∈Q√gq′qxq′ +ηq ∈ Rlq , (4.39)
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Figure 4.1.: Expected utilities of Player 1 versus Player 2 where “Region τ” corre-
sponds to the expected utilities achievable at Kantorovich degree τ .
where xq ∈ Rlq is the transmit signal vector of player q, gq′q ∈ R+ is the channel
gain from the transmitter antenna in link q′ to the receiver antenna in link q, ηq ∈
Rlq is the white Gaussian noise vector with covariance matrix E(ηqηTq ) = η0I, and
η0 ∈ R++ is the power spectral density. Denoting the covariance matrix of the
transmitting signal vector xq by Xq = E(xqxTq )∈ Slq , the mutual information of link
q is expressed as
1/2log2
det
(
∑q′∈Q gq′qXq′ +η0I
)
det
(
∑q′∈Q\{q} gq′qXq′ +η0I
) . (4.40)
There is also a power constraint enforcing tr(Xq) = Pq ∈ R++ with Pq as the
power limit. We henceforth denote the mutual information formulation (4.40) by
Uq(Xq,X−q). The above arguments imply that the channel capacity of link q is
given by
max
Xq∈Xq
Uq(Xq,X−q), (4.41)
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where Xq = {X  0, tr(X) = Pq}. As the capacity of link q is affected by the
input X−q from the other link, we have a competitive game whose outcome can be
evaluated using game equilibria. Popescu et al. [9] give an analytical model that
states the conditions under which multiple equilibria arises for the wireless game in
this example. To induce multiple equilibria, we introduce significant interference
into the wireless system by setting the mutual-interference channel gain values to
g12 = g21 = 1 (see [9]). We then use the analytical model in [9] to pre-determine
the initial search points such that the water-filling procedure [68] converges to the
best and worst performing pure Nash equilibria strategies. Their utilities are de-
noted by “NE 1” and “NE 2” respectively in Figure 4.2. In this example, we use
a quadratic approximation of the logarithm in the mutual information formulation
(4.40) to obtain a polynomial objective. We set each transmitter’s signal dimen-
sion to lq = 2, power limits P1 = P2 = 1, and spectral density η0 = 1.0e−4. We
vectorize the covariance matrix input Xq into vector form resulting in nq = 3 per
player for the resulting polynomial game. By varying the Kantorovich degree τ
from 1 to 5, we compute the respective feasible sets of ε-correlated equilibria, and
plot the resulting expected utilities for both players in Figure 4.2. The result in
Figure 4.2 shows that the ε-correlated equilibrium with global-optimal expected
social welfare achieves the same welfare value as the best-performing pure Nash
equilibrium obtained using the analytical model in [9].
4.6. Conclusion
Our demonstrations in numerical examples 1 and 2 show the viability of using
Kantorovich polynomials to represent the test function space required in formulat-
ing correlated equilibria.
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5. Welfare-Maximizing Correlated
Equilibria with Regrets in Power
Control Games
The solution concept of correlated equilibrium introduced by Aumann [28], [20],
generalizes the Nash equilibrium by considering the possible existence of a central
arbitrator coordinating the strategies of the players. Since coordination facilitates
players with more information leading to new behaviour, there have been recent
applications tapping onto the enlarged set of equilibria with the aim of achieving
better network performance. For instance, Altman et al. [86] show that, in an ana-
lytical setup involving a multiple access channel with the slotted ALOHA protocol,
an arbitrator exercising a correlated equilibrium results in higher throughput than
in the absence of coordination where players settle for a Nash equilibrium. Other
applications that algorithmically compute correlated equilibria include spectrum
access for cognitive radio [42], node activation in sensor networks [45], and power
allocation in multiple-input-multiple-output systems [46]. The underlying algo-
rithms used for computing correlated equilibria are the distributed and learning
methods by Hart and Mas-Colell [61], [41], and Stoltz and Lugosi [30]. The above
algorithms however return only an arbitrary equilibrium without any performance
guarantee on the social welfare.
Power control games in multichannel networks in general have multiple pure Nash
equilibria with varying social welfare values. Players therefore may find them-
selves at an equilibrium with suboptimal welfare. As such, we formulate and com-
pute an approximate correlated equilibrium with the highest possible welfare but
with regrets. With our formulation, we first give theoretical bounds on the regret.
We then elaborate how to translate the formulation into a sequence of semidefinite
programming problems. In case the computed correlated equilibrium has infinite
support, we propose a heuristic method that forcefully extracts a discrete probabil-
ity distribution representing an approximate correlated equilibrium.
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This chapter is taken from our third paper in section 1.7.
5.1. Introduction
5.1.1. Problem Background : Multiple equilibria
In multichannel power control games, a lot of emphasis is placed on finding pure
Nash equilibria. For example, researchers check for quasi-concavity of utility
functions that ensures existence of at least one pure Nash equilibrium [27]. If
existence can not be ascertained, then the alternative is to introduce modifications
to obtain a supermodular [6] or a potential game [7]. However, uniqueness of equi-
librium demands more stringent criteria such as requiring the utility functions to
observe the diagonally strict concavity property by Rosen in concave games [12].
In general, a multichannel power control game can have multiple equilibria.
To choose among multiple equilibria, social welfare or sum of utilities is used as an
efficiency selection criterion [27]. Unless the game satisfies additional conditions
for equilibrium uniqueness such as requiring the utility functions to possess a pre-
requisite level of concaveness, distributed algorithms such as [8] converge only to
an arbitrary pure Nash equilibrium with possibly suboptimal social welfare. This
motivates us to pursue the equilibrium that gives the highest return on the latter.
5.1.2. Improving Efficiency with Correlated Equilibria
An important feature of the set of correlated equilibria is that it is convex and
contains all Nash equilibria as special cases [30]. A recent development by Stein
et al. [31] uses convex relaxations to compute correlated equilibria specifically
for polynomial games1. Extending the approach in [31], Kong et al. [74] exploit
advances in global polynomial optimization [38] and robust semidefinite program-
ming (SDP) [51], [81] to compute moment sequences [53] corresponding to corre-
lated equilibria with global-optimal expected social welfare. Although the solution
method in [74] handles only polynomial utility functions, useful approximations
can still be derived since polynomials can approximate continuous functions well
in a compact set [40].
The method in [74] can be used to provide bounds information on the social wel-
fare achievable by the equilibria of a polynomial game with multivariate infinite
1A polynomial game is a continuous game in which players have utility functions expressed as
polynomials.
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compact sets of strategies. However the solution computed by [74] gives only
moments of the probability measure constituting the correlated equilibrium. The
support2 of a probability measure is either finite3 or infinite over the domain set.
Notably, research in recovering measures with infinite support over multivariate
domains from moments is not well-established at the time of writing this chap-
ter. Considering the above factor, we propose in this chapter a heuristic method
to recover only from moments that correspond to probability measures with finite
support using [87], [88]. This implies our heuristic is able to recover a discrete
probability distribution that describes exactly the correlated equilibrium solution
computed in [74] if the latter has finite support. The recovered distribution how-
ever is only an approximation of the equilibrium solution if the latter has infinite
support. To account for the loss in precision, we introduce the approximate cor-
related equilibrium with ε-regrets. In this chapter, we use the approach in [74]
combined with [39] to formulate and compute an approximate equilibrium solu-
tion expressed in moments. We propose a heuristic to recover from the moments
a discrete probability distribution constituting an approximate correlated equilib-
rium with regret.
5.1.3. Contributions
The contributions of this chapter consist of the following.
1. We give a problem formulation suitable for analysis and computation. We
provide theoretical bounds on the ε-regret.
2. Using Bernstein polynomials [78] and quadratic module membership con-
straints [53], we arrive at a formulation solvable as a sequence of SDP prob-
lems.
3. Since an exact correlated equilibrium of a polynomial game can be a con-
tinuous probability density function, we propose a heuristic that attempts to
forcefully extract a discrete probability distribution during an intermediate
step of our sequential SDP algorithm (see [74] for algorithm). We elaborate
how to forcefully recover a discrete probability distribution constituting an
approximate correlated equilibrium with ε-regret.
2The support of a probability measure pi is the smallest set S⊆ Rn for which pi(Rn\S) = 0.
3A probability measure with finite support is a discrete probability distribution.
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4. We demonstrate the heuristic in two examples, demonstrating the extraction
of an exact correlated equilibrium if the global-optimal correlated equilib-
rium has finite support. However in the second example, we show the lim-
itation of the heuristic by extracting an approximate correlated equilibrium
with significant regret.
5.1.4. Organization of Chapter
The solution method in this chapter is based on techniques in [38], [51], [53]. To
aid understanding, we introduce relevant concepts in the remainder of this section.
In section 5.2, we define approximate correlated equilibria using the notion of re-
gret. In section 5.3, we give the problem formulation, the theoretical bounds on re-
gret, the translation of the formulation into linear SDP problems, and the heuristic
method for forceful recovery of a discrete distribution. Finally in section 5.4, we
apply the heuristic from section 5.3 in two examples in which we obtain discrete
probability distributions constituting exact and approximate correlated equilibria.
5.2. Definition of Approximate Correlated Equilibrium
with ε-Regret
Stoltz and Lugosi in [30] restrict ζq : Xq → Xq in the formulation of correlated
equilibria for continuous games in inequality (2.4) by Hart and Schmeidler [49]
to certain classes of departure functions such as continuous functions for ease of
mathematical analysis. Subsequently, Stein et al. in [31] reformulate correlated
equilibria for continuous games in inequality (2.4) into a form more convenient
for computation by using the mathematical construct called test functions. In this
paper, we employ the test functions introduced by Stein et al. for regret bound anal-
ysis and solution computation. We focus only on correlated equilibria associated
with a particular class of test functions.
Definition 7 Let F q be a set of test functions fq : Xq → [0,1]. Defining F ,
∏q∈QF q, an exact F -correlated equilibrium pi considers only test functions fq
from F q, ∀q ∈Q such that
∫
X
fq(xq) [uq(x)−uq(tq,x−q)]dpi(x)≥ 0, ∀ fq ∈F q, tq ∈ Xq, q ∈Q. (5.1)
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Adapting from inequality (5.1), an approximate F -correlated equilibrium µ with
ε-regret is defined by
∫
X
fq(xq) [uq(x)−uq(tq,x−q)]dµ(x)+ ε ≥ 0, ∀ fq ∈F q, tq ∈ Xq, q ∈Q. (5.2)
Remark 26 For the purpose of obtaining an upper bound on the ε-regret in in-
equality (5.2), we restrict F q to the class of Lipschitz continuous functions with
Lipschitz constant of at most κ ∈ R++.
5.3. Problem Formulation and Solution
In subsection 5.3.1, we give a formulation of approximate correlated equilibria
with regrets. In subsection 5.3.2, we give a general bound on regret with re-
spect to the formulation in subsection 5.3.1. In subsection 5.3.3, we give a bound
on the regret specifically for the power control problem. We then describe the
power control game model by Huang et al. [8] in subsection 5.3.4. We then give
an infinite-dimensional problem formulation for exact correlated equilibria with
global-optimal expected social welfare in subsection 5.3.5. To compute an ap-
proximate equilibrium, we give the SDP relaxation of the problem in subsection
5.3.6. However, the equilibrium solution obtained from solving the relaxation is
expressed in moments, not yet in the form of a probability function. In order to
start describing our heuristic method, we first assume that the computed moment
sequence at a particular relaxation order corresponds to a discrete probability dis-
tribution. We explain in subsection 5.3.7 how to extract solutions from the moment
matrix. We also explain in subsection 5.3.8 how to recover the discrete probability
distribution based on the moment matrix and the extracted solutions. Finally in
subsection 5.3.9, we propose a heuristic for forceful recovery of a discrete proba-
bility distribution from the moment matrix.
5.3.1. A Computational Model For Approximate Correlated
Equilibria With Regrets
Our main interest is to reformulate the approximate correlated equilibria constraint
in inequality (5.2) into a form suitable for regret bound analysis and solution com-
putation. To achieve this, we approximate the set F q, q∈Q of Lipschitz functions
in Remark 26 using Bernstein polynomials [78]. We then re-express the formula-
tion based on Bernstein polynomials as a polynomial positivity constraint, which
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is expressible as a quadratic module membership constraint [54], [56], [51].
Definition 8 For n ∈ N and z ∈ Rn, an n-dimensional Bernstein basis polynomial
multi-indexed by j ∈ Dτn with degree vector τ ∈ Nn is
bτj(z), b
τ1
j1(z1) . . .b
τn
jn(zn), (5.3)
where bτiji(zi)=s(τi− ji, ji)z
ji
i (1− zi)τi− ji . Due to the multi-index j, we have |Dτn|
number of Bernstein basis polynomials. According to [78], the Bernstein polyno-
mial approximation of a given continuous function f (z) over the hypercube [0,1]n
is
bτ( f ,z), ∑
j∈Dτn
f
( j1
τ1
, . . . ,
jn
τn
)
bτj(z). (5.4)
Remark 27 We assume each input domain Xq, q ∈ Q is affine-transformed to fit
into [0,1]nq .
Remark 28 To express inequality (5.2) in the moment form, we approximate each
fq ∈F q using a Bernstein polynomial approximation bτ( fq,xq) from definition
(5.4) with degree τ ∈ Nnq0 .
Remark 29 For convenience, we use a scalar value τ to represent (τi)i=1,...,nq
where τi = τ . We also introduce shorthand notations νq(x, tq), uq(x)−uq(tq,x−q)
and δq ,
⌈
deg(νq(x, .))/2
⌉
.
At moment relaxation order d, the measure µd ∈PX is an approximate correlated
equilibrium if it satisfies the following,
∫
X
bτ( fq,xq) [uq(x)−uq(tq,x−q)]dµd(x)+ ε ≥ 0, ∀ fq ∈F q, tq ∈ Xq, q ∈Q,
(5.5)
where τ is positive infinite. Due to the finite order d used to parameterize a moment
relaxation, µd in inequality (5.5) corresponds to a truncated moment sequence
consisting of moments of order up to 2d,
y, (yα)α∈S2dn =
∫
X
(xα)α∈S2dn dµd(x) ∈ RS
2d
n . (5.6)
Since our eventual goal is to express inequality (5.5) in the moment form, this
makes the maximum allowable scalar degree τ of bτ( fq,xq) in inequality (5.5) to
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be
⌊
2(d−δq)/nq
⌋
. Therefore at moment relaxation order d, the probability mea-
sure µd representing an approximate correlated equilibrium satisfies the following
inequality
∫
X
b⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋( fq,xq) [uq(x)−uq(tq,x−q)]dµd(x)≥ 0, ∀ fq ∈F q, tq ∈ Xq,
(5.7)
where fq : Xq → [0,1] is a test function (see Section 5.2). Note that the total
induced ε-regret in inequality (5.5) will be accounted for later in Theorem 15.
To make the approximate correlated equilibria constraint in inequality (5.7) com-
putationally viable, we re-express it as a polynomial positivity constraint over the
parameter set F q ×Xq. Such a positivity constraint is realizable as a quadratic
module membership constraint as explained in the following remark.
Remark 30 Due to definition (5.4), the Bernstein polynomial approximation of a
given function fq ∈F q is
b⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋( fq,xq) = ∑
j∈D⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋nq
wq jb
⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋
j (xq), (5.8)
where wq j = fq
(
j1
⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋ , . . . ,
jnq
⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋
)
∈ [0,1]. Therefore, inequality (5.7)
becomes
∫
X

 ∑
j∈D⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋nq
wq jb
⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋
j (xq)

 [uq(x)−uq(tq,x−q)]dµd(x)≥ 0,
∀wq j ∈ [0,1], tq ∈ Xq.
(5.9)
Denoting the left-hand-side of inequality (5.9) by lq,µd (wq, tq), the correlated equi-
libria constraint (5.9) becomes
lq,µd (wq, tq)≥ 0, ∀wq ∈Wdq , [0,1]
∣∣∣∣D⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋nq
∣∣∣∣
, tq ∈ Xq, (5.10)
where wq , (wq j) j∈D⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋nq
. Due to results concerning non-negative polynomi-
als over a compact set by Kuhlmann and Marshall in [56], introducing an arbitrary
ε0 ∈ R++ enables inequality (5.10) to be subsumed under the following quadratic
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module membership constraint,
lq,µd (wq, tq)+ ε0 ∈M2r
(
(h j) j∈D⌈2(d−δq)/nq⌉nq
,(hi)i∈I q
)
, (5.11)
where
M2r
(
(h j) j∈D⌈2(d−δq)/nq⌉nq
, (hi)i∈I q
)
,
s0(wq, tq)+ ∑
j∈D⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋nq
s j(wq, tq)h j(wq j)+ ∑
i∈I q
si(wq, tq)hi(tq)
(5.12)
is the quadratic module generated by constraints h j(wq j) and hi(tq) that respec-
tively define the feasible parameter sets of wq j and tq in membership constraint
(5.10), and s0 ∈S 2r(wq,tq), s j ∈S
2(r−⌈deg(h j(wq))/2⌉)
(wq,tq)
, and si ∈S 2(r−⌈deg(hi(tq))/2⌉)(wq,tq)
are scalar SOS polynomials. We show later in Theorem 14 the relationship be-
tween ε0 and r in membership constraint (5.11).
Remark 31 Since membership constraint (5.11) enforces lq,µd (wq, tq) + ε0 ≥ 0,
∀wq ∈Wdq , tq ∈ Xq, the largest lower bound of lq,µd (wq, tq) is −ε0.
Remark 32 We highlight that ε0 in membership constraint (5.11) forms only part
of the total induced ε-regret in inequality (5.5), which is quantified later in Theo-
rem 15.
5.3.2. Positive Upper Bound on ε0 for Wireless Games with General
Polynomial Utilities and Constraints
We first give a theorem concerning ε0 induced by our re-expressing of inequality
(5.7) as a quadratic module membership constraint (5.11). We note that constraint
(5.11) alone already enforces non-negativity of lq,µd (wq, tq) over Wdq ×Xq but we
lack an upper bound on degree 2r of the quadratic module in constraint (5.11).
To obtain such a bound on r, we use results by Powers and Reznick in [89] and
Scherer and Hol in [51] to relate ε0 to r where we first need to affine-transform
the parameter set (wq, tq) ∈Wdq ×Xq to rest within the polyhedron bounded by the
standard simplex. We perform this transformation step because [89], [51] give an
upper bound on the quadratic module degree when the parameter set is the simplex-
bounded polyhedron. We denote the simplex-bounded polyhedron by Z1 , {z ∈
Rm | z ≥ 0, eT z ≤ 1}. For convenience, from current subsection until subsection
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5.3.3, we let Φ = Wdq ×Xq where Φ ⊂ Rm, m =
∣∣∣∣D⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋nq
∣∣∣∣+ nq, δq is taken
from Remark 29, and d is the moment relaxation order.
Remark 33 Scherer and Hol in [51] map an arbitrary parameter set Φ ∈ Rm to
rest within the simplex-bounded polyhedron Z1 by applying an affine transforma-
tion a : Φ → Z ⊆ Z1 on Φ to obtain the new coordinate z = a(φ), ρ(φ/c+ e) ∈
Z ⊆ Z1 where ρ = 1m+√m , c ∈ R++ satisfies c−‖φ‖22 > 0, and e is a vector of
ones. For clarification, we note that the inverse-image of Z1 ⊇ Z (i.e. Φ1 ⊇ Φ)
with respect to transformation a : Φ → Z is
a−1(Z1) =Φ1 ,
{φ ∈ Rm | a(φ)≥ 0, eT a(φ)≤ 1} .
That is, Φ is the original parameter set and Φ1 ⊃Φ is a polyhedron containing Φ.
The affine transformation a : Φ → Z serves to map the parameter sets Φ and Φ1
to the z-space.
Remark 34 Although the compact parameter set Wdq ×Xq after the affine trans-
formation in Remark 33 cannot be bounded exactly by the standard simplex due to
the definition of Wdq in inequality (5.10), we nevertheless adopt the same approach
in [51] by using the affine transformation to first map Wdq ×Xq to rest within Z1
as explained in Remark 33.
Remark 35 From this point onwards, we assume the constraints h j(φ), ∀ j ∈I
defining Φ are re-scaled such that h j(φ)≤ 1, ∀ j ∈I hold true.
Remark 36 To obtain an upper degree bound on the quadratic module in defini-
tion (5.12), we refer to the redundant ball-constraint c−‖φ‖22 > 0, ∀φ ∈Φ using
a sufficiently large radius c ∈ R++ from Remark 33 to satisfy the following con-
straint qualification stated in Theorem 1 of [51],
c−‖φ‖22 = ψ0(φ)+ ∑
j∈I
ψ j(φ)h j(φ), (5.13)
where ψ0(φ)∈S 2rφ , ψ j(φ)∈S
2(r−⌈deg(h j(φ))/2⌉)
φ . To begin explaining how we ob-
tain an upper degree bound on r in quadratic module membership constraint (5.11)
that defines approximate correlated equilibria, we denote lq,µd (wq, tq) in member-
ship constraint (5.11) by l(φ). We recall in Remark 31 that the largest lower bound
of l(φ), φ ∈Φ is −ε0. Let l(φ)+2ε0 ∈R[φ ] be the polynomial made positive over
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Φ due to the addition of 2ε0 to l(φ) to offset the largest lower bound. Denoting the
index set of the combined constraints h j and hi in membership constraint (5.11)
by I , we set to achieve what is stated in Remark 34 by re-representing l(φ) and
h j(φ), j ∈I in the z-space as
ˆl(z), l(a−1(z)), ˆh j(z), h j(a−1(z)), ∀ j ∈I . (5.14)
By introducing substitution terms ψˆ0(z) , ψ0(a−1(z))/c, ψˆ j(z) , ψ j(a−1(z))/c,
we get to re-express equation (5.13) in the z-space as
1−‖z/ρ− e‖22 = ψˆ0(z)+ ∑
j∈I
ψˆ j(z)ˆh j(z). (5.15)
We now apply transformation a : Φ→Z in Remark 33 to re-express l(φ)+2ε0 > 0,
∀φ ∈Φ in the z-space through definitions (5.14). Therefore, we obtain ˆl(z)+2ε0 >
0, ∀z ∈ Z.
Remark 37 Due to Remark 34, we use Lemma 8 of [55] by Schweighofer to extend
positivity of ˆl(z)+ 2ε0 from the smaller Z to the larger simplex-bounded polyhe-
dron Z1. Since ˆl(z)+2ε0 > 0, ∀z ∈ Z holds true due to Remark 36, it is shown in
Lemma 8 of [55] that by careful selection of constants namely ξ ∈R++, k ∈N and
a quadratic module element ξ ˆh(z,k) ∈ M2r(ˆh j∈I (z)), the expression ˆl(z) + 2ε0
subtracted by ˆh(z,k) can be made to satisfy the following extended positivity con-
straint,
ˆl(z)+2ε0−ξ ˆh(z,k)> 0, ∀z ∈ Z1. (5.16)
Thus by the above, we are able to extend positivity of ˆl(z)+2ε0 from Z to the larger
Z1.
Since we now have ˆl(z)+2ε0−ξ ˆh(z,k)> 0, ∀z ∈Z1, we employ Remarks 33 - 37
to draw a connection between ε0 and r in constraint (5.11). For convenience, we
denote the left-hand-side of inequality (5.16) by ˆl0(z).
Lemma 4 Assume 0 < ˆl0(z) ∈Rγ [z], ∀z ∈ Z1, which is the simplex-bounded poly-
hedron. Introduce ρ = 1
m+
√
m
and let ˜lγ0(z˜0, . . . , z˜m) be the Bernstein-Be´zier4 form
of ˆl0(z) with barycentric coordinates z˜0, . . . , z˜m with respect to Z1. If we select a
4This is elaborated in the accompanying proof of the lemma.
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θ ∈ N satisfying θ ≥ γ(γ − 1)L(˜lγ0(z))/(2λ ), then there exist scalar SOS polyno-
mials s(z) and t(z) respectively with degrees of at most 2θ and 2θ − 2 such that
ˆl0(z) = s(z)+ t(z)(1−‖z/ρ− e‖2).
Proof 19 The following statements up to inequality (5.20) are taken from selec-
tive parts of Section 3 in [89] by Powers and Reznick but with the notations
adapted to our context here. We start by recalling that Z1 is the polyhedron
bounded by the standard m-simplex in Rm with vertices {v0, . . . ,vm}where vi ∈Rm,
i ∈ {0, . . . ,m}. The set of barycentric coordinates of Z1 is {σ0(z), . . . ,σm(z)}
where each σi∈{0,...,m}(z) ∈ R1[z] is a linear polynomial. Furthermore, we uphold
the following,
σi∈{0,...,m}(z)≥ 0,
m
∑
i=0
σi(z) = 1, z =
m
∑
i=0
viσi(z), ∀z ∈ Z1. (5.17)
Given ˆl0(z) ∈ Rγ [z], then for any β ≥ γ , there exists a homogeneous polynomial
˜lβ0 (z˜0, . . . , z˜m) in m+1 variables of degree β such that
˜lβ0 (z˜0, . . . , z˜m) = ˜l
β
0 (σ0(z), . . . ,σm(z)) =
ˆl0(z).
We can construct ˜lβ0 (z˜0, . . . , z˜m) as follows. Suppose ˆl0(z) = ∑|α|≤γ aαzα , then
ˆl0(z) = ∑
|α|≤γ
aα
(
m
∑
i=0
viσi(z)
)α(
m
∑
i=0
σi(z)
)γ−|α|
,
thus we set
˜lβ0 (z˜0, . . . , z˜m) = ∑
|α|≤β
aα
(
m
∑
i=0
viz˜i
)α (
m
∑
i=0
z˜i
)β−|α|
. (5.18)
Note that ˜lβ0 (z˜0, . . . , z˜m) is the Bernstein-Be´zier form of ˆl0(z) with respect to Z1.
To proceed further, we first invoke Theorem 2 in [89] on the simplex-bounded poly-
hedron Z1 (i.e. convex polyhedron). Let the polyhedron Z1 be bounded by linear
polynomials σ0(z), . . . ,σm(z) ∈ R1[z] such that Z1 =
{
z ∈ Rm | σi∈{0,...,m} ≥ 0
}
.
Given ˆl0(z) ∈ Rγ [z] is strictly positive on Z1, there exists degree θ ∈ N such that
ˆl0(z) conforms to the following representation,
ˆl0(z) = ∑
|α|≤θ
bασα00 (z) . . .σ
αm
m (z), (5.19)
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where bα ≥ 0, |α | = |(α0, . . . ,αm)| ≤ θ . Let ˜lγ0(z˜0, . . . , z˜m) be the function taken
from equation (5.18). Let λ = minz∈Z1 ˆl0(z). According to Theorem 3 in [89], if
we select a θ ∈ N satisfying
θ ≥ γ(γ−1)L(
˜lγ0(z˜0, . . . , z˜m))
2λ − γ , (5.20)
then ˆl0(z) ∈ Rγ [z] has a representation of the form in equation (5.19) of degree θ .
Due to Lemma 3 in [51] by Scherer and Hol, there exist scalar SOS polynomials
sα(z) and tα(z) respectively with degrees 2|α | and 2|α |−2 such that
zα01 . . .z
αm−1
m (1− eT z)αm = sα(z)+ tα(z)(1−‖z/ρ− e‖2). (5.21)
where α ∈ Nm+10 . We adopt the same approach of Lemma 4 in [51] to derive
the following arguments. Recall Z1 ,
{
z ∈ Rm | z≥ 0, eT z≤ 1} is the simplex-
bounded polyhedron. We can let σ0(z) = z1, σ1(z) = z2, . . . , σm(z) = 1− eT z.
Since ˆl0(z)> 0, ∀z∈Z1, we employ θ from inequality (5.20), and invoke equations
(5.19) and (5.21) to arrive at the following,
ˆl0(z) = ∑
|α|≤θ
bαzα01 . . .z
αm−1
m (1− eT z)αm = s(z)+ t(z)(1−‖z/ρ− e‖2), (5.22)
where s(z) = ∑α∈Nm+10 ,|α|≤θ bαsα(z) and t(z) = ∑α∈Nm+10 ,|α|≤θ bαtα(z) respectively
have degrees of at most 2θ and 2θ −2, and ρ = 1
m+
√
m
. 
Theorem 14 Given φ ∈Φm, l(φ)∈Rγ [φ ], we assume the quadratic module mem-
bership constraint l(φ)+ ε0 ∈ M2r(h j∈I (φ)) holds for some ε0 ∈ R++ and r ∈ N
such that l(φ)+2ε0 > 0,∀φ ∈Φ but minφ∈Φ1 l(φ)+2ε0 < 0. To relate ε0 to r, we
first define
ρ , 1
m+
√
m
, a(φ), ρ(φ/c+ e), A,
{
φ ∈Φ1 | a(φ) = Z1, l(φ)≤ ε02
}
,
and δ ∈ R++ where
min
j∈I
h j(φ)≤−δ and h j(φ)≤ 1, ∀ j ∈I , φ ∈ A.
Given ε0, there exist corresponding constants ξ ∈R++, k∈N, C∈R++ and ϑ ∈R
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such that
l(φ)+2ε0 + ξ δ2 > 0, ∀φ ∈Φ1,
δ
2
≥ |I |−1
2k+1 ,
ε0
2
≥ ξ |I |
2k+1 ,
−2ε0 < minφ∈Φ1 {l(φ)−ξ h(φ ,k)}< 0,
(5.23)
and the following positive upper bound on ε0 applies,
ε0 ≤ 12
{
Cγ(γ−1)
r+ϑ −Cγ(γ−1)
[
L(˜lγ(φ))+L(ξ ˜hγ(φ ,k))]
− r+ϑ
r+ϑ −Cγ(γ−1) minφ∈Φ1 {l(φ)−ξ h(φ ,k)}
}
,
(5.24)
where r has to be sufficiently large such that r > Cγ(γ − 1)− ϑ , ϑ ∈ R de-
pends on the constraints h j(φ), j ∈ I , operator L(.) is defined by L( f (φ)) ,
max
α∈Sdeg( f (φ))n | fα |
α1!...αn!
|α|! for arbitrary f (φ) ∈R[φ ], ˜lγ(φ) and ˜hγ(φ ,k) are the re-
spective Bernstein-Be´zier form of l(φ) and h(φ ,k) with respect to Φ1, h(φ ,k) ,
∑ j∈I
[
(1−h j(φ))2kh j(φ)
]
, and γ = deg(l(φ)).
Proof 20 From Remark 33, we first apply transformation a : Φ → Z⊆ Z1 on Φ to
obtain the new coordinate z. We now have ˆl(z) from definitions (5.14). Since l(φ)+
2ε0 > 0, ∀φ ∈Φ holds true due to Remark 36, we have ˆl(z)+2ε0 > 0, ∀z∈Z⊆Z1.
Since by assumption there exist z1 ∈Z and z2 ∈Z1\Z such that ˆl(z1)+2ε0 > 0 and
ˆl(z2)+ 2ε0 < 0, this means enforcing positivity of the expression ˆl(z)+ 2ε0 over
the entire Z1 requires extension of existing positivity of ˆl(z)+ 2ε0 from Z to the
larger Z1. With reference to Remark 37, we adopt the same approach in Lemma
8 of [55] by Schweighofer by subtracting the non-zero quadratic module element
ξ ˆh(z,k) = ξ ∑ j∈I
[
(1− ˆh j(z))2k ˆh j(z)
] ∈ M(ˆh j∈I (z)), ξ ∈ R++, k ∈ N from the
expression ˆl(z)+2ε0. We denote the subtracted expression by
ˆl0(z), ˆl(z)+2ε0−ξ ˆh(z,k) ∈ Rγ [z]. (5.25)
By Lemma 8 of [55], there exist ξ ∈R++ and k ∈N that satisfy the following three
conditions,
ˆl(z)+2ε0 +
ξ δ
2
> 0, δ
2
≥ |I |−1
2k+1 ,
ε0
2
≥ ξ |I |
2k+1 , ∀z ∈ Z1, (5.26)
such that ˆl0(z)> 0, ∀z ∈ Z1. Without compromising inequalities (5.26), we further
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decrease ξ but increase k such that
0 > min
z∈Z1
{
ˆl(z)−ξ ˆh(z,k)}>−2ε0 (5.27)
hold true. This ensures existence of λ ∈ R++ such that ˆl0(z)≥ λ , ∀z ∈ Z1 where
λ = min
z∈Z1
ˆl0(z) = 2ε0 +min
z∈Z1
{
ˆl(z)−ξ ˆh(z,k)}> 0. (5.28)
According to Lemma 4 of this paper, if we introduce θ ∈ N such that
θ ≥ γ(γ−1)L(
˜lγ0(z))
2λ , (5.29)
where γ = deg(ˆl0(z)) and ˜lγ0(z) is the Bernstein Be´zier form of ˆl0(z), then there
exist scalar SOS polynomials sˆ(z), tˆ(z) respectively with degrees of at most 2θ and
2θ −2 such that
ˆl0(z) = sˆ(z)+ tˆ(z)(1−‖z/ρ− e‖22) = sˆ(z)+ tˆ(z)
[
ψˆ0(z)+ ∑
j∈I
ˆh j(z)ψˆ j(z)
]
,
(5.30)
where ψˆ0(z) and ψˆ j(z) are taken from equation (5.15). From definition (5.25) and
equation (5.30), we have
ˆl(z)+2ε0−ξ ∑
j∈I
[
(1− ˆh j(z))2k ˆh j(z)
]
= sˆ(z)+ tˆ(z)ψˆ0(z)+ ∑
j∈I
tˆ(z)ˆh j(z)ψˆ j(z),
(5.31)
where sˆ(z) and tˆ(z) respectively have degrees of at most 2θ and 2θ−2. Expanding
equation (5.31), we obtain
ˆl(z)+2ε0 = sˆ(z)+ tˆ(z)ψˆ0(z)+ ∑
j∈I
ˆh j(z)
[
tˆ(z)ψˆ j(z)+ξ
{
(1− ˆh j(z))2k
}]
.
(5.32)
Introducing new substitution terms sˆ0(z) and sˆ j(z) where
sˆ0(z) = sˆ(z)+ tˆ(z)ψˆ0(z), sˆ j(z) = tˆ(z)ψˆ j(z)+ξ
{
(1− ˆh j(z))2k
}
, ∀ j ∈I ,
(5.33)
we obtain from equations (5.32)-(5.33) the following,
ˆl(z)+2ε0 = sˆ0(z)+ ∑
j∈I
ˆh j(z)sˆ j(z) ∈M2r
(
ˆh j∈I (z)
)
. (5.34)
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Since all elements in the quadratic module M2r(ˆh j∈I (z)) have degrees up to 2r,
implying sˆ j(z), j ∈ {0}∪I are defined by
sˆ j(z) ∈S 2(r−⌈deg(
ˆh j(z))/2⌉)
z , (5.35)
we conclude from equations (5.32)-(5.34) and constraint (5.35) that r satisfies
2r≤max{2θ , 2θ −2+deg(ψˆ0(z)),
max
j∈I
{
max
[
2θ −2+deg(ψˆ j(z)), 2k deg(ˆh j(z))
]
+2
⌈
deg(ˆh j(z))/2
⌉}}
.
(5.36)
Since deg(ˆh j(z))≥ 1, j ∈I for the simple fact that ˆh j(z) are constraints, inequal-
ity (5.36) simplifies to become
2r≤max{2θ −2+deg(ψˆ0(z)),
max
j∈I
{
max
[
2θ −2+deg(ψˆ j(z)), 2k deg(ˆh j(z))
]
+2
⌈
deg(ˆh j(z))/2
⌉}}
.
(5.37)
Through inequality (5.37), we get to establish a conditional relationship between
r and θ dependent on the magnitude of k deg(ˆh j(z)). However, θ has to satisfy the
criterion in inequality (5.29) in order for equation (5.30) to hold true. Therefore,
we introduce a constant 12 <C ∈ R++ to construct
θ = Cγ(γ−1)L(
˜lγ0(z))
λ , (5.38)
where λ is taken from equation (5.28). To ensure θ remains relevant to inequality
(5.37), we choose a sufficiently large C in equation (5.38) such that θ satisfies
2θ −2+deg(ψˆ j(z))> 2k deg(ˆh j(z)), ∀ j ∈I .
With the suitably large θ in place, we invoke inequality (5.37) to arrive at the
following,
2r ≤ 2θ −2+ max
j∈{0}∪I
{
deg(ψˆ j(z))+2
⌈
deg(ˆh j(z))/2
⌉}
, (5.39)
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where ˆh0(z) = 1. Introducing
ϑ = 1− max
j∈I ∪{0}
{
1
2
deg(ψˆ j(z))+
⌈
deg(ˆh j(z))/2
⌉} ∈ R, (5.40)
we arrive at the following from inequality (5.39) and equation (5.40),
r+ϑ ≤ θ . (5.41)
Due to equation (5.38) and inequality (5.41), λ from equation (5.28) satisfies
λ ≤ C
r+ϑ γ(γ−1)L(
˜lγ0(z)), (5.42)
assuming r+ϑ > 0. We shall explain at the end of this proof what values r must
adopt in order for r + ϑ > 0 to hold true. Since ˜lγ0(z) is the Bernstein-Be´zier
form of ˆl0(z), we employ a property of the L(.) operator stating that L(p+ q) ≤
L(p)+L(q) for arbitrary p ∈ R[z], q ∈ R[z] (see Lemma 5 in [51]). Letting ˜lγ(z),
˜hγ(z,k) and 2ε0 (∑mi=0 z˜i)γ be the terms in the Bernstein-Be´zier form of ˆl0(z), we
arrive at the following,
L
(
˜lγ0(z)
)
= L
(
˜lγ(z)−ξ ˜hγ(z,k)+2ε0
(
m
∑
i=0
z˜i
)γ)
≤ L(˜lγ(z)−ξ ˜hγ(z,k))+L
(
2ε0
(
m
∑
i=0
z˜i
)γ)
≤ L(˜lγ(z))+L(ξ ˜hγ(z,k))+2ε0.
(5.43)
Taking λ from equation (5.28), and applying inequality (5.43) on inequality (5.42),
we have
2ε0 ≤ C
r+ϑ γ(γ−1)
[
L
(
˜lγ(z)
)
+L
(ξ ˜hγ(z,k))+2ε0]−min
z∈Z1
{
ˆl(z)−ξ ˆh(z,k)} ,
(5.44)
where ϑ is taken from equation (5.40). Consolidating ε0 onto the left-hand-side of
inequality (5.44), we obtain
2ε0 ≤ Cγ(γ−1)
r+ϑ −Cγ(γ−1)
[
L(˜lγ(z))+L
(ξ ˜hγ(z,k))]
− r+ϑ
r+ϑ −Cγ(γ−1) minz∈Z1
{
ˆl(z)−ξ ˆh(z,k)} , (5.45)
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where r has to be sufficiently large such that r > Cγ(γ − 1)−ϑ . Thus r satisfies
the earlier assumption of r+ϑ > 0 in inequality (5.42) since Cγ(γ−1)> 0 due to
C > 12 in equation (5.38) and γ ≥ 1 in equation (5.25). By re-expressing inequality
(5.45) in φ , we obtain
2ε0 ≤ Cγ(γ−1)
r+ϑ −Cγ(γ−1)
[
L(˜lγ(φ))+L(ξ ˜hγ(φ ,k))]
− r+ϑ
r+ϑ −Cγ(γ−1) minφ∈Φ1 {l(φ)−ξ h(φ ,k)} ,
(5.46)
where ˜lγ(φ) and ξ ˜hγ(φ ,k) are Bernstein-Be´zier form of l(φ) and ξ h(φ ,k) with
respect to Φ1. Due to ξ and k satisfying inequalities (5.27), the upper bound on ε0
in inequality (5.46) is positive. 
Remark 38 When r in inequality (5.46) is significantly larger than Cγ(γ−1)−ϑ ,
both ξ and k can be adjusted so that 0 > r+ϑ
r+ϑ−Cγ(γ−1) minφ∈Φ1{l(φ)− ξ h(φ ,k)}
= (−2ε0)+, which is a value slightly larger than −2ε0. Bringing (−2ε0)+ to the
left-hand-side of inequality (5.46), we see that ε0 approaches zero as r grows to
infinity.
Corollary 2 Extending from Theorem 14, if Φ is a polyhedron and r > Cγ(γ −
1)+1, then the following positive upper bound on ε0 applies,
ε0 ≤ 12
{
Cγ(γ−1)
r−1−Cγ(γ−1)
[
L(˜lγ(φ))+L(ξ ˜hγ(φ ,k))]
− r−1
r−1−Cγ(γ−1) minφ∈Φ1 {l(φ)−ξ h(φ ,k)}
}
,
(5.47)
where values ε0, r, C, γ , ξ , k and functions l(φ), ˜lγ(φ), h(φ ,k), ˜hγ(φ ,k), L(.) are
taken from Theorem 14.
Proof 21 Since Φ is a polyhedron by assumption, we have deg(ˆh(z)) = 1, ∀ j ∈I
in equation (5.40). By Theorem 4 of [51] by Scherer and Hol, the scalar SOS
polynomials ψˆ j(z), j ∈ {0}∪I in equation (5.15) satisfy deg(ψˆ j(z)) ≤ 2 since
Φ is a polyhedron. Therefore we obtain ϑ = −1 for equation (5.40), resulting in
inequality (5.47). 
We now introduce a second theorem, which considers the other regret component
(see Remark 32) induced by our use of Bernstein polynomials in approximating
the continuous test function space F q in inequality (5.7). This second theorem
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relies on Theorem 14 to account for the total ε-regret induced by the measure µd
at relaxation order d in inequality (5.5).
Theorem 15 We denote by ε(µd ,r) the total induced ε-regret in inequality (5.5)
for a moment relaxation parameterized by (d,r). Given µd is the corresponding
approximate correlated equilibrium, the regret ε(µd ,r) satisfies the following up-
per bound condition,
ε(µd ,r)< ε0
(
lq,µd ,r
)
+κ
(
∑
q∈Q
1⌊
2(d−δq)/nq
⌋
) 1
2
max
tq∈Xq
µd,tq(Xq),
where κ is the Lipschitz constant bound on F q, and ε0
(
lq,µd ,r
)
with a sufficiently
large r satisfying Remark 38 is the regret bound induced by Theorem 14 when
we enforce the original positivity constraint lq,µd (wq, tq)≥ 0, ∀(wq, tq) ∈Wdq ×Xq
in inequality (5.10) as a quadratic module membership constraint lq,µd (wq, tq)+
ε0(lq,µd ,r) ∈M2r((h j) j∈D⌈2(d−δq)/nq⌉nq ,(hi)i∈I q) with degree 2r in inequality (5.11).
Proof 22 Through Theorem 14, we account for the regret induced by our re-
expressing of the semi-infinite correlated equilibria constraint in inequality (5.10)
as a quadratic module membership constraint of degree 2r in constraint (5.11).
From quadratic module membership constraint (5.11), we have
lq,µd (wq, tq)+ ε0
(
lq,µd ,r
)≥ 0, ∀wq ∈Wdq , tq ∈ Xq, (5.48)
where ε0(lq,µd ,r)> 0 corresponds to ε0 in constraint (5.11), and Wdq is taken from
inequality (5.10). Recall in inequality (5.5) that the total induced regret ε(µd,r)
satisfies the following,
∫
X
bτ( fq,xq) [uq(x)−uq(tq,x−q)]dµd(x)+ ε(µd,r)≥ 0, ∀ fq ∈F q, tq ∈ Xq,
(5.49)
where τ is positive infinite. Since ε(µd,r)> 0, inequality (5.49) implies there exist
specific fq,ε ∈F q and tq,ε ∈ Xq such that
∫
X
fq,ε(xq) [uq(x)−uq(tq,ε ,x−q)]dµd(x)+ ε(µd,r) = 0. (5.50)
Recall in Remark 29 that νq(x, tq), uq(x)−uq(tq,x−q) and δq,
⌈
deg(νq(x, .))/2
⌉
.
We define the measure µd,tq(Sq) ,
∫
Sq×X−q [uq(x)−uq(tq,x−q)]dµd(x). We have
µd,tq(Xq)≥ 0, ∀tq ∈Xq since the constant function fq(xq) = 1 satisfying inequality
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(5.7) leads to ∫X b⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋(1,xq)νq(x, tq) dµd = ∫X νq(x, tq) dµd ≥ 0 due to unity
of partition of the Bernstein basis polynomials. Due to inequality (5.48), equation
(5.50) and Theorem 2.5 in [90], we have
ε(µd ,r)≤ ε0
(
lq,µd ,r
)
+ lq,µd (wq,ε , tq,ε)−
∫
X
fq,ε(xq)νq(x, tq,ε)dµd(x)
= ε0
(
lq,µd ,r
)
+
∫
Xq
[
b⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋( fq,ε ,xq)− fq,ε(xq)
]
dµd,tq,ε (xq)
< ε0
(
lq,µd ,r
)
+κ
(
∑
q∈Q
1⌊
2(d−δq)/nq
⌋
) 1
2
max
tq∈Xq
µd,tq(Xq),
where wq,ε is derived from application of equation (5.8) on fq,ε ∈F q, and κ is the
Lipschitz constant bound on F q. 
5.3.3. Positive Upper Bound on ε-Regret for Wireless Games with
Polynomial Utilities and Linear Constraints
If the compact parameter set Wdq×Xq is a polyhedron, Theorems 14, 15 and Corol-
lary 2 state that a moment relaxation parameterized by (d,r) has regret ε(µd,r)
satisfying
ε(µd ,r)< max
q∈Q
[
1
2
{
Cγ(γ−1)
r−1−Cγ(γ−1)
[
L(˜lγ(φ))+L(ξ ˜hγ(φ ,k))]
− (r−1)
r−1−Cγ(γ−1) minφ∈Φ1 {l(φ)−ξ h(φ ,k)}
}
+κ
(
∑
q∈Q
1⌊
2(d−δq)/nq
⌋
) 1
2
max
tq∈Xq
µd,tq(Xq)

 ,
(5.51)
where r > Cγ(γ − 1)+ 1, constants C, γ , ξ , k and functions l(φ), ˜lγ(φ), h(φ ,k),
˜hγ(φ ,k), L(.) are taken from Theorem 14, measure µd,tq(Xq) is defined in Theorem
15, κ is the Lipschitz constant bound, and δq is taken from Remark 29. Due to
Remark 38, we have lim(d,r)→(+∞,+∞) ε(µd,r) = 0. Therefore, finite convergence
is realizable if the problem domain permits non-zero ε(µd ,r) regret using finite
(d,r).
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5.3.4. Power Control Games with Rational Utilities and Linear
Constraints
In this subsection, we refer to the game model in [8] by Huang et al., and hence-
forth treat each network link as a player with multivariate strategies. In the net-
work, each link q ∈ Q transmits over a set of orthogonal channels indexed by K.
Link q’s strategy set is
Xq ,
{
xq ∈ R|K| | ∑
k∈K
xkq ≤ Pmaxq , xkq ≥ Pminq , ∀k ∈K
}
, ∀q ∈Q, (5.52)
where xkq is link q’s power allocation along channel k, and Pmaxq is the total power
constraint for link q. Link q’s signal-to-interference-noise-ratio (SINR) on channel
k is:
SINRkq(xk),
gkqqxkq
ηk +∑q′ 6=q gkq′qxkq′
,∀q, q′ ∈Q, k ∈K, (5.53)
where xk , (...,xkq, ...) are the power allocations of all players along channel k, gkq′q
is the channel gain from transmitter node of link q′ to receiver node of link q, and
ηk is the background noise power. Similar to [8], we assume that each link has a
“channel separable” utility defined as
uq(x), ∑
k∈K
ukq
(
SINRkq(xk)
)
, ∀q ∈Q, (5.54)
where ukq(.) represents the benefit or utility link q receives from channel k. Since
our focus in this paper is on the special class of power control games with rational
utilities and linear constraints, we use the quadratic utility function suggested in
[8],
ukq
(
SINRkq(xk)
)
, a
(
SINRkq(xk)
)2
+bSINRkq(xk), ∀q ∈Q, k ∈K, (5.55)
where constants b ∈ R++, a ∈ R−− satisfy b ≥−4amaxxk SINRkq(xk)> 0. There-
fore uq(x) in definition (5.54) is rational, and the constraints are linear in definition
(5.52)
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5.3.5. Formulation for Computing Global-Optimal Correlated
Equilibria in Power Control Games with Rational Utilities
In this subsection, we give an infinite-dimensional problem formulation for ap-
proximate correlated equilibria in power control games with rational utilities and
linear constraints.
Proposition 13 The problem formulation for exact correlated equilibria pi with
global-optimal expected social welfare is
Φpi : sup
pi∈PX
∑
q∈Q
∫
X
uq(x) dpi(x)
s.t.
∫
X
b( fq,xq) [uq(x)−uq(tq,x−q)]dpi(x)≥ 0,
∀ fq ∈F q, tq ∈ Xq ⊂ Rnq , q ∈Q,
where PX is the set of all probability measures over X, and b( fq,xq) is the Bern-
stein polynomial approximation of fq(xq) with infinite degree.
Proof 23 The objective is derived from expectation of the social welfare function.
The constraints defining exact correlated equilibria are taken from Corollary 2.14
of [31]. 
Since the SINRkq(xk) in definition (5.53) is a rational function, the utility uq(x)
in definition (5.54) is a rational polynomial expressible as uq(x) = pq(x)/gq(x),
where pq(x) ∈ R[x], 0 < gq(x) ∈ R[x]. To deal with the rational terms, we rewrite
problem Φpi in the following proposition.
Proposition 14 Introducing new measures piq ∈PX, q ∈ Q such that for all sub-
sets B⊆X, we have ∫B dpi(x)= ∫B g1(x)dpi1(x) and ∫B gq(x)dpiq(x)= ∫B g1(x)dpi1(x),
∀q∈Q\{1}, then problem Φpi is equivalent to the following with no rational term.
Φpiq∈Q : sup
piq∈PX
∑
q∈Q
∫
X
pq(x) dpiq(x)
s.t.
∫
X
b( fq,xq) [pq(x)− pq(tq,x−q)]dpiq(x)≥ 0,
∀ fq ∈F q, tq ∈ Xq ⊂ Rnq ,q ∈Q,∫
X
g1(x) dpi1(x) = 1,∫
X
xαgq(x) dpiq(x) =
∫
X
xαg1(x) dpi1(x), ∀α ∈ Nn0, q ∈Q\{1}.
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Proof 24 Using the same approach in subsection 2.1 of [39], problem Φpiq∈Q is a
direct consequence of replacing pi with measures piq∈Q by enforcing the equal-
ities
∫
B dpi(x) =
∫
B g1(x)dpi1(x) and
∫
B gq(x)dpiq(x) =
∫
B g1(x)dpi1(x), ∀B ⊆ X,
q ∈Q\{1}. 
Remark 39 Solving problem Φpiq∈Q is in essence dealing with a revised game of
|Q|-players with pq(x), q ∈ Q (i.e. numerators of utilities uq(x), q ∈ Q in problem
Φpi ) as their respective utility functions, which are polynomials.
Remark 40 To derive the problem formulation for computing approximate cor-
related equilibria, we first simplify inequality (5.9) to arrive at the following in
moment form,
∫
X

 ∑
j∈D⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋nq
wq jb
⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋
j (xq)

νq(x, tq)dµd(x) =
∑
j∈Dnq
wq j

 ∑
α∈Sn
yα

b jα − ∑
ζ∈S2dqnq
c jαζ tζq



 ,
(5.56)
where νq(.) is taken from Remark 29, b jα ∈ R, c jαζ ∈ R are constants.
Proposition 15 From Proposition 14, problem Φpi can be reformulated as the fol-
lowing moment optimization problem.
Φyq∈Q : max
yq∈RN
n
0
∑
q∈Q
pqT yq
s.t. Mq(yq) 0,
Mq(hq j ∗ yq) 0, ∀ j ∈I q,
∑
j∈Dnq
wq j

 ∑
α∈Sn
yα

b jα − ∑
ζ∈S2dqnq
c jαζ tζq



≥ 0,
∀(wq, tq) ∈Ωq×Xq,


∀q ∈Q,
∑
β∈Sdgqn
gqβ yqβ = 1, q = 1,
∑
β∈Sdgqn
gqβ yq,α+β = ∑
β∈Sdg1n
g1β y1,α+β ,∀α ∈ Nn0, q ∈Q\{1},
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where wq j, b jα , c jα ∈ R are due to Remark 40, dgq , deg(gq(x)), pq(x),gq(x) are
taken from Proposition 14, yq is a moment sequence corresponding to measure
piq in Proposition 14, and Mq(yq) and Mq(hq j ∗ yq) are the infinite moment and
localizing matrices.
Proof 25 In order to rewrite Φpiq∈Q as an optimization problem over moment se-
quences instead of probability measures, we introduce the following set,
Y , {y ∈ RNn0 | ∃pi ∈PX, y =
∫
X
b(x) dpi(x)}.
Assuming hq j(x) for all q∈Q, j ∈I q satisfy the Archimedean5 property, Theorem
4.17 of [53] which references a result in [54], states that Y has the following
semidefinite representation,
Y = {y ∈ RNn0 | M(y) 0, M(hq j ∗ y) 0, j ∈I q, q ∈Q},
where M(y) and M(hq j ∗ y) are the infinite moment and localizing matrices. We
now devise a moment optimization problem with feasible set (yq)q∈Q ∈ ∏q∈QY .
From problem Φpiq∈Q , we have ∑q∈Q
∫
X pq(x)dpiq(x) =∑α∈Nn0 pqαyq,α = pqT yq. En-
forcing the constraints in Φpiq∈Q through their moments, we obtain Φyq∈Q . 
5.3.6. Derivation of Moment Relaxation for Computing an
Approximate Correlated Equilibrium with ε-Regret
To solve problem Φyq∈Q for an approximate correlated equilibrium µ (see Section
5.2), we relax the problem using finite (i.e. truncated) moment sequences yq ,
(yqγ)γ∈S2dn , q ∈ Q. We arrive at the following linear SDP problem parameterized
5The property is satisfiable by several means, such as introducing a redundant bound constraint
c− xT x ≥ 0 with a sufficiently large c > 0 into the existing constraint set.
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by a finite (d,r) ∈ N2,
Φd,ryq∈Q : max
yq∈RS2dn
∑
q∈Q
pqT yq
s.t. Mdq (yq) 0,
Md−dq jq (hq j ∗ yq) 0, ∀ j ∈I q,
∑
j∈D⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋nq
wq j

 ∑
α∈S2dn
yα

b jα − ∑
ζ∈S2dqnq
c jαζ tζq



+ ε =
s2r0 (wq, tq)+ ∑
j∈D⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋nq
s
2(r−⌈deg(h j(wq j))/2⌉)
j (wq, tq)h j(wq j)
+ ∑
i∈I q
s
2(r−⌈deg(hi(tq))/2⌉)
i (wq, tq)hi(tq),


∀q
∈Q,
∑
β∈Sdgqn
gqβ yqβ = 1, q = 1,
∑
β∈Sdgqn
gqβ yq,α+β = ∑
β∈Sdg1n
g1β y1,α+β ,∀α ∈ S2d−max(dgq ,dg1 )n ,
q ∈Q\{1},
where ε is the total induced regret, s0, s j, si are scalar SOS polynomials in (wq, tq)
with degree bounds 2(r− ⌈deg(h j(φ))/2⌉), pq(x), gq(x) are taken from problem
Φyq∈Q , relaxation parameters dq j, dq0 and dgq ∈ N are defined respectively as dq j ,
⌈deg(hq j(x))/2⌉, dq0 , ⌈deg(pq(x))/2⌉ and dgq , deg(gq(x)).
After solving problem Φd,ryq∈Q , we can recover a moment sequence y that corre-
sponds to the approximate correlated equilibrium µ (see Section 5.2) from the yq∈Q
solution using the following equation since
∫
B dpi(x) =
∫
B g1(x)dpi1(x), ∀B ⊆ X in
Proposition 14,
yα = ∑
β∈Sdgln
glβ yl,α+β , α ∈ S2d−dgln , (5.57)
where l = argminq∈Qdgq . For notational convenience, we define δ (d), d−⌈dgl/2⌉
with l taken from equality (5.57). We then use the moments of µ in y to recon-
struct the moment matrix Mδ (d)(y), which is essential for the solutions-extraction
procedure described in the next subsection.
Remark 41 In this subsection, we have shown how to translate our formulation
based on Bernstein polynomials and quadratic module membership constraints in
subsection 5.3.1 into a sequence of tractable linear SDP problems.
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Remark 42 For the class of power control games with rational utilities and linear
constraints, we can use inequality (5.51) to determine an upper bound on the ε-
regret for a moment relaxation parameterized by a finite (d,r).
5.3.7. Extracting Solutions From the Moment Matrix
According to [53], if Mδ (d)(y) is a flat extension of Mδ (d)−1(y), then y corresponds
to a measure whose support consists of rank(Mδ (d)(y)) number of solutions. This
means that the probability measure with moments in y, allocates non-zero proba-
bility values exclusively to these solutions6. We then use the solutions-extraction
procedure in [87] to compute the complex variety7 of the kernel8 of Mδ (d)(y).
The variety set contains solutions forming the support set of the discrete probabil-
ity distribution representing an approximate correlated equilibrium. The steps are
listed below.
1. Let ˆj = rank(Mδ (d)(y)) = rank(Mδ (d)−1(y)), which is the number of atom
solutions. Let U =
[
U1 U2 . . . U ˆj
]
= svd9(Mδ (d)−1(y)), and U j∈{1,..., ˆj} are
column vectors. We now form the polynomial basis B = (ρ j(x)) where
ρ j(x) = bδ (d)−1(x)TU j, and j = 1, . . . , ˆj, and ˆj = |VC(Ker(Mδ (d)(y)))| follows
from [87], [53].
2. Define ˜Pxqi with entries [ ˜Pxqi ]α,β−eqi = [Mδ (d)]α,β where
α ∈ bδ (d)−1(x), β ∈ xqibδ (d)−1(x), i ∈ {1, . . . ,nq}.
3. Let Pxqi = UT ˜PxqiU , MB = UT Mδ (d)−1(y)U , Xqi = M−1B Pxqi (see equation
(4.13) in [87]), and generate a random weight vector ω ∈ Rn+ such that
∑ni=1 ωi = 1.
4. Using Theorem 2.4 in [87], we get to relate the atom solutions
v ∈ VC(Ker(Mδ (d)(y))) to X = ∑q∈Q ∑i=1,...,nq ωqiXqi.
5. Every atom solution v is related to an eigenvector derived from the eigen-
decomposition of X . For ease of discussion, let v be a specific atom so-
6When a probability measure assigns non-zero probability values to a finite number of solutions,
the latter are called atoms.
7The complex variety VC(J ) of an ideal J is defined by VC(J ) , {x ∈ Cn | p(x) = 0, ∀p ∈
J ⊆ R[x]}.
8Given Md(y) with arbitrary y∈RS2dn , the kernel of the moment matrix is defined as the set {p(x)∈
Rd [x] | p(x) = pT bd(x), Md(y)p = 0}. The kernel of Md(y) forms an ideal.
9The singular value decomposition operator svd(A) returns UΣV †, where U , V are unitary and Σ is
diagonal with nonnegative entries.
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lution. Let ζB,v be an eigenvector of X . Now ζB,v = (ρ j(v)) j=1,..., ˆj. To
obtain the actual coordinates (x11, . . . ,xqi, . . . ,xqnq) for this specific v, we de-
termine xqi from the basis B by solving the system of polynomial equations
ρ j(x) = ρ j(v), ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , ˆj}. To obtain the coordinates of another distinct
atom solution v′ ∈ VC(Ker(Mδ (d)(y))), replace v with v′ in the above steps.
Determining the discrete probability distribution over the solutions is explained in
the next subsection.
5.3.8. Recovering A Discrete Probability Distribution From The
Moment Matrix
Assuming the probability measure µd at relaxation order d has only finite ˆj num-
ber of solutions from subsection 5.3.7, we introduce probability weights ω ∈ R ˆj
where the equality ∑ j∈{1,..., ˆj}ω j = 1 holds. We then construct the linear system of
Gaussian cubature equality rules [88],
∑
j∈{1,..., ˆj}
ω jaαj =
∫
X
xα dµd(x), ∀α ∈ S2δ (d)n , (5.58)
where the right-hand-side values are taken from Mδ (d)(y) computed in subsection
5.3.6, and the left-hand-side contains the unknown weights ω j obtainable using a
linear programming solver.
5.3.9. Heuristic For Forceful Recovery Of A Discrete Probability
Distribution From The Moment Matrix
We emphasize that for a general polynomial game, the actual correlated equilib-
rium pi measure may have an infinite or a large support that prevents Mδ (d) from
satisfying the rank condition in subsection 5.3.7. We propose a heuristic method
to forcefully extract a discrete probability distribution representing an approximate
correlated equilibrium.
1. When solving problem Φd,ryq∈Q according to the algorithm steps in [74], check
if the rank condition in subsection 5.3.7 is satisfied. If true, apply the steps
in subsections 5.3.7 and 5.3.8 to extract a discrete probability distribution
µd .
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2. Compute the ε-regret such that ∑x−q∈X−q µd(x) [uq(x)−uq(tq,x−q)]+ ε ≥ 0,
∀xq, tq ∈ Xq, q ∈ Q based on the formulation for correlated equilibria in
games with discrete strategy sets [28], [20].
3. If ε-regret is within players’ tolerance, terminate algorithm and recommend
µd as the approximate ε-correlated equilibrium. Otherwise, resume with the
algorithm in [74]. Re-check the rank condition using Step 1 of the heuristic.
Therefore the heuristic is not guaranteed to extract an approximate correlated equi-
librium with small regrets. Rather, the heuristic is an attempt to forcefully recover
whichever discrete distribution that manifests during the course of the algorithm.
The limitation of the heuristic is shown in our numerical example 2 in section 5.4.
5.4. Numerical Examples
In this section, we demonstrate two numerical examples based on the power con-
trol game model in subsection 5.3.4. We use the Gauss-Seidel best-response algo-
rithm [91] to determine the pure Nash equilibria of the game.
To compute an approximate correlated equilibrium with near global-optimal ex-
pected social welfare for each example, we use the SDP tool [82] to solve problem
Φd,ryq∈Q in subsection 5.3.6 for the moment matrix Mδ (d)(y). For a relaxation order
d, we use the procedures in subsections 5.3.7 and 5.3.8 to extract an approximate
equilibrium in the form of a discrete probability distribution from Mδ (d)(y). With
the equilibrium, we determine the corresponding regrets as defined in section 5.2.
In the examples, we customize the utility functions in definition (5.55) using a =
−0.0002, b = 0.1000. For each link, we impose the power constraint ∑k∈K xkq =
Pmaxq , ∀q ∈ Q, and set the maximum and minimum powers in Watt to Pmaxq = 1W
and Pminq = 0. The links are placed within a 100m-by-100m area. Similar to [8],
we model the channel gain values in definition (5.53) using gkqq′ = ∆−4qq′ , q, q′ ∈ Q,
k ∈ K where ∆qq′ is the distance between the transmitter node in link q and the
receiver node in link q′. Finally, we set the noise powers in definition (5.53) to
ηk = 0.0001W, ∀k ∈K similar to the first numerical example in [8].
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5.4.1. Wireless Application 1
We set up four links Q = {1, . . . ,4} operating in two channels K = {1,2}. The
normalized channel gain matrices are
G1 =


1.0800 0.2550 0.0436 0.0102
0.0350 1.0200 0.2575 0.0044
0.0052 0.2525 1.0400 0.0300
0.0101 0.0408 0.2550 1.0100

 ,
G2 =


1.1000 0.2525 0.0420 0.0102
0.0275 1.0300 0.2525 0.0048
0.0044 0.2550 1.0500 0.0275
0.0103 0.0404 0.2800 0.9900

 ,
where Gkqq′ = gkqq′/ηk, q,q′ ∈ Q, k ∈ K in definition (5.53). We denote player q’s
action by (x1q,x2q). We then invoke the best-response algorithm using random start
points to compute the pure Nash equilibria in Table 5.1. We solve the semidef-
inite relaxation Φd,ryq∈Q of order 4, and obtain for this example an exact correlated
equilibrium in Table 5.2. We stop at relaxation order 4 because the flat extension
condition in subsection 5.3.7 is satisfied by Mδ (d)(y). In Table 5.3, we denote by
“NE 1,. . .,NE 5” the social welfare values of pure Nash equilibria from Table 5.1,
and denote by “CE” the welfare value of the correlated equilibrium from Table 5.2.
Table 5.3 shows that the players’ social welfare for the correlated equilibrium is
0.4081, which coincides with the welfare achievable by the best-performing Nash
equilibrium from Table 5.1.
Since the flat extension condition is satisfied for this example, we remark that the
equilibrium in Table 5.2 describes exactly the correlated equilibrium with global-
optimal expected social welfare.
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Table 5.1.: Pure Nash Equilibria
Equilibrium
No.
Player 1’s
Action
Player 2’s
Action
Player 3’s
Action
Player 4’s
Action
1 (0, 1) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 0)
2 (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 0) (0, 1)
3 (0.9177, 0.0823) (0, 1) (0, 1) (1, 0)
4 (1, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (0, 1)
5 (0, 1) (1, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0)
Table 5.2.: An Exact Correlated Equilibrium With Zero Regret
Sol.
No.
Player 1’s
Action
Player 2’s
Action
Player 3’s
Action
Player 4’s
Action
Prob.
Value
1 (0, 1) (1, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) 1
Table 5.3.: Social Welfare Values of Nash Versus Correlated Equilibria
Social Welfare
NE 1 0.3696
NE 2 0.3704
NE 3 0.3707
NE 4 0.4039
NE 5 0.4081
CE 0.4081
5.4.2. Wireless Application 2
In this example, we set up four links (Q = {1, . . . ,4}) operating in two channels
(K = {1,2}). The normalized channel gain matrices are
G1 =


0.2133 0.0081 0.0127 0.0119
4.0800 0.2500 1.0300 0.2525
3.9600 0.0404 0.2700 1.0200
0.1552 0.0097 0.0392 0.2525

 ,
G2 =


0.2173 0.0080 0.0123 0.0116
4.0400 0.2575 1.0100 0.2550
4.0800 0.0412 0.2625 1.0100
0.1648 0.0099 0.0448 0.2400

 .
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The pure Nash equilibria are tabulated in Table 5.4. We solve the relaxation Φd,ryq∈Q
of order 4, and obtain an approximate correlated equilibrium solution represented
as a discrete probability distribution in Table 5.5. Higher orders are omitted be-
cause relaxations of higher orders do not satisfy the flat extension condition. Table
5.6 shows that players following the approximate equilibrium in Table 5.5 expe-
rience regrets not exceeding 0.2412 for ε . In Table 5.7, we compare the social
welfare values of the Nash equilibria from Table 5.4 with the correlated equilib-
rium from Table 5.5. Table 5.7 shows that the players’ expected social welfare for
the approximate correlated equilibrium is 0.0782, which outperforms all welfare
values of Nash equilibria from Table 5.4.
We remark that the inability of higher order relaxations in satisfying the flat ex-
tension condition indicates that the distribution in Table 5.5 is an approximation
of the correlated equilibrium, which leads to large regret, indicating that forceful
extraction of a discrete probability distribution does not always yield good results.
Table 5.6 suggests that the approximation is less than ideal, and the actual cor-
related equilibrium with global-optimal expected social welfare has either a large
finite support with significantly more solutions than those in Table 5.5, or has an
infinite support.
Table 5.4.: Pure Nash Equilibria
Equilibrium
No.
Player 1’s
Action
Player 2’s
Action
Player 3’s
Action
Player 4’s
Action
1 (0, 1) (1, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0)
2 (1, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (0, 1)
Table 5.5.: An Approximate Correlated Equilibrium With Regrets
Sol.
No.
Player 1’s
Action
Player 2’s
Action
Player 3’s
Action
Player 4’s
Action
Prob.
Value
1 (1, 0) (0, 1) (0, 1) (1, 0) 0.5049
2 (0, 1) (1, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) 0.4951
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Table 5.6.: Players’ Regrets for Equilibrium in Table 5.5.
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 TotalRegrets
Expected
Regret 0.0000 0.0000 0.2412 0.0000 0.2412
Table 5.7.: Social Welfare Values of Nash Versus Correlated Equilibria
Social Welfare
NE 1 0.0751
NE 2 0.0756
CE 0.0782
5.5. Conclusion
We give a problem formulation suitable for both analysis and computation. How-
ever, recovering measures with infinite support remains an outstanding challenge.
In view of example 2, more research is needed in recovering probability func-
tions that describe more accurately the probability measures constituting correlated
equilibria.
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6. Sum of Non-Concave Utilities
Maximization for MIMO
Interference Systems
To evaluate system capacity, past works on Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output sys-
tems (MIMO) with mutually interfering links have focused on maximizing the
sum of mutual information as the objective criterion. There have been several
works that compute the system capacity of a MIMO interference system under dif-
ferent assumptions regarding the availability of Channel State Information (CSI)
at the transmitters. When CSI is absent at the transmitters, Telatar in Lemma 5 of
[92] states that the channel matrix in the sum of mutual information formulation
has the same distribution as the channel matrix being eigen-transformed by the uni-
tary matrix derived from the eigen-decomposition of the covariance matrix input.
Through this property, Blum in [23] proposes a power allocation model for com-
puting the system capacity by optimizing only the eigenvalues. Subsequent work
based on Blum’s model includes [93]. Under the different assumption that CSI is
present at the transmitters, Liu et al. in [94] propose a sum of mutual information
maximization formulation that assumes equal power allocation across all antennas
in each transmitter node. This allows each input covariance matrix associated with
a transmitter node to be replaced with a single scalar decision variable. However,
such an assumption may not hold in general unless factors such as additional cost
imposed by extra hardware needed for non-uniform power allocation [94] poses a
major issue.
Since the ultimate goal of a MIMO system is to support network applications used
by consumers, we consider the non-concave sigmoid utility function, which is the
recommended choice according to Shenker [22] for modeling consumer satisfac-
tion in applications with inelastic traffic needs. An example of inelastic traffic
need is the minimum data-rate requirement imposed by bandwidth-intensive ap-
plications such as live video streaming. The traffic need of a live video consumer
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is inelastic relative to the data rate because a certain minimum amount of band-
width is required for its successful operation independent of the actual available
bandwidth. We formulate the sum of utilities maximization as a global optimiza-
tion problem with polynomial constraints and a rational objective function. In the
event that the computed global optimal solution leads to some links achieving data-
rates below the minimum required by inelastic traffic need, a remedy is to incor-
porate additional constraints that force the global optimization method to compute
the next global best solution while still guaranteeing all players their minimum
data-rates. Such a remedy ensures the inelastic traffic need is not compromised
by negligence of the minimum data-rate requirements. Using a technique known
as moment relaxation, we derive a sequence of Semidefinite Programming (SDP)
problems whose optimal objective values converge to the global maximum sum of
utilities. In our simulation examples, we employ our optimization model to de-
termine the average global maxima sum of utilities by optimizing the covariance
matrices of the transmitters. We then compare the results with those attainable by
the alternative non-uniform optimal power control model that optimizes only the
eigenvalues of the covariance matrices. By examining performance differences
between the two models, we obtain insights about how interference and excessive
data-rate requirements imposed by the application can impede link-consumers’
ability to maximize their sum of utilities.
This chapter is taken from our fourth paper in section 1.7.
6.1. Introduction
Ever since the pioneering works of Foschini and Gans [95] and Telatar [92] that
promise improved spectral efficiency using MIMO designs for isolated single-user
wireless links, there has been extensive research on evaluating the throughput per-
formance of systems consisting of multiple simultaneously transmitting MIMO
links under the detrimental effects of co-channel interference. For example, inter-
ference from adjacent cells in MIMO cellular systems degrades the overall system
capacity significantly [96], [97]. The same phenomenon arises in MIMO ad-hoc
networks, where each transmitter and receiver pair suffers from interference im-
posed by other pairs operating in the same frequency band [98]. We henceforth
refer to a system of mutually interfering MIMO links as a MIMO interference
system.
An objective criterion for throughput performance is the system capacity, which
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involves maximizing the sum of mutual information of the network links. Comput-
ing capacity requires optimizing the input covariance matrices of the transmitters.
This is equivalent to choosing orthonormal eigenvectors spanning the transmission
signal space and the corresponding non-negative eigenvalues for power allocation
along each eigenvector axis. Since channel matrices form a key ingredient in the
sum of mutual information formulation, the extent to which one can optimize the
input covariance matrices to achieve higher capacity depends on the availability
of CSI at the transmitters1 [99], [100]. In the absence of CSI, the transmitter has
no knowledge of the specific realization of the channel matrices, and therefore is
unable to fully optimize its input covariance matrix. In other words, the absence of
CSI renders the transmitter incapable of choosing any favourable eigen-subspace
for interference avoidance [99], [100]. On the other hand, presence of CSI means
the transmitter can capitalize on the known realization of the channel matrices to
fully optimize its input covariance matrix, thereby utilizing its multiple antennas
more effectively for interference avoidance to achieve higher capacity [99], [100].
In this chapter, we focus on MIMO interference systems with feedback for flat
fading channels similar to the one in [101] where CSI is available at the transmit-
ters and receivers. We also assume each receiver performs single-user detection,
meaning all unintended transmissions are treated as pure interference such that in-
terference cancellation at the receiver does not apply [101], [99]. Our focus on
such systems is motivated by the fact that having CSI at the transmitters enables
the system to achieve higher sum of mutual information by optimizing the input
covariance matrices of the transmitters for each realization of the channel matrices.
Although maximizing the sum of mutual information is pertinent from the system
performance point of view, achieving consumer satisfaction is also an important
evaluation criterion based on the sum of utilities of consumers behind the net-
work links [22]. Depending on the choice of the utility function, an increase in
the sum of mutual information may not yield a proportionate improvement in the
sum of utilities. As a result, maximizing solely the sum of mutual information
may overlook the important goal of improving the sum of utilities of consumers.
Moreover, achieving good consumer satisfaction requires one to maximize the sum
of utilities based on suitable utility functions that reflect reliably the experiences
of consumers using the network application. Shenker [22] differentiates inelas-
tic network traffic from elastic traffic. Shenker advocates that utility functions
for network applications with elastic traffic are better modeled as strictly concave
1The instantaneous realization of the channel matrices are known to the transmitters.
128
functions whereas utilities for inelastic traffic are more accurately modeled as non-
concave functions such as the sigmoid function. There are recent developments
that employ the sigmoid utility function, such as power control and scheduling
of single antenna systems by Qian and Zhang [102], and utility maximization of
MIMO broadcast channels by Brehmer and Utschick [103].
In this chapter, we offer the following contributions. We aim to compute the global
maximum sum of utilities for a MIMO interference system supporting applications
with inelastic network traffic. We first model a link consumer’s utility as a sigmoid
function [22] of the link’s mutual information. We then give a problem formu-
lation for computing the instantaneous global maximum sum of utilities given a
specific realization of the stochastic channel matrices. In our model, we optimize
the covariance matrices where CSI is assumed available at the transmitters. Al-
though our optimization model produces global maxima sum of utilities, we point
out to the reader that non-global optimal algorithms such as beamforming [99] are
more likely to be used in real-world applications for practical reasons. In order
to determine how close or how far the link-consumers get to operate relative to
the global maxima sum of utilities under the negative effects of interference and
excessive data-rate requirements, we compare our global maxima results with out-
put coming from an alternative optimization model that does not fully optimize
the covariance matrices. For comparison purpose, we refer to the optimal power
control problem by Liu et al. in [94] but without the equal power allocation condi-
tion. To arrive at a non-uniform optimal power control model, we reuse our global
optimization model but restricting the eigenvectors spanning the transmission sig-
nal space to unit orthonormal vectors. In other words, the alternative model for
comparison purpose is a restricted version of our model that optimizes only the
eigenvalues. We then compute and compare the average global maxima sum of
utilities achievable by our first model with the results attainable by the alternative
model. In our simulation examples, we consider consumers with low and high
data-rate needs who are using a network application facilitated by the MIMO in-
terference system. By placing the link nodes within box areas of varying lengths,
the links are subject to interference of different intensities.
In our optimization model, we express the sum of utilities maximization as a global
optimization problem consisting of polynomial constraints and a rational objective
function expressible as a ratio of two polynomials. To solve for the instantaneous
global optimal objective value, we investigate the use of the moment approach [38],
[53], [39] to reformulate the global optimization problem in the moment form. We
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then obtain moment relaxations expressible as SDP problems, solvable using SDP
tools such as [104], [82].
6.1.1. Related Work
In [94], Liu et al. compute the global maximum sum of mutual information for
MIMO interference systems using Branch and Bound (BB) method with Refor-
mulation Linearization Technique (RLT) [105] assuming CSI is available at the
transmitters. The BB-RLT approach essentially solves linear RLT relaxations of
the original maximization problem for performance bounds within an iterative BB
framework. Due to our focus on optimizing the input covariance matrices in the
transmission signal space under the assumption that CSI is available at the trans-
mitters, we represent the input covariance matrix of each transmitter as a Hermitian
covariance matrix. Since the Hermitian inputs are positive semidefinite matrices
[101], any future work undertaking RLT to compute the global maximum sum of
mutual information will have to take into consideration the positive semidefinite
constraints required for defining the input Hermitian covariance matrices of the
transmitters. Unfortunately, linear constraints on the RLT variables in the RLT
relaxation alone are unable to describe accurately the positive semidefinite cones.
In [106], Anstreicher proposes the addition of positive semidefinite constraints to
strengthen the RLT relaxation since in an RLT relaxation a single positive semidef-
inite condition is capable of removing a substantial portion of the feasible region
than without it. In addition, Qualizza et al. report in [107] that an LP relaxation
yielding an outer-approximation of the positive semidefinite cone within a branch-
and-cut framework leads to convergence difficulties while attempting to solve the
problem to optimality. Therefore, we do not employ RLT in this chapter due to the
above-mentioned difficulties in representing positive semidefinite cones.
A related problem domain is the global maximization of the weighted sum-rate
for a set of interfering links in single-antenna systems. Qian et al. in [108] use
monotonic optimization [109] to achieve weighted throughput maximization for
power control applications. In [102], Qian and Zhang extend their work to power
control with scheduling to maximize system performance across time. However,
monotonic optimization requires assumptions such as normality2 of the feasible
set, which is violated by positive semidefinite cones.
In [103], Brehmer and Utschick employ non-concave utilities to model applica-
2An arbitrary set X⊆ Rn+ satisfies the normality property if [0,x] ⊆ X, ∀x ∈ X.
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tions with inelastic traffic in a MIMO broadcast channel (MIMO-BC) setup. In
the MIMO-BC, the system consists of a single transmitter with multiple receivers
where each connection or downlink is assigned a sigmoid utility function of the
mutual information. In order to employ monotonic optimization, Brehmer and
Utschick assume normality of the feasible set that relies on the inherent convex-
ity property of the capacity region of a MIMO-BC [110] achievable through dirty
paper coding [111]. However, the same convexity property is not guaranteed to
hold for a MIMO interference system in which each link has its own transmitter
and receiver. With regards to maximizing the sum of utilities, we do not employ
monotonic optimization since normality of the feasible set cannot be ascertained
for general MIMO interference systems.
6.1.2. Contributions
The contributions of this chapter consist of the following.
1. We formulate the global maximization of the sum of sigmoid utilities for a
MIMO interference system as a global optimization problem with a rational
objective function.
2. We apply the moment approach in [38], [53], [39] to obtain moment relax-
ations of the rational function optimization problem. Each moment relax-
ation is expressible as a linear SDP problem. Solving a sequence of such
SDP relaxations gives rise to increasingly tight upper bounds on the global
optimal objective value of the sum of sigmoid utilities.
3. In our simulation examples, we solve our first optimization model and the
alternative model to determine the performance differences. Based on the
results, we obtain insights about how interference and data-rate requirements
can impede link-consumers’ ability to maximize their sum of utilities.
6.1.3. Organization of Chapter
The solution method in this chapter is based on techniques in [38], [53], [39]. To
aid understanding, we introduce relevant concepts in the remainder of this section.
In section 6.2, we give the problem formulation and the algorithm for computing
the global optimal sum of sigmoid utilities for a MIMO interference system. In
section 6.3, we compute and compare the average global maxima sum of utilities
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achievable by our optimization model from section 6.2 relative to the alternative
model in four simulation examples. In section 6.4, we conclude our findings.
6.2. Problem Formulation and Solution
In subsection 6.2.1, we derive a sum of utilities maximization problem formula-
tion with positive semidefinite constraints for a MIMO interference system. In
subsection 6.2.2, we re-express the sum of utilities maximization as a global op-
timization problem with polynomial constraints and a rational objective function.
We then apply the moment approach in subsection 6.2.3 to reformulate the global
optimization problem in the moment form. In subsection 6.2.4, we arrive at a
finite-dimensional moment relaxation, which is expressible as a linear SDP prob-
lem. Upon solving the linear SDP problem, we explain in subsection 6.2.5 how
to determine the global optimal objective value, and obtain solution values when
a certain condition of the moments are satisfied. Finally in subsection 6.2.6, we
specify a sequential SDP algorithm.
6.2.1. Sum of Rational Utilities Maximization for a MIMO
Interference System
We refer to the MIMO system capacity model by Ye and Blum in [101]. We
denote the index set of the MIMO links by Q, and introduce the set of Hermitian
covariance matrix inputs of the transmitter nodes as X , {Xq ∈ CnTq×nTq , q ∈
Q | Xq  0}3 where nTq is the number of antennas at the transmitter node of link
q. We assume CSI is available at the transmitters. We denote by Hq′q ∈ CnRq×nTq′ ,
q′, q ∈ Q the complex Gaussian distributed MIMO channel matrix between the
transmitter node in link q′ and the receiver node in link q, where nRq is the number
of antennas at the receiver node of link q. We elaborate the modeling details of
Hq′q in subsection 6.3.1.
We denote by Rq the total interference plus noise picked up by the receiver node
of link q. Assuming Rq is Gaussian distributed, it is expressible as
Rq , ∑
q′∈Q\{q}
ρq′qHq′qXq′H†q′q + I, ∀q ∈Q, (6.1)
where I is the identity matrix, Xq′ ∈X , and ρq′q is the interference-to-noise-ratio
3The constraints Xq ∈ CnTq×nTq and Xq  0 imply Xq = X†q .
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(INR) per unit transmit power with respect to the interference generated by the
transmitter node in link q′ but is picked up by the receiver node in link q. We
denote the mutual information of link q by λq(X ),
λq(X ), log2
[
det
(
Rq +ρqqHqqXqH†qq
)
det(Rq)
]
, ∀q ∈Q, (6.2)
where det(.) is matrix determinant, ρqq is the signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) per unit
transmit power with respect to the signal generated by the transmitter node of link
q and is picked up by the receiver node in the same link. We elaborate the modeling
details of SNR and INR in subsection 6.3.1. As explained in section 6.1, we apply
the sigmoid function on the mutual information to obtain the utility function of
link q,
uq(X ),
1
1+ τ [−aqλq(X )+bq]
, ∀q ∈Q, (6.3)
where aq ∈R++, bq ∈R++, and τ ∈R++. The data-rate needs of a link-consumer
commensurate with the magnitude of bq. For ease of modeling and demonstration
purpose, we model consumers with low data-rate needs using an arbitrary bq = 3,
and consumers with higher data-rate needs using a relatively larger value such as
bq = 6. We let τ = e (i.e. base of natural logarithm) as in [102]. Setting aq = 1log2 e
in definition (6.3), the utility functions of consumers with low and high data-rate
needs are shown in Figure 6.1. Rewriting λq(X ) of definition (6.2) in base e,
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Figure 6.1.: Utility functions 1 and 2 respectively for consumers with low (bq = 3)
and high (bq = 6) data-rate needs, q ∈Q.
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definition (6.3) becomes
uq(X ) =
[
det
(
Rq +ρqqHqqXqH†qq
)]aq log2 e[
det
(
Rq +ρqqHqqXqH†qq
)]aq log2 e
+ ebq [det(Rq)]aq log2 e
, ∀q ∈Q.
(6.4)
In order for equation (6.4) to be a rational function, we assume aq is chosen by
design to satisfy aq log2 e ∈ N. Therefore the formulation for maximizing the sum
of utilities uq(X ), q ∈ Q from equation (6.4) given a specific realization of the
channel matrices Hq′q ∈ CnRq×nTq′ , q′, q ∈Q is
ΦX : max
X
∑
q∈Q
uq(X )
s.t. tr(Xq) = Pmax,
Xq  0,
}
∀q ∈Q,
where tr(.) is matrix trace, and Pmax is the maximum power limit. Note problem
ΦX is not a linear SDP due to its rational objective function.
6.2.2. Reformulation of Problem ΦX as a Global Optimization
Problem with Polynomial Constraints and a Rational Objective
Function
Before applying the moment approach, we need to reformulate problem ΦX as a
global optimization problem with polynomial constraints. To achieve this, we first
vectorize the set of Hermitian covariance matrix inputs X to obtain x ∈ R∑q∈Q nq
where nq = n2Tq such that
x = ∏
q∈Q
vec(Xq). (6.5)
The power limit constraints of problem ΦX are readily expressible as linear con-
straints in x. In order to replace the positive semidefinite constraints of problem
ΦX with polynomial constraints, we introduce the following remark.
Remark 43 In problem ΦX , each positive semidefinite constraint Xq  0, q ∈ Q
is equivalent to enforcing non-negativity of every principal minor4 of Xq [112]. By
representing Xq as a symbolic matrix, one can obtain principal minors of Xq using
an algorithm for computing symbolic matrix determinant such as [113].
4See subsection 1.8.
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We now give an example on how to re-express a Hermitian positive semidefinite
constraint Xq  0, q ∈Q into corresponding polynomial constraints in x.
Example 1 For an arbitrary link q ∈ Q with Hermitian input Xq ∈ C2×2 where
vec(Xq) = (xq1,xq2,xq3,xq4), we have
Xq =
[
xq1 xq2 + xq3j
xq2− xq3j xq4
]
,
where j,√−1. The principal minors of Xq are xq1, xq1xq4−(xq2+xq3j)(xq2−xq3j)
and xq4. Due to Remark 43, we can replace the positive semidefinite constraint
Xq  0 in problem ΦX with the right-hand-side polynomial constraints of the
following equivalence,
Xq  0 ⇐⇒ xq1 ≥ 0, xq1xq4− x2q2− x2q3 ≥ 0, xq4 ≥ 0.
Invoking Remark 43 and vectorizing X to obtain the vector input x, the positive
semidefinite constraints Xq  0, ∀q ∈ Q and the power limit constraints tr(Xq) =
Pmax in problem ΦX are re-expressible as polynomial constraints 0 ≤ hi(xq) ∈
R[xq], ∀i ∈ I q, q ∈ Q. Denoting the feasible set of x by X, we give a result
concerning the latter.
Proposition 16 The feasible set X is real basic semialgebraic and compact.
Proof 26 See Appendix D.1. 
Replacing the rational uq(X ) in equation (6.4) with uq(x), and owing to Proposi-
tion 16, problem ΦX is re-expressible as a global optimization problem ΦX with
a rational objective function over the real basic compact semialgebraic set X.
6.2.3. Reformulating Global Optimization Problem in Moment Form
In order to reformulate problem ΦX using the moment approach in [38], [39],
we first re-express problem ΦX as a sum of utilities maximization problem with
respect to a probability measure pi ∈PX where PX is the set of all probability
measures over X. We denote the revised problem by Φpi , in which we apply the
integral operator on the sum of utilities objective in ΦX with respect to pi acting as
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the new decision variable. The reason for this step is so that the integral operator
in Φpi acting on the objective in ΦX gets to reformulate ΦX entirely in the moment
form. We express Φpi in the following proposition.
Proposition 17 Problem ΦX is equivalent to maximizing the expected sum of util-
ities,
Φpi : sup
pi∈PX
∑
q∈Q
∫
X
uq(x) dpi(x).
Proof 27 See Appendix D.2. 
Since uq(x) is a rational function, the utility of link q is expressible as a ratio
uq(x) = pq(x)/gq(x), where pq(x) ∈ R[x], 0 < gq(x) ∈ R[x]. To deal with the
rational terms, we rewrite problem Φpi in the following proposition.
Proposition 18 Introducing new measures piq ∈PX, q ∈ Q such that
∫
X dpi(x) =∫
X g1(x)dpi1(x) and
∫
X gq(x)dpiq(x) =
∫
X g1(x)dpi1(x), ∀q ∈ Q\{1}, problem Φpi is
equivalent to the following with no rational term.
Φpiq∈Q : sup
piq∈PX
∑
q∈Q
∫
X
pq(x) dpiq(x)
s.t.
∫
X
g1(x) dpi1(x) = 1,∫
X
xαgq(x) dpiq(x) =
∫
X
xαg1(x) dpi1(x), ∀α ∈ Nn0, q ∈Q\{1}.
Proof 28 See Appendix D.3. 
Remark 44 The integral operator acting on the objective and the constraints in
problem Φpiq∈Q with respect to piq∈Q results in a problem formulation expressed
entirely in the moment form. For example, the objective in Φpiq∈Q is expressible as
∑
q∈Q
∫
X
pq(x) dpiq(x) = ∑
q∈Q
∑
α∈Sd0n
pqαyqα ,
where d0 ,
⌈
deg(∑q∈Q pq(x))
⌉
, pqα is a real coefficient, and yqα =
∫
X x
α
q dpiq(x)
is a moment.
136
Remark 45 We now reformulate problem Φpiq∈Q as an optimization problem with
moment sequences in place of probability measures. To do this, we introduce the
set
Y , {y ∈ RNn0 | ∃pi ∈PX, y =
∫
X
b(x) dpi(x)}.
Assuming the polynomial constraints 0≤ hi(xq)∈R[xq], ∀i∈I q, q∈Q satisfy the
Archimedean5 property, Theorem 4.17 of [53] referencing a result in [54], states
that Y has the following positive semidefinite representation,
Y = {y ∈ RNn0 | M(y) 0, M(hi ∗ y) 0, ∀i ∈I q, q ∈Q},
where M(y) and M(hi ∗ y) are the infinite moment and localizing matrices.
Due to Remarks 44 and 45, we reformulate problem Φpiq∈Q as a moment optimiza-
tion problem with moment sequences yq ∈Y in the following proposition.
Proposition 19 A reformulation of Φpiq∈Q as an optimization problem with infinite
moment sequences is expressible as
Φyq∈Q : maxyq∈Y ∑q∈Q pq
T yq
s.t. Mq(yq) 0,
Mq(hi ∗ yq) 0, ∀i ∈I q,
}
∀q ∈Q,
∑
β∈Sdgqn
gqβ yq,β = 1, q = 1,
∑
β∈Sdgqn
gqβ yq,α+β = ∑
β∈Sdg1n
g1β y1,α+β ,∀α ∈ Nn0, q ∈Q\{1},
where dgq , deg(gq(x)), pq(x) and gq(x) are taken from Proposition 18, yq is a
moment sequence corresponding to measure piq in Proposition 18, and Mq(yq),
Mq(hi ∗ yq) are the infinite moment and localizing matrices.
Proof 29 See Appendix D.4. 
5The property is satisfiable by several means, such as introducing a redundant bound constraint
c− xT x ≥ 0 with a sufficiently large c > 0 into the existing constraint set.
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6.2.4. Solving the Moment Optimization Problem as an SDP
To solve Φyq∈Q , we relax the problem using finite (i.e. truncated) moment se-
quences yq , (yqγ)γ∈S2dn , q ∈ Q. Therefore, we arrive at the following moment
relaxation of order d ∈ N, where 2d ≥ deg(∑q∈Q uq(x)).
Φdyq∈Q : max
yq∈RS2dn
∑
q∈Q
pqT yq
s.t. Mdq (yq) 0,
Md−diq (hi ∗ yq) 0, ∀i ∈I q,
}
∀q ∈Q,
∑
β∈Sdgqn
gqβ yq,β = 1, q = 1,
∑
β∈Sdgqn
gqβ yq,α+β = ∑
β∈Sdg1n
g1β y1,α+β ,∀α ∈ S2d−max(dgq ,dg1 )n ,
∀q ∈Q\{1},
where pq(x), gq(x) are taken from Φyq∈Q , and di, dgq ∈N are defined respectively as
di , ⌈deg(hi(x))/2⌉ and dgq , deg(gq(x)). In problem Φdyq∈Q , the objective and the
equalities are affine in yq∈Q, and the nonlinear constraints are positive semidefinite
in yq∈Q. As a result, problem Φdyq∈Q is solvable as a linear SDP problem.
After solving Φdyq∈Q , a moment sequence y that corresponds to the measure pi in
Proposition 17 can be recovered from the computed yq∈Q using the following
equality since
∫
X dpi(x) =
∫
X g1(x)dpi1(x) in Proposition 18,
yα = ∑
β∈Sdgln
glβ yl,α+β , α ∈ S2d−dgln , (6.6)
where l = argminq∈Qdgq . For notational convenience, we define δ (d), d−⌈dgl/2⌉
with l taken from equality (6.6). We then use the moments of pi in y to reconstruct
the moment matrix Mδ (d)(y), which is essential for the solution-extraction proce-
dure described in the next subsection.
6.2.5. Extracting Solution From the Moment Matrix
Using a sufficiently large relaxation order d, one can either use Gloptipoly 3 by
Henrion et al. [104] or utilize an SDP solver such as [82] to solve Φdyq∈Q for
the global optimal objective value. According to [53], if Mδ (d)(y) is a flat ex-
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tension6 of Mδ (d)−1(y), then y corresponds to a measure whose support consists of
rank(Mδ (d)(y)) number of solutions. If the above flat extension criterion is satis-
fied for a given relaxation order d, then one is able to obtain the global maximizing
solutions in x using Gloptipoly 3 or the solutions-extraction procedure in [87].
6.2.6. Sequential SDP Algorithm
We highlight the steps for solving problem Φdyq∈Q .
1. Select a tolerance ξ > 0, set iteration counter to k = 1, set relaxation order
to dk ,maxq∈Q
⌈
deg(uq(x))/2
⌉
, and zk−1 =+∞.
2. Solve problem Φdkyq∈Q with an SDP solver such as [82], denote the optimal
objective value by z∗k , and the optimal moment sequence by y∗k .
3. If the flat extension criterion in subsection 6.2.5 is satisfied or z∗k−1 <+∞ and
|(z∗k − z∗k−1)/z∗k−1| ≤ ξ hold true, terminate and return (z∗k , y∗k). Otherwise,
set dk+1 = dk +1, increment k and repeat Step 2.
6.3. Numerical Example
In subsection 6.3.1, we discuss the modeling details of the MIMO interference sys-
tem. In subsection 6.3.2, we specify the system parameters used in the four simu-
lation examples. In subsection 6.3.3 we illustrate the simulation results. Recall in
subsection 6.2.1 that the channel matrices Hq′q ∈ CnRq×nTq′ are complex Gaussian
distributed. To compute the average global maxima sum of utilities achievable by
our optimization model (see problem Φdyq∈Q) and by the alternative model that op-
timizes only the eigenvalues, we produce 1000 scenarios with randomly generated
Hq′q. For each scenario, we solve our optimization model in problem Φdyq∈Q up to an
appropriate moment relaxation order d, based on the steps in subsection 6.2.6. In
subsection 6.3.4, we tabulate the performance differences between our covariance
matrices optimization model and the alternative eigenvalues optimization model.
6.3.1. MIMO Interference System Model
We use the flat Rayleigh fading narrowband MIMO channels with log-normal
shadowing in [100]. Let the index set of the MIMO links be Q. We denote the max-
imum distance between a transmitter node and the corresponding receiver node in
6See subsection 1.8.
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any link by dmax in meters. Likewise, we denote the minimum separating distance
between any two nodes in the system by dmin in meters. We set up the transmitter
and receiver nodes to reside in box areas of varying lengths in meters that influence
the interference intensity among the |Q|-links. Recall the SNR ρqq and INR ρq′q
that first appear in definition (6.1), ρq′q is defined by
ρq′q ,
(
dmax
dq′q
)γ
10(SNRmin−s)/10, ∀q′, q ∈Q,
where SNRmin dB (decibel) is required for successful link transmission, dq′q is the
distance between the transmitter node in link q′ and the receiver node in link q, γ
is the path loss exponent, and log-normal shadowing random variable s has zero
mean and standard deviation σs dB. For a MIMO channel, the Kronecker model
[114], [115] assumes that the spatial correlation of the antennas at a transmitter
node is independent and separable from the antennas’ correlation at other nodes.
To model antennas’ correlation, we adopt the correlation model in [116]. We quan-
tify antennas’ correlation at a receiver node q with cRq , and antennas’ correlation at
a transmitter node q′ with cTq′ . The MIMO channel matrix between the transmitter
node of link q′ and the receiver node of link q is defined by
Hq′q ,
1
√
nTq′
√
CRq Gq′q
√
CTq′ ∈ C
nRq×nTq′ , ∀q′, q ∈Q,
where cRq ∈R++ and cTq′ ∈R++ respectively parameterize CRq ∈ SnRq and CTq′ ∈
S
nTq′ , which form the correlation matrices of the antennas at the receiver node of
link q and at the transmitter node of link q′, and Gq′q is an independent and iden-
tically distributed circularly-symmetric and zero-mean complex Gaussian random
variable with unit variance.
6.3.2. Parameter Settings
For our simulations, we set nTq = nRq = 2, ∀q ∈ Q, dmin = 1 m, dmax = 2 m.
For log-normal shadowing, we set σS = 1 dB, γ = 3. Assuming strong antennas’
correlation, we set cRq = cTq = 0.9, ∀q ∈ Q. We also set Pmax = 1 Watt, and
SNRmin = 20 dB. We define the sigmoid utility function in equation (6.4) using
aq =
1
log2 e
, ∀q ∈ Q. In each example, we vary the box area length to influence
interference intensity, and respectively use bq = 3 and 6 to model consumers with
low and high data-rate needs.
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6.3.3. Simulation Results
Recall in subsection 6.2.2 that our model optimizes covariance matrices of the
transmitters, in contrast to the alternative model that optimizes only the eigenval-
ues. With this in mind, we refer to our optimization model by “COV” and to the
alternative model by “EIG” in the following results depicted in Figures 6.2(a)-
6.3(b).
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(a) 2 Low Data-Rate Consumers(bq = 3, q ∈ {1,2})
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Figure 6.2.: Average Global Maxima Sum Of Utilities For Networks Of 2 Link-
Consumers.
141
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
Box Area Length (meters)
Av
e.
 G
lo
b.
 M
ax
. S
um
 O
f U
tili
tie
s 
(un
it−
les
s)
 
 
COV
EIG
(a) 3 Low Data-Rate Consumers(bq = 3, q ∈ {1,2,3})
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Figure 6.3.: Average Global Maxima Sum Of Utilities For Networks Of 3 Link-
Consumers.
6.3.4. Under-Performance Due To Interference And Excessive
Data-Rate Requirement
Table 6.1 shows the differences in performance using our “COV” model over the
“EIG” model. When link-interference is weak and the application requires low
data-rates, the two setups involving 2 and 3 links with box length=12 and bq = 3
show that optimizing the “COV” model achieves less than 10% increase, mean-
ing link consumers using non-global optimal algorithms for practical reasons are
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likely to achieve near global maxima sum of utilities as long as both interference
and the data-rate requirement remain weak. When link-interference is strong but
the application requires only low data-rates, the two setups involving 2 and 3 links
with box length=4 and bq = 3 show that the “COV” model achieves 10%-20%
increase, meaning unless interference is strong, it remains possible that the link
consumers get to achieve satisfactory sum of utilities relative to the global maxima
as long as the data-rate requirement remains weak. When link-interference is weak
but the application requires high data-rates, the two setups involving 2 and 3 links
with box length=12 and bq = 6 show that the “COV” model achieves 10%-30%
increase, meaning even though interference is weak, it becomes increasingly dif-
ficult for high data-rate link-consumers to achieve global maxima sum of utilities.
When link-interference is strong and the application requires high data-rates, the
two setups involving 2 and 3 links with box length=4 and bq = 6 show that the
“COV” model achieves 40%-50% increase, meaning it becomes significantly dif-
ficult for the link-consumers to achieve global maxima sum of utilities when the
MIMO system is subject to strong interference, and concurrently has to support
intensive application-specific data-rate requirements. Although the simulation ex-
amples focus on applications with inelastic network traffic where consumer utili-
ties are modeled as sigmoid functions, insights can still be drawn to improve future
MIMO system design work. The above observations suggest that the MIMO sys-
tem designer should first evaluate whether a given system has sufficient capacity
to satisfy the data-rate requirement of the application. The designer is advised to
take mitigating steps to manage potential system interference only after the system
has passed the minimum data-rate requirement. Such a design approach enables
link-consumers using non-global optimal but practical interference-avoidance al-
gorithms to operate closer to the global maxima sum of utilities.
6.4. Conclusion
Our demonstrations in subsections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 show that solving for the instan-
taneous global maximum sum of sigmoid utilities as a global optimization problem
with a rational objective function via the moment approach is feasible. Through
optimizing the “COV” and “EIG” models, the simulation results demonstrate the
negative consequences from coercing a MIMO system subject to interference into
supporting applications with excessive data-rate requirements. The optimization
method presented in this chapter however relies on the scalability of SDP solvers.
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Table 6.1.: Percentage Increases In Average Global Maxima Sum Of Utilities Us-
ing “COV” Over “EIG” Model
Box Area Length 4 6 8 10 12
% Increase
(2 links, bq = 3)
13.3385 8.9268 6.1008 5.5196 4.9638
% Increase
(2 links, bq = 6)
42.3179 30.1159 24.2691 18.5391 14.9861
% Increase
(3 links, bq = 3)
18.9563 13.3160 11.4594 9.0686 7.0260
% Increase
(3 links, bq = 6)
50.7260 43.0928 37.1038 32.0355 26.8409
Standard solvers such as [82] based on the classical primal-dual interior point
method [117] do not readily scale up to handle larger size SDP problems, thereby
hindering the moment approach outlined in section 6.2 from handling larger net-
works. For future work, we propose exploring large-scale SDP solvers such as the
projection method in [118], [119].
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7. Evaluation
7.1. Evaluation of Achievements
1. We have given a problem formulation for computing correlated equilibria
with the highest possible expected social welfare. With the sequential SDP
algorithm, we can obtain bounds on the social welfare of the game. Since
the original formulation for correlated equilibria requires a representation of
the test function space, the bounds we obtain may be conservative.
2. The formulation of correlated equilibria based on Kantorovich polynomials
with sparsity does indeed translate into lower-dimensional positive semidefi-
nite constraints. However, the number of Bernstein basis polynomials grows
rapidly. Although the bounds we obtain using our Kantorovich-based refor-
mulation are better than those obtainable using the formulation in 1, the
obtained bounds may still be conservative.
3. The heuristic method can extract a correct discrete probability distribution
if the desired correlated equilibrium has a finite and small number of atom
solutions. In reality, there could be correlated equilibria with infinite sup-
port that may lead to unacceptable regrets. Therefore, more research needs
to be done in terms of recovering probability functions that describe more
accurately the probability measures constituting correlated equilibria.
4. Although all problem formulations in this thesis are reformulated into mo-
ment relaxations solvable as polynomial-time linear SDP problems, deter-
mining near-exact correlated equilibria with global optimal expected social
welfare still requires solving large-size moment relaxations. Therefore, the
time taken to solve large size problems remains a significant practical chal-
lenge.
5. Solving polynomial optimization problems is already NP-hard. Computing
Pareto-optimal solutions is computationally viable for small problems but
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handling medium to larger size problems remains difficult. For the wire-
less networks evaluated in this thesis, our optimization framework can han-
dle only small networks consisting of two to four links operating in either
two subchannels for the single-channel case (e.g. single channel game by
Popescu et al. [9]) or two orthogonal channels for the multichannel case
(e.g. power control game by Huang et al. [8]).
7.2. Future Work
1. To address uncertainty in the problem such as fluctuating market demands,
we turn to the parametric polynomial optimization technique in [120] by
Lasserre. To extend our existing optimization framework developed in this
thesis to handle extraneous uncertainty, we assume the uncertainty is ex-
pressible through a parameterization of the original polynomial optimization
problem using a compact continuous (i.e. non-disconnected) parameter set
U with a probability measure ϕ ∈PU with given moments γα , ∀α ∈ Nn0.
Since uncertainty can appear in the constraints, we augment the traditional
feasible input domain set X with uncertainty set U such that the new revised
feasible set K becomes
K,
{
(x,u) ∈ X×U | h j(x,u)≥ 0, j ∈I
}
,
where h j(x,u) is a polynomial constraint parameterized by u ∈ U. For con-
venience, we assume we deal with a minimization problem with polynomial
objective p(x,u) and polynomial constraints h j(x,u) ≥ 0 parameterized by
uncertainty variable u ∈ U such that
ρ , inf
pi∈PK
{∫
K
p(x,u) dpi(x,u) | pi( ˆU) = ϕ( ˆU), ∀ ˆU⊆ U
}
, (7.1)
where ˆU is a measurable subset of the uncertainty set U, pi( ˆU) is the marginal
of pi on a measurable subset of U, x is the original optimization decision vari-
able, p(x,u) is a polynomial objective parameterized by uncertainty variable
u ∈ U, and I is the index set of all constraints. Our main objective is to
solve problem (7.1). For a moment relaxation order d ∈ N, Lasserre shows
that problem (7.1) with uncertainty set U has the following semidefinite re-
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laxation,
inf
z∈S2dn
pT z
s.t. Md(z) 0,
Md−⌈deg(h j)/2⌉(h j ∗ z) 0, j ∈I ,
zα = γα , ∀α ∈ S2dn ,
(7.2)
where p is the coefficient vector of the polynomial objective p(x,u), z =
(x,u) is the vector containing the original decision variable x and the param-
eter variable u, M(z) and M(h j ∗ z) are the moment and localizing matrices,
γα are the given moments of probability measure ϕ ∈PU over U, and I
is the index set of all constraints including those defining the parameter set
U. Lasserre shows that the sequence of relaxations of the form (7.2) with
increasing relaxation order d have solutions that converge to ρ in problem
(7.1). Therefore, the above explains how to extend our existing optimiza-
tion framework to handle uncertainty through the parametric polynomial
optimization technique by Lasserre. This way, we get to improve the op-
timization framework developed in this thesis to handle uncertainties that
may appear in a volatile environment as mentioned in subsection 1.5.
2. In problem Pd of Proposition 4, we re-express the semi-infinite positive
semidefinite constraint into a quadratic module membership constraint (i.e.
sum-of-squares). Alternatively, we can also employ a general nonlinear
semi-infinite programming algorithm such as the semi-infinite programming
algorithm by Darlington et al. in [121]. The semi-infinite programming al-
gorithm checks for violations of constraints with respect to the parameter
set, and maintains a list of violated constraints to guide the iterative steps
of the optimization process. One can also try randomization methods (e.g.
Monte Carlo methods) to handle the semi-infinite semidefinite constraint.
3. In our optimization framework, the objective function can be customized
into a risk function instead of the usual social welfare objective. Con-
sider the random variable function p(x,u), u ∈ U, where U is the uncer-
tainty set used for parameterizing p(x,u) defined by p : Rn ×U → R, x is
the decision variable to be optimized, and ϕ ∈ PU is the corresponding
probability measure over the uncertainty set U. Introducing weight values
w1 > 0 and w2 > 0, it is possible to extend our optimization framework to
accommodate a risk function such as ρ(p(x,u)) = (1−w1)Eϕ(p(x,u)) +
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w1CVAR(p(x,u)) where CVAR(.) is the Conditional-Value-At-Risk func-
tion defined by CVAR(p(x,u)), infa∈R
{
a+ 11−κ Eϕ([p(x,u)−a]+)
}
where
κ = w2
w1+w2
, and [v]+ = max(0,v). To approximately minimize the risk func-
tion ρ(p(x,u)), we first reformulate the risk minimization problem parame-
terized by uncertainty u ∈ U as
inf
x∈Rn, (a,b1,b2,θ)∈R4
(1−w1)Eϕ(p(x,u))−w1θ
s.t. a+
1−b1
1−κ Eϕ(p(x,u)−a)−θ ≥ 0, ∀a ∈ A⊂ R,
b1(1−b1) = 0, b2(1−b2) = 0,
p(x,u)−a+b1Γ≥ 0, p(x,u)−a−b2Γ≥ 0,
b1 +b2 ≤ 1,
(7.3)
where b1 and b2 are constrained to be binary variables, A is a suitable real
number compact interval, Γ ∈ R++ is a sufficiently large positive number,
and θ is a lower bound of the CVAR value. We can re-express problem
(7.3) in the form (7.1) where the feasible input domain set is augmented to
become X×U×R4. This way, we can re-apply the parametric polynomial
optimization method by Lasserre.
4. This focus of this thesis is on formulating and computing near-exact ε-
correlated equilibria where ε can be kept arbitrarily small. We propose to
look into reformulating correlated equilibria that leads to a good approxima-
tion with bounds information. For this, we need real and functional analysis
tools in order to arrive at a good approximating formulation. The approx-
imating formulation will also have to be computationally tractable, and be
able to handle high problem dimensionality. Otherwise, algorithm scalabil-
ity remains an outstanding issue.
5. The approximating formulation should be analyzed for constraint qualifica-
tions such as continuity of the objective and the constraints. Without such
considerations, standard SDP solvers such as SeDuMi [122] relying on non-
smooth optimization techniques such as the conjugate gradient method may
end up producing poor quality solutions.
6. Standard SDP solvers such as CSDP [82], SeDuMi [122] and SDPT3 [123]
based on the primal-dual interior point method [117] do not readily scale
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up to handle large size SDP problems, thereby hindering the moment ap-
proach from realizing complex real-life industrial applications. We propose
exploring large-scale SDP solvers such as the projection method in [118],
[119].
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A. Proofs for Chapter 3
A.1. Miscellaneous Proofs
Proposition 20 Given l ∈N, m∈N, A∈ Slm, and B∈ Sm, (A,B)l , trl
(
AT (I⊗B))∈
Rl×l is symmetric.
Proof 30 Let A be partitioned into the block matrix


A11 Ai j . . .
A ji A22 . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

 (A.1)
where Ai j ∈Rm×m with (i, j)∈Kl . Let I⊗B∈Rlm×lm be partitioned into the block
matrix 

B 0 . . .
0 B . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

 . (A.2)
Applying block matrix multiplication, we get
trl(AT (I⊗B)) =


tr(A11B) tr(Ai jB) . . .
tr(A jiB) tr(A22B) . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

 . (A.3)
Since A and B are symmetric as given, Ai j = ATji implies tr(Ai jB) = tr(A jiB). 
Proposition 21 Given m ∈N, n ∈N, A ∈ Sm, B ∈ Sn, and column selection matri-
ces namely P ∈ Rm×n and Q ∈ Rm×n, we have 〈PT AQ, B〉= 〈A, PBQT〉.
Proof 31 It is well known that given arbitrary C ∈Rm×n and D ∈Rn×m, tr(CD) =
tr(DC). Since AQ ∈ Rm×n, PB ∈ Rm×n, PBQT ∈ Rm×m, the following can be de-
rived,
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〈
PT AQ, B〉 = tr((PT AQ)T B) = tr(QT AT PB)
= tr
(
(AQ)T PB
)
= tr
(
PB(AQ)T
)
= tr
(
PBQT AT ) = 〈A, PBQT〉 . 
Proposition 22 Given ρ ∈ N, l ∈ N, permutation matrix ∆ ∈ Rlρ×lρ , positive
semidefinite Z ∈ Slρ , and constant Λ ∈ Sρ , there exist column selection matrices
Pk ∈ Rlρ×ρ and Qk ∈ Rlρ×ρ such that
〈[
∆T Z∆
]
k , Λ
〉
=
〈
Z, ∆PkΛQTk ∆T
〉
, k ∈Kl.
Proof 32 We first expand 〈[∆T Z∆]k , Λ〉,〈[
∆T Z∆
]
k , Λ
〉
=
〈
PTk ∆T Z∆Qk, Λ
〉
=
〈
(∆Pk)T Z∆Qk, Λ
〉
.
By Proposition 21, we have〈
(∆Pk)T Z∆Qk, Λ
〉
=
〈
Z, ∆Pk Λ(∆Qk)T
〉
=
〈
Z, ∆Pk ΛQTk ∆T
〉
.
Proposition 23 Given ρ ∈ N, l ∈ N, permutation matrix ∆ ∈ Rlρ×lρ , positive
semidefinite Z ∈ Slρ , constant Λ ∈ Sρ , and an arbitrary V ∈ Sl , there exist col-
umn selection matrices Pk ∈ Rlρ×ρ , Qk ∈ Rlρ×ρ such that
〈
V, (∆T Z∆,Λ)l
〉
= ∑k∈Kl [V ]k
〈
∆Ek⊗Λ∆T ,Z
〉
. (A.4)
Proof 33 We first expand (∆T Z∆,Λ)l ,
(
∆T Z∆,Λ
)
l = trl
(
(∆T Z∆)T I⊗Λ)
=


tr
([
∆T Z∆
]
1,1 Λ
)
· · · · · ·
· · · tr([∆T Z∆]k Λ) · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·


=


〈[
∆T Z∆
]
1,1 , Λ
〉
· · · · · ·
· · · 〈[∆T Z∆]k , Λ〉 · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·

 .
(A.5)
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By Proposition 22, the r.h.s of equation (A.5) becomes


〈
Z, ∆P1,1ΛQT1,1∆T
〉
· · · · · ·
· · · 〈Z, ∆PkΛQTk ∆T〉 · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·

 . (A.6)
Therefore, we have
〈
V, (∆T Z∆, Λ)l
〉
= ∑
k∈Kl
[V ]k
〈
∆PkΛQTk ∆T , Z
〉
= ∑
k∈Kl
[V ]k
〈
∆Ek⊗Λ∆T , Z
〉
.
(A.7)

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B. Proofs for Chapter 4
B.1. Formulation For Computing Global Optimal
Correlated Equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 7:
We cast the maximization of the social welfare objective as a global polynomial
optimization problem [38] in the decision variable pi ∈PX. Introducing inequality
(4.7) with ¯L+Xq from Remark 14. as the test function space, we get problem P. 
B.2. Representing ¯L+Xq Using Kantorovich Polynomials
Definition 9 [76] The integral of f (z) ∈ L[0,1]n is strongly differentiable at a point
z0 ∈ [0,1]n if there exists a finite
lim
δ→0
1
µ(δ )
∫
δ
f (x) dµ(x), (B.1)
where δ is the hyper-rectangle interval containing z0, and µ is the Lebesgue mea-
sure.
Theorem 16 [76] For every function f (z)∈L[0,1]n , if the integral of f (z) at a point
z0 ∈ [0,1]n is strongly differentiable, then the sequence of (Kτn f )(z0) converges to
f (z0) with increasing τ .
Proof of Proposition 8:
We denote ∏i=1,...,n(τi + 1)
∫
[0,1]n χτj (z′) f (z′)dz′, τ ∈ Nn in definition (4.9) by ω j.
We let τ go to infinity such that ω j becomes equivalent to expression (B.1) by
setting δ = [ jiτi+1 ,
ji+1
τi+1 ]. Since f (z) is bounded and has finite integral over [0,1]n,
this means expression (B.1) always exists and is finite on [0,1]n. This implies
f (z) is strongly differentiable and limτ→∞(Kτn f )(z) = f (z) for every z in [0,1]n,
by Theorem 16. Therefore f (z) ∈ ¯L+[0,1]n is a linear combination of Bernstein basis
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polynomials with non-negative bounded ω j coefficients due to definition (4.9). For
uniqueness of coefficients, we first let ξ ji = jiτi and factor ∏i=1,...,n(τi + 1) out of
the ω j’s. Since we have limτi→∞[
ξ ji τi
τi+1 ,
ξ ji τi+1
τi+1 ] = ξ ji , and all members of [0,1] are
limit points of rational numbers jiτi , we have limτ→∞{
ji
τi
| ji = 0, . . . ,τi} = [0,1],
hence ω j = f (ξ ji), ξ ji ∈ [0,1]. Now consider a different bounded measurable g(z)
such that f (z) 6= g(z) only at z = ξ ji . Letting ω ′j = g(ξ ji), we have ω j 6= ω ′j, hence
showing that each f (z) within [0,1]n is a linear combination of a unique sequence
of coefficients in (ω j) j∈Dn . 
B.3. Re-expressing Problem P As An Infinite-Dimensional
Moment Optimization Problem
Proof of Proposition 9:
From problem P in Proposition 7, we have ∑q∈Q
∫
X uq(x) dpi(x) = ∑α∈Nn0 uαyα =
uT y. We then devise a moment optimization problem whose feasible set of mo-
ment sequences Y in definition (4.11) has the following semidefinite representa-
tion [54],
Y = {y ∈ RNn0 | M(y) 0, M(hk ∗ y) 0, ∀k ∈I Xq , q ∈Q}.
The moment matrix M(y) and the ocalizing matrices M(hk ∗y) enforce the moment
sequence y =
∫
X b(x) dpi(x) to correspond to a pi ∈PX. To optimize for correlated
equilibria, we invoke Proposition 8 and introduce inequality (4.10), resulting in
problem (4.12), which is the moment form of problem P. 
B.4. Deriving Finite-Dimensional Semi-Infinite
Relaxation of Problem P
Proof of Proposition 10:
Applying truncated moment sequence y∈RS2dn and degree τ = ⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋ into
problem (4.12) using Remarks 16 and 17, we get problem Pd . 
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B.5. Adding Bound Constraint To Satisfy Archimedean
property
To ensure Mrγ in the quadratic module membership constraint (4.17) satisfies the
Archimedean property, we add a redundant constraint cq−φ TCγ φCγ ≥ 0, cq ∈ R++
as suggested by Lasserre in [79].
B.6. A New Graph Extension Method To Ensure
Satisfaction Of Running Intersection Property
To ensure the maximal cliques Cγ , γ ∈ Γq in the membership constraint (4.17)
conform to the running intersection property [79], we introduce a graph extension
method called commonality extension. Given x in bold font indexes the attributes
of x ∈X = ∏q∈Q Xq, we require one assumption concerning the constraints hk(tq),
k ∈I Xq . We assume the constraints for each player q∈Q do not interfere with the
actions of another player q′ 6= q such that {i∈ x | α ∈ dsupp(hk(tq)), k ∈I Xq ,αi >
0} ∩ {i ∈ x | α ∈ dsupp(hl(tq)), l ∈I Xq′ ,αi > 0} = /0.
For the following propositions we first let φq = (wq, tq), and apply CSP matrix
construction rules (4.16) on the quadratic module membership constraint (4.15)
(i.e. pq(y,wq, tq) in inequality (4.13)) to obtain a CSP graph G(φ q,Eq). We let
wq and t q respectively index wq = (ω j)j∈D⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋nq
of inequality (4.13) and the
attributes of tq where wq∪t q = φ q, and wq∩t q = /0.
Proposition 24 Each maximal clique of G(φ q,Eq) is a complete subgraph with
members ω j and tC, for a specific j ∈wq and some C⊆ t q.
Proof 34 Applying CSP matrix construction rules (4.16) on pq(y,wq, tq) of in-
equality (4.13), the term ω jyαa jαζ tζq connects fully among ω j and {tqi | ζi > 0}.
The constraint h j(ω j), j ∈I Ωq introduces no new edge but hk(tq), k ∈I Xq at
most connects fully all attributes in tq. Since there is no cross-term ω jωl , j 6= l,
in pq(y,wq, tq) of inequality (4.13), each maximal clique contains only one ω j and
some attributes in tq. 
We denote the maximal cliques extracted from G(φ q,Eq) by Cγ , γ ∈Γq,
Proposition 25 For every j ∈ wq such that j ∈ Cγ , γ ∈ Γq, there exist γ ′ ∈ Γq,
γ ′ 6= γ , j′ ∈wq, j′ 6= j, j′ ∈ Cγ ′ where Cγ ∩t q = Cγ ′ ∩t q.
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Proof 35 Consider the r.h.s of inequality (4.13). For any j ∈wq and ζ ∈ S2dqnq such
that a jαζ 6= 0 with respect to the term ω jyαa jαζ tζq , there exists for every j′ ∈wq,
j′ 6= j, an α ′ ∈ S2dn such that a j′α ′ζ 6= 0. These cross-term relationships between tζq
and every ω j, j ∈wq imply for every maximal clique Cγ , its tq members are shared
by every other Cγ ′ , γ ′ 6= γ . 
Proposition 26 We partition Γq into Γq =
⋃
j∈wq Γ j where Γ j = {γ ∈ Γq | Cγ ∩
wq = { j}} due to Proposition 24. For a specific j ∈wq, we introduce the common-
ality collection defined as O j = {i ∈ t q | ∃k, l ∈ Γ j,k 6= l, i ∈ Ck ∩Cl ∩ t q}. Due
to Proposition 25, we have for every γ ∈ Γ j there exists j′ 6= j, γ ′ ∈ Γ j′ such that
Cγ ∩t q = Cγ ′ ∩t q. This means O j is the same for every j ∈wq. For this, we denote
O j by O. The sequence ({ j}∪O) j∈wq followed by (Cγ)γ∈Γq satisfies the running
intersection property.
Proof 36 Letting γ1, . . . ,γm,γm+1 ∈Γq be mutually exclusive, and Cγm+1∩wq = {l}
for an arbitrary l, we have

 ⋃
j∈wq
({ j}∪O)∪Cγ1 ∪ . . .∪Cγm

∩Cγm+1 ⊆ {l}∪O, (B.2)
hence satisfying the running intersection property. We let j1, . . . , jm, jm+1 ∈wq be
mutually exclusive. Considering
⋃
j∈wq{ j}∪O, we have
[({ j1}∪O)∪ . . .∪ ({ jm}∪O)]∩ ({ jm+1}∪O) =O ⊂ { j}∪O, (B.3)
for an arbitrary j ∈wq hence satisfying the running intersection property. 
Therefore we define our commonality extension of G(φ q,Eq) as the revised CSP
graph whose edges are Eq ∪
[⋃
j∈wq F({ j}∪O)
]
, where F(.) is the operator that
fully connects all vertices in its input set argument. Due to Proposition 26, the
maximal cliques extracted from the revised CSP graph satisfy the running inter-
section property as per required.
B.7. Independence Of Non-Negative Summands
Proposition 27 With respect to pq(y,ω , t) in inequality (4.13), the set of moment
sequences {y ∈ S2dn : pq(y,ω , t)≥ 0,∀(ω , t) ∈Ωq×Xq} is equivalent to {y ∈ S2dn :
pq(y,ω , t)≥ 0,∀(ω , t) ∈ {(ω , t) ∈Ωq×Rnq : ω jhk(t)≥ 0,∀( j,k) ∈wq×I Xq}}.
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Proof 37 We consider an alternative way in upholding hk(t)≥ 0, k∈I Xq , through
the augmented ωlhk(t)≥ 0, ∀l ∈wq. If there is one ωl = 0, other ωl′ 6= 0, l′ 6= l still
enforce ωl′hk(t)≥ 0. If all ωl’s are zeros, upholding hk(t)≥ 0 becomes immaterial
since the constraint pq(y,ω , t)≥ 0 in inequality (4.13) becomes trivially satisfied.

Theorem 17 [80] Assume that the sparsity structure of a constrained polynomial
is given by p(φ) = ∑γ∈Γ pγ , pγ ∈ R[φCγ ], and for every i ∈I Φ , there exists γ ∈ Γ
such that hi ∈ R[φCγ ]. Assuming further that Mγ , γ ∈ Γ generated by hi(φ), i ∈
I γ are Archimedean and the maximal cliques satisfy condition (4.18), then the
implication “if p(φ) > 0,φ ∈Φ, then p ∈ ∑γ∈Γ Mγ” holds. That is, if p(φ) > 0,
φ ∈Φ, then p(φ) = ∑γ∈Γ
[
sγ(φCγ )+∑i∈I γ si(φCγ )hi(φCγ )
]
where sγ , si ∈S φCγ .
Proposition 28 We assume the maximal cliques extracted from G(φ ,E) in sub-
section 4.4.7 are represented by Cγ ∈ Γq, and pq(y,φ) in inequality (4.13) is
re-expressible as ∑γ∈Γq pγ(φCγ ). By replacing each hi(t) ≥ 0, i ∈I Xq with the
augmented ωlhi(t), ∀l ∈ wq, and partitioning Γq =
⋃
l∈wq Γl such that Γl = {γ ∈
Γq : Cγ ∩wq = {l}}, we have
∑
γ∈Γq
pγ(y,φCγ )+ ε > 0,∀ε > 0 if and only if pl(y,φCl )≥ 0, l ∈wq, (B.4)
where
Cl =
⋃
γ∈Γl
Cγ , and ∑
l∈wq
pl(y,φCl ) = ∑
l∈wq
∑
γ∈Γl
pγ(y,φCγ ) = ∑
γ∈Γq
pγ(y,φCγ ).
Proof 38 By Proposition 27, replacing hi(t) ≥ 0 with ωlhi(t) ≥ 0, ∀l ∈ wq pre-
serves the feasible y representable by pq(y,φ)+ε > 0. To prove only-if, we invoke
Theorem 17 to obtain
∑
γ∈Γq
[
pγ(y,φCγ )
]
+ ε =
∑
γ∈Γq
[
sγ(φCγ )+ ∑
j∈Cγ∩wq
s j(φCγ )h j(φCγ∩wq)+ ∑
k∈I γ
sk(φCγ )φCγ∩wqhk(φCγ∩t q)
]
,
(B.5)
where sγ , s j, sk ∈S Cφ . Based on the above partitioning of Γq, we re-express
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equation (B.5) as
∑
l∈wq
[
∑
γ∈Γl
pγ(y,φCγ )+ εl
]
= ∑
l∈wq
∑
γ∈Γl
[
sγ(φCγ )+ ∑
j∈Cγ∩wq
s j(φCγ )h j(φCγ∩wq)+ ∑
k∈I γ
sk(φCγ )φCγ∩wqhk(φCγ∩t q)
]
.
(B.6)
The above equation (B.6) simplifies to
∑
l∈wq
pl(y,ωl, t)+ ε = ∑
l∈wq

sl(ωl, t)+ sl0(ωl, t)hl(ωl)+ ∑
k∈I Xq
slk(ωl, t)ωlhk(t)

 ,
(B.7)
where sl , sl0, slk ∈S (ωl ,t). The terms in sl0(ωl, t)hl(ωl) + ∑k∈I Xq slk(ωl, t)ωlhk(t)
are monomials with strictly non-zero exponents in ωl but the terms in sl(ωl, t) can
be monomials of the type alζ tζ or constants bl where alζ , bl ∈ R, and ζ ∈ Nnq0 .
Since there is no tζ on the l.h.s of equation (B.7), we have ∑l alζ = 0. For a fixed l,
recall from section 1.8 that sl(ωl, t) = b((ωl, t),S|(ωl ,t)|)T Zlb((ωl, t),S|(ωl ,t)|), Zl 
0, which implies alζ , ζ ∈ 2Nnq0 appear as diagonal entries in the positive semidefi-
nite Zl . Since all principal minors of Zl must be positive semidefinite, the diagonal
entries in Zl corresponding to alζ must be non-negative. Since ∑l alζ = 0, we
have alζ = 0, l ∈ wq, ζ ∈ 2Nnq0 . Now consider a fixed l and an alζ , ζ /∈ 2Nnq0 ,
which appears in the same row or column with an alζ ′ , ζ ′ ∈ 2Nnq0 resting on the
diagonal of Zl . Since alζ ′ = 0 based on the above argument, and any 2× 2 prin-
cipal minor in Zl can have alζ ′ as its lower right entry and the two symmetric
alζ ’s as its off-diagonal entries, we have alζ = 0, ζ /∈ 2Nnq0 . The l.h.s of (B.7)
has ε , therefore ∑l bl = ε . Since bl is a 1× 1 leading principal minor of Zl , each
sl(ωl, t) term contributes exactly one non-negative bl such that ∑l bl = ε is sat-
isfied. Therefore for each l ∈ wq, we let εl = bl , and we have pl(y,ωl, t)+ εl =
sl(ωl, t)+ sl0(ωl, t)hl(ωl)+∑k∈I Xq slk(ωl, t)ωlhk(t). The only-if part of equiva-
lence (B.4) implies for every l ∈wq, pl(y,ωl, t)+ εl ∈ Ml , ∀εl > 0, which leads to
pl(y,ωl, t)≥ 0 due to Theorem 2, where Ml is generated by hi(t), i ∈I l such that
I l = {i∈I Φq : hi ∈R[φCl ]} indexes constraints that correspond to the l-th max-
imal clique. For the if-part, since pl(y,φCγ )≥ 0, l ∈wq ⇒ ∑γ∈Γq pγ(y,φCγ )≥ 0, it
is obvious that ∑γ∈Γq pγ(y,φCγ )+ ε > 0, ∀ε > 0 holds. 
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B.8. Derivation Of Primal Formulation
Proof of Proposition 11:
Wrt. inequality (4.13), we let φq = (wq, tq), wq indexes wq = (ω j)j∈D⌊2(d−δq)/nq⌋nq , andφ q indexes the attributes in φq. We denote the concatenation of jth unit vector
e j ∈ {0,1}len(wq) and degree vector ζ ∈ S2dqnq by e j|ζ . By Remark 23 and Theorem
5 of [80], the quadratic module membership constraint (4.17) holds true. Recall
the expression pq(y,wq, tq) in inequality (4.13), the membership constraint (4.17)
is expressible as
∑
j∈wq
∑
ζ∈S2dqnq
[
∑
α∈S2dn
a jαζ yα
]
φ e j|ζ + ε = ∑
γ∈Γq
[
sγ(φCγ )+ ∑
i∈I γ
si(φCγ )hi(φCγ )
]
,
(B.8)
where Cγ ⊂ φ q, γ ∈Γq refer to the maximal cliques extracted according to subsec-
tion 4.4.7, sγ(φCγ ) ∈S S
r/2
φCγ , si(φCγ ) ∈S S
r′i/2
φCγ , and r
′
i +
(
1− (−1)deg(hi(φCγ ))
)
/2 =
r−deg[hi(φCγ )]. Expanding the r.h.s of equation (B.8), we have
s
r′i
i (φCγ )hi(φCγ ) = br
′
i/2(φCγ )T Z′i br
′
i/2(φCγ )hi(φCγ ), i ∈I γ ,
srγ(φCγ ) = br/2(φCγ )T Zγ br/2(φCγ ),

 γ ∈Γq, (B.9)
where Z′i ∈ Ss(|Cγ |,r
′
i/2), Zγ ∈ Ss(|Cγ |,r/2) are positive semidefinite matrices [50], [53].
To simplify equations (B.8)-(B.9), we first rewrite a jαζ yαφ e j|ζ in equation (B.8) as
aαβ yαφ βCγ with β ∈ Sr|Cγ | such that r≥ 2dq+1 since |ζ | ≤ 2dq and |e j|= 1. We use
the same approach in section 5 of [51] in the following derivations. Introducing
constant matrices Λ′iβ ∈ Ss(|Cγ |,r
′
i/2), Λγβ ∈ Ss(|Cγ |,r/2) such that
br′i/2(φCγ )br′i/2(φCγ )T hi(φCγ ) = ∑β∈Sr′i|Cγ |
Λ′iβ φ βCγ , i ∈I γ ,
br/2(φCγ )br/2(φCγ )T = ∑β∈Sr|Cγ | Λγβ φ
β
Cγ ,

 γ ∈Γq,
equations (B.9) are re-expressible as
br′i/2(φCγ )T Z′ibr
′
i/2(φCγ )hi(φCγ ) = ∑
β∈Sr′i|Cγ |
tr(Z′iΛ′iβ )φ βCγ , i ∈I γ ,
br/2(φCγ )T Zγbr/2(φCγ ) = ∑
β∈Sr|Cγ |
tr(ZγΛγβ )φ βCγ ,


γ ∈Γq.
(B.10)
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Since r ≥ r′, we focus only on r. Equating coefficients of the monomials φ β , β ∈
Sr|Cγ | on the l.h.s of equation (B.8) with coefficients of the monomials on the r.h.s
of equations (B.10) with respect to equation (B.8), we obtain the following con-
straints for replacing the semi-infinite correlated equilibria constraints in problem
Pd of Proposition 10,
∑
α∈S2dn
aαβ yα + εβ − ∑
i∈I γ
tr
(
Z′iΛ′iβ
)
− tr(ZγΛγβ)= 0, ∀β ∈ Sr|Cγ |,
Z′i  0, Zγ  0, i ∈I γ ,


γ ∈Γq,
q ∈Q,
where I γ is from quadratic module membership constraint (4.17), εβ = ε if |β |=
0 else εβ = 0, and d from Proposition 10. Updating problem Pd with the above
constraints, we get problem Pd,r. 
C. Proofs for Chapter 5
C.1. Proof of Proposition 13
The objective is derived from expectation of the social welfare function. The con-
straints formulating exact correlated equilibria come from Corollary 2.14 of [31].

C.2. Proof of Proposition 14
Using the same approach in section 2.1 of [39], problem Φpiq∈Q is a direct conse-
quence of replacing pi with measures piq∈Q by enforcing the equalities
∫
B dpi(x) =∫
B g1(x)dpi1(x) and
∫
B gq(x)dpiq(x) =
∫
B g1(x)dpi1(x), ∀B⊆ X, q ∈Q\{1}. 
C.3. Proof of Proposition 15
In order to rewrite Φpiq∈Q as an optimization problem over moment sequences in-
stead of probability measures, we introduce the following set,
Y , {y ∈ RNn0 | ∃pi ∈PX, y =
∫
X
b(x) dpi(x)}.
Assuming hq j(x) for all q ∈ Q, j ∈I q satisfy the Archimedean1 property, The-
orem 4.17 of [53] referencing a result in [54], states that Y has the following
semidefinite representation,
Y = {y ∈ RNn0 | M(y) 0, M(hq j ∗ y) 0, j ∈I q, q ∈Q},
where M(y) and M(hq j ∗ y) are the infinite moment and localizing matrices. We
now devise a moment optimization problem with feasible set (yq)q∈Q ∈ ∏q∈QY .
1The property is satisfiable by several means, such as introducing a redundant bound constraint
c− xT x ≥ 0 with a sufficiently large c > 0 into the existing constraint set.
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From problem Φpiq∈Q , we have ∑q∈Q
∫
X pq(x)dpiq(x) = ∑α∈Nn0 pqαyq,α = pqT yq.
Enforcing the constraints in Φpiq∈Q through their moments, we obtain Φyq∈Q . 
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D. Proofs for Chapter 6
D.1. Proof of Proposition 16
The constraints in problem ΦX are expressible as polynomial constraints hi(xq),
i ∈ I q, meaning the feasible set is real basic semialgebraic by definition [53].
Moreover, the same constraints in ΦX enforce the diagonals of each Hermitian
input Xq, q ∈ Q to be compact. To prove compactness of the off-diagonals in
Xq, recall that the positive semidefinite constraints in ΦX require every principal
minor to be non-negative [112]. Let such a minor be x j jxkk − o jko†k j where x j j,
xkk ∈ R+ are the jth and kth diagonal elements of an arbitrary Xq, and o jk ∈ C is
the off-diagonal at the jth row and kth column. The product x j jxkk is non-negative
and upper bounded, meaning the feasible set of o jk is compact. 
D.2. Proof of Proposition 17
Problem ΦX is a standard global polynomial optimization problem. According to
Lasserre in [38], problem ΦX is equivalent to the following problem where the
feasible set X is replaced by PX,
sup
pi∈PX
∑
q∈Q
∫
X
uq(x) dpi(x),
which completes the proof. 
D.3. Proof of Proposition 18
Using the same approach in subsection 2.1 of [39], problem Φpiq∈Q is a direct
consequence of replacing pi with measures piq∈Q while enforcing the equalities∫
B dpi(x)=
∫
B g1(x)dpi1(x) and
∫
B gq(x)dpiq(x)=
∫
B g1(x)dpi1(x), ∀B⊆X, q∈Q\{1}.

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D.4. Proof of Proposition 19
In order to rewrite Φpiq∈Q as an optimization problem over moment sequences in-
stead of probability measures, we recall the set of moment sequences Y in Re-
mark 45. We derive a moment optimization problem with feasible set (yq)q∈Q ∈
∏q∈QY . From problem Φpiq∈Q , we have ∑q∈Q
∫
X pq(x)dpiq(x) = ∑α∈Nn0 pqαyq,α =
pqT yq. Enforcing the equalities in Φpiq∈Q through their moments, we obtain Φyq∈Q .

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